Maclin v. Sbc Ameritech

Decision Date01 April 2008
Docket NumberNo. 07-1751.,07-1751.
Citation520 F.3d 781
PartiesMildred MACLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SBC AMERITECH, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Clara L. Larry (argued), Larry & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kevin D. Kelly (argued), Lord Bissell & Brook, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before RIPPLE, SYKES and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Mildred Maclin brought this action against her employer, Ameritech, alleging discrimination on the basis of disability, race and gender.1 After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted Ameritech's motion in its entirety. Ms. Maclin then appealed to this court.2 For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I BACKGROUND
A.

Ms. Maclin began working for Ameritech in 1994. By June 2001, she had been promoted to area manager, a second-level management position that has a salary and bonus potential in what Ameritech refers to as the MT market zone. In January or February of 2003, Ms. Maclin accepted a demotion in lieu of being laid off; she became a first-level manager with a salary and bonus potential in the MU market zone. At Ameritech, an employee's salary and bonus potential is determined by her pay grade, not her title. The MU market zone is one step below the MT pay grade; accordingly, it has a lower salary range and a smaller potential bonus.

In fall 2003, Ms. Maclin participated in developing what later became known as Bid Central, a new group at Ameritech. While Bid Central was being developed, it called its MU-level employees implementation engineers. Later, once the group became formalized, employees in the MU pay grade at Bid Central became known as complex bids managers. When Ms. Maclin was transferred to Bid Central, she remained a first-level manager with a salary in the MU market zone.

Bruce Gregory became Ms. Maclin's supervisor around October 2003. Gregory assigned Ms. Maclin to the team lead role in the group. On October 16, 2003, Ms. Maclin's official title at Bid Central became area manager of complex bids.3 This assignment as team lead and the change in title did not change her salary or bonus potential; she remained in the MU market zone. Although Ms. Maclin was not second-level management and was not in the MT market zone when she was team lead, she did have administrative and supervisory duties that other complex bids managers in the MU market zone at Bid Central did not have.

Ms. Maclin was injured in a car accident in December 2003. She took a medical leave of absence that began on December 17, 2003, approximately two months after she became the team lead at Bid Central. On December 23, 2003, Gregory appointed Dave Gentilini, a white male, as interim team lead in Ms. Maclin's absence.4 While Ms. Maclin was still on medical leave, however, Gregory decided to make Gentilini the permanent team lead. In discussions with the human resources department, he stated that he had seen performance problems with her work, including incomplete or incorrectly performed assignments and mishandled projects. He also stated that Gentilini had performed exceptionally well in the position and that, by the time Ms. Maclin returned to work, Gentilini had held the position more than twice as long as she had held it.

Gregory also changed the nature of the team lead role during Ms. Maclin's absence. During Ms. Maclin's tenure as team lead, Gregory had been working with other departments at Ameritech to establish Bid Central and had relied on the team lead to act as a focal point for the concerns of the other complex bids managers. By the time Ms. Maclin returned to full-time work in June 2004, however, Bid Central was no longer in its formative stages. The team lead role lost its administrative duties and the other bids managers began reporting directly to Gregory rather than the team lead. In the modified team lead position that Gentilini held, none of the other complex bids managers reported to him. He also never performed the administrative duties that Ms. Maclin had performed before her leave, such as approving time sheets and reimbursement forms.

Ms. Maclin was not assigned to the modified team lead role when she returned from her medical leave. About a month before she returned to full-time work, her title was changed officially to complex bids manager. The change did not affect her salary range and bonus potential; she remained in the MU salary range where she had been before her leave. She did not possess the additional supervisory and administrative responsibilities she had held before her absence, but neither did Gentilini possess those duties in the modified team lead position.

Ameritech's compensation guidelines list several factors that determine whether, and in what amount, a pay increase will be awarded and the amount of that award. One factor is the employee's current salary compared to that salary grade's target range. The guide also contains a matrix for determining the combined salary increase and bonus payment that an employee may receive. The matrix considers two factors: (1) current salary relative to that salary level's range, and (2) the employee's performance evaluation. An employee like Ms. Maclin, with a salary in the top third of her salary range who met, but did not exceed, her supervisors' expectations, may receive a combined raise and bonus not to exceed two percent of her salary. An employee like Gentilini, with a salary in the middle to lower end of the MU range who performed exceptionally well, qualifies under Ameritech's system for a larger combined raise and bonus.

In 2004, Ameritech awarded bonuses and pay raises based on the employee's performance in 2003. It awarded Ms. Maclin a 1.5% pay increase and a 1.5% lump sum bonus. Her combined pay raise and bonus exceeded the total that, according to Ameritech's compensation guidelines, she should have received for that year. Gentilini received a combined pay increase and bonus of 4% of his salary, an amount within the range prescribed by Ameritech's compensation guidelines for a person with his salary and performance review. Even after the raises were given, however, Gentilini was paid less than Ms. Maclin. He and two other members of Bid Central also were given an additional discretionary bonus that Ms. Maclin was not awarded.

B.

Ms. Maclin brought this action against Ameritech on April 27, 2005. She claimed that, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., Ameritech had failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. She also claimed that Ameritech had demoted her from the team lead position because of her disability, in violation of the ADA, and because of her race and gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Finally, she claimed that Ameritech had discriminated against her on the basis of her disability, race and gender when Ameritech set her pay raise and when it denied her a discretionary bonus. Ms. Maclin did not allege any violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.

After discovery, Ms. Maclin and Ameritech filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Ameritech on each of Ms. Maclin's claims. Ms. Maclin timely appealed.

II DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court's decision to grant summary judgment. Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 516 (7th Cir.2007). Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Krieg, 481 F.3d at 516. When considering cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must construe all inferences in favor of the party against whom the particular motion is made. Krieg, 481 F.3d at 516. The nonmoving party cannot succeed by resting on its pleadings; it must provide evidence on which a jury reasonably could find in its favor. Squibb v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir.2007). "We may affirm a summary judgment on any ground that finds support in the record where the ground has been adequately presented in the trial court so that the non-moving party had an opportunity to submit affidavits or other evidence and contest the issue." Lawshe v. Simpson, 16 F.3d 1475, 1483 (7th Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. ADA Claims

Ms. Maclin contends that she is disabled and that Ameritech discriminated against her on the basis of this disability. The district court determined that Ms. Maclin was not disabled as that term is defined by the ADA. Because a "plaintiff seeking to avoid summary judgment must demonstrate that there is at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [she] is disabled," Squibb, 497 F.3d at 780, the court granted summary judgment to Ameritech on all of Ms. Maclin's ADA claims.

The ADA prohibits discrimination against a "qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). It defines a disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more ... major life activities."5 Id. § 12102(2)(A). An employee is disabled if she "is unable to perform [a major life] activity or is `significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which' she can perform it, as compared to an average person in the general population." Squibb, 497 F.3d at 781 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)) (alteration omitted). "Whether a particular impairment substantially limits a major life activity is a case-specific, individualized inquiry." Id.

Ms. Maclin submits that she is limited in the major life activity of sitting because she cannot sit for more than two hours at a time without severe pain. We...

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