MacLeod v. Vest Transportation Company, GC6361.

• Decision Date: 25 September 1964
• Docket Number: No. GC6361.,GC6361.
• Citation: 235 F. Supp. 369
• Parties: Douglas MacLEOD and Thomas L. Cashion, Plaintiffs, v. VEST TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

235 F. Supp. 369

Douglas MacLEOD and Thomas L. Cashion, Plaintiffs, v. VEST TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Defendant.

No. GC6361.

United States District Court N. D. Mississippi, Greenville Division.

September 25, 1964.

Philip Mansour, Greenville, Miss., for plaintiffs.

W. C. Keady, Keady, Campbell & DeLong, Greenville, Miss., for defendant.

CLAYTON, District Judge.

Clemmie J. Adams was a member of the crew of a motor vessel and its tow operating on the Mississippi River near East Muscatine, Illinois, when he died as a result of a marine casualty on September 27, 1963. This vessel was owned and operated by Vest Transportation Company. Adams was survived by his widow, Mrs. Floriece Adams, and two minor children.

Complaint was filed in this court by Douglas MacLeod and Thomas L. Cashion, both of whom are attorneys. One of them resides in Arkansas and the other in Missouri. They seek to enjoin Vest Transportation Company and its insurance carriers from negotiating or in any way attempting to settle the claim arising out of the death of Clemmie J. Adams with anyone except them, alleging that Mrs. Adams contracted with them to represent her in a claim for damages for the benefit of herself and her minor children for the death of Clemmie J. Adams under the provisions of the Jones Act and general maritime law whereby plaintiffs were to receive a contingent fee for their said representation. They allege that they began working under this contract and notified an attorney for Vest Transportation Company that they were representing Mrs. Adams and her children. The allegations of the complaint upon which the prayer for injunction is based are as follows:

"That notwithstanding this notice, the defendant and/or its attorneys and insurance carrier have attempted to negotiate a settlement of this claim directly with Mrs. Floriece Adams and have induced her to breach her contract with the plaintiffs."

The complaint also alleges:

"That the said Mrs. Floriece Adams has written to the plaintiffs informing them that she no longer desires their services and that she will reimburse them for the expenses incurred by them in representing her after she has received the proceeds of a settlement with the defendant."

The complaint also contains allegations of value as to the claim and to the effect that plaintiffs will be damaged by reason of the threatened action of the defendant.

The defendant has filed a motion, under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for a summary judgment and this motion is before the court on affidavits and briefs of the parties.

The facts in this record which are material to a disposition of the aforementioned motion are not in dispute. Mrs. Adams is a resident of Louisiana. Before September 29, 1963, she did not know either of the plaintiffs or know anything about them. On that date plaintiff, Cashion, came to see her at Gay's Funeral Home at Oak Grove, Louisiana, while she was arranging for the funeral of her deceased husband, and there obtained from her a letter contract which was typed out on stationery of this funeral home. This document was addressed to the two plaintiffs and undertook to employ them to represent Mrs. Adams and her two minor children on a contingent fee basis for the handling of the aforementioned death claim against Vest "Towing" Company of Greenville, Mississippi. It was signed by Mrs. Adams and accepted for plaintiffs by Cashion. The funeral of the deceased seaman took place in Louisiana on October 1, 1963. On the day following the funeral, Cashion visited Mrs. Adams in her home near Delhi, Louisiana, and discussed matters pertaining to the deceased. On October 4, Mrs. Adams, on the advice of a Louisiana lawyer who had been on close terms with her deceased husband, telephoned Cashion and told him that she wanted to end his employment and Mr. MacLeod's immediately, but that she would, of course, protect them on any expense and for payment of any time they had spent or work they had done up to that point. She shortly received a letter from Cashion asking why she wanted to cancel the contract and she immediately wrote him a note confirming what she had told him on the telephone. That letter reads as follows:

"As I told you in our conversation on the phone October 4, 1963, that I do not want either you or Mr. MacLeod to represent me on this case. I was under shock at the time I talked to you September 29, 1963. If you will send me an itemized statement of the expense, I will reimburse them after settlement."

There is a complete absence of evidence to show that defendant, Vest Transportation Company, caused in any way the aforementioned actions of Mrs. Adams with respect to the said contract with plaintiffs. In fact, all the evidence is to the contrary.

Defendant contends that since all of the acts complained of in this case took place in Louisiana, then the law of that state must control. The minority rule which obtains in that state is that one who is not a party to a contract is not liable in damages to one of the parties to such contract for inducing the other party to breach it. See Stringer v. Consumers Credit Corp., 234 Miss. 240, 105 So.2d 756 (1958); B. J. Wolf & Sons v. New Orleans Tailor-Made Pants Co., 113 La. 388, 37 So. 2, 67 L.R.A. 65 (1904); Robert Heard Hale, Inc. v. Gaiennie, 102 So.2d 324 (La.Ct.App.1958); Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F.Supp. 37 (W.D.La. 1957), and New Orleans Opera Guild, Inc. v. Local 174, Musicians M. P. U., 242 La. 134, 134 So.2d 901 (1961), all of which support the rule as above stated. If inducement by a third party to breach a contract is not actionable in damages, no injunction would lie here against defendant.

Plaintiffs contend that the law of Louisiana does not control since the contract was not to be performed in that state and cite section 766, Restatement of the Law of Torts, in support of their contention that they should be able to maintain this action. But that section, even if taken as authoritative, has to do with a right against a person who "induces or otherwise purposely causes a third person not to

"a) perform a contract with another, or

"b) enter into or continue a business relation with another. * * *"

And, as has been said, there is a complete absence of evidence in this record that defendant in this case had anything at all to do with the actions of Mrs. Adams with respect to termination of her contract with plaintiffs...