Maclin v. Paulson
Decision Date | 14 April 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 79-1539,79-1539 |
Citation | 627 F.2d 83 |
Parties | Jerome R. MACLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Deputy Sheriff PAULSON et al., Defendants-Appellees. . Heard |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Christopher L. Varner, Jenner & Block, Barry Sullivan, Jerold Solovy, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
David C. Field, Spangler, Jennings, Spangler & Dougherty, Gary, Ind., for defendants-appellees.
Before FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge, CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge and JAMESON, Senior District Judge. *
Plaintiff, an Indiana state prisoner, filed a civil rights damage action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Charles Boone, Chief of Police in Gary, Indiana. In that pro se complaint, he alleged that he was (1) arrested and beaten by Boone on February 17, 1978, while in custody, (2) denied medical treatment by Boone following the beating, and (3) denied the right to call legal counsel during pretrial detention. He sought a declaratory judgment and $50,000 in damages. Plaintiff asserted that Boone had violated plaintiff's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
In September 1978, plaintiff filed four additional pro se civil rights actions. The first was against Deputy Sheriff Paulson of Lake County, Indiana. In this complaint Maclin alleged that Paulson denied him medical treatment, refused to permit him to call an attorney and permitted him to be beaten "by unknown inmates" while in Paulson's custody. In this complaint he also sought $50,000 in damages, asserting that his Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated by Paulson.
The second September 1978 complaint was against Gary Police Department "Arresting Officer No. 1," stating that plaintiff was beaten by Arresting Officers No. 1 and 2 on February 17, 1978, while in the detention unit at the Gary, Indiana, police station. He also asserted that both officers denied him medical treatment after the beating and refused to permit him to call a lawyer "and see a judge without unnecessary delay." Plaintiff again claimed that his Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated and that he was entitled to $50,000 in damages.
The third September complaint was against Gary Police Department "Arresting Officer No. 2" and alleged the same facts as against Arresting Officer No. 1, and identical relief was sought.
The final September complaint was against the Lake County jail physician, whose name does not appear in the complaint. The gravamen of this complaint was that said defendant had denied Maclin medical attention after he had obtained a court order, thus violating plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff renewed his previous requests for $50,000 in damages. According to the notice of appeal (App. A-42), the physician is named Dr. Greuteris.
After the four September 1978 complaints were filed, Judge Sharp granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on September 21, 1978. A week later, Judge Sharp consolidated the July 1978 complaint (No. H-78-309) with the four September complaints (all numbered S-78-207), and on November 1, 1978, Sheriff Paulson and the Lake County jail physician filed an answer denying the key allegations against them. Also on November 1st, Chief of Police Boone and Arresting Officers 1 and 2 filed their answer denying the allegations against them. The John Doe officers simultaneously moved the court to dismiss the complaints against them on the grounds that the summonses to the arresting police officers did not properly contain their names and that the complaints against them failed to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. They and Boone also moved for a more definite statement with respect to the complaints because they were "vague, indefinite and ambiguous" and because plaintiff had not named the arresting police officers. Therefore, Boone and the arresting officers asked Judge Sharp to require plaintiff to file an amended complaint.
On January 4, 1979, Judge Sharp entered an order in response to Boone's and the two police officers' motion for a more definite statement. In granting that motion, the district judge ordered plaintiff "to file an amended complaint stating specifically the time, place and exact conduct of each defendant that is claimed to be a constitutional violation." The court declined to rule on the motion to dismiss "since it in no way complies with Rule 7(b) of the local rules of court." (App. A-28.)
Eight days thereafter the two arresting officers asked the court to set aside the service of summonses and to dismiss the amended complaint against them because copies of the summonses and amended complaint had been served upon the Gary Police Department rather than at their dwelling houses or usual places of abode. Two days later, Judge Sharp set aside the service of the summonses and dismissed the action as to the "John Doe" defendants, viz., the two arresting officers, stating that:
" 'Doe' pleading is not permitted by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that accordingly, said 'Doe' defendants are entitled to be dismissed and are stricken from the plaintiff's Amended Complaint." (App. A-34.)
A few days later, Police Chief Boone requested the district court to dismiss the complaint as to him on the ground that plaintiff's amended complaint did not state "specifically the time, place and exact conduct of Charles Boone that is claimed to be a Constitutional violation" (App. A-35). In response, plaintiff wrote a letter to the court in which he stated that he alleged all that he knew and that his lack of counsel imperiled his efforts to be more specific as to Boone's conduct (App. A-38). Nevertheless, on February 20, Judge Sharp dismissed the complaint with respect to Boone "since no personal involvement is alleged or suggested" (App. A-39).
Finally, on May 4, the judge entered his last order on the consolidated cases, denying plaintiff's petition for appointment of counsel and holding that the July complaint and the amended complaint did not state a claim against any defendant (App. A-40). The appeal is from that order. On October 19, this Court appointed counsel for plaintiff on appeal. After reviewing the various briefs and hearing oral argument, we reverse and remand the case.
Including the amended complaint, plaintiff filed six civil rights actions on forms provided by the district court. In each complaint, he claimed that his constitutional rights had been violated, and his claims were supported with brief factual statements. As required by Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure each complaint contained "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Such notice pleadings are sanctioned by the civil rules, with the pleadings to be "liberally construed." Roberts v. Acres, 495 F.2d 57, 58-59 (7th Cir. 1974). Evidentiary matters need not be pleaded (Rohler v. TRW, Inc., 576 F.2d 1260, 1264 (7th Cir. 1978)) and it is a truism that pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those prepared by counsel. French v. Heyne, 547 F.2d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 1976).
Applying the above standards to the complaints herein, we hold that they should not have been dismissed. The allegations that Boone denied plaintiff medical care and beat him plainly state claims. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251; Davis v. Murphy, 559 F.2d 1098, 1102 (7th Cir. 1977). If Boone did not personally beat plaintiff but was present when his officers beat him, or if Boone had ordered the beating, he would be liable. Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972); McDonald v. State of Illinois, 557 F.2d 596, 602 (7th Cir. 1977), certiorari denied, 434 U.S. 966, 98 S.Ct. 508, 54 L.Ed.2d 453. The complaint against Boone is not based on a theory of respondeat superior but is adequate since it is based on his personal wrongdoing and "police behavior which is the product of * * * (his) active encouragement and direction * * * or as a result of * * * mere acquiescence in such behavior." Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 626-627 (7th Cir. 1979). Also, if plaintiff was denied the right to call an attorney or was denied a right to have counsel present during his interrogation in Boone's custody, the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments would be implicated. Consequently, the complaint against Boone was viable, 1 as defense counsel admitted at oral argument.
Plaintiff has claimed that the jail physician denied him medical care in violation of a court order (App. A-20). This allegation is also sufficient. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251.
Paulson allegedly beat plaintiff and denied him the right to call an attorney. As seen from our discussion of the complaint against Boone, such allegations are sufficient to state a claim...
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