MacMurray v. Bd. of Trustees of Bloomsburg SC, Civ. No. 76-1181

• Decision Date: 04 April 1977
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 76-1181
• Citation: 428 F. Supp. 1171
• Parties: Dr. Robert R. MacMURRAY, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG STATE COLLEGE et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

428 F. Supp. 1171

Dr. Robert R. MacMURRAY, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG STATE COLLEGE et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 76-1181

United States District Court, M. D. Pennsylvania.

January 28, 1977.

As Amended February 8 and April 4, 1977.

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Jon C. Lyons, Robert B. Elion, Robert B. Wayne, Williamsport, Pa., for plaintiff.

Jeffrey Cooper, Norman J. Watkins, Deputy Attys. Gen., J. Justin Blewitt, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Chief, Civil Litigation, Robert P. Kane, Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Harrisburg, Pa., John C. Youngman, Williamsport, Pa., for defendants.

OPINION

MUIR, District Judge.

Dr. Robert R. MacMurray, a professor at Bloomsburg State College, has filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 alleging that Dr. James H. McCormick the President of Bloomsburg State College, the Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, and John Pittenger, the Secretary of Education of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have violated his constitutional rights by terminating his employment without prior notice or a hearing in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. MacMurray also claims that Dr. T. J. Saini, Chairman of the Economics Department of Bloomsburg State College has violated his First Amendment rights, and has maliciously interfered with his contract rights and harassed him. MacMurray alleges that Saini began a campaign to have him dismissed because of his refusal to support Saini in the latter's effort to be elected President of the local chapter of the Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties. On May 24, 1974, MacMurray signed an agreement with Bloomsburg State College whereby he agreed to take graduate courses in economics on the condition that the college grant him leave with pay for the fall semester of the 1974-1975 school year. On May 28, 1974, MacMurray received notification that he had been granted tenure as a professor at Bloomsburg. On August 5, 1974, MacMurray informed James H. McCormick, President at Bloomsburg State College, that he would not abide by the agreement of May 24, 1974. On January 8, 1975, McCormick wrote a letter to Dr. MacMurray in which he stated that he was terminating him for his refusal to abide by the agreement. McCormick stated that a college must be operated in an orderly and logical manner and agreements between the President of the College and faculty members must be honored. On January 15, 1975, McCormick, the President of Bloomsburg State College, told the Board of Trustees of that institution of his termination of MacMurray. According to an affidavit submitted by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees in support of their motion for summary judgment, it took no action except to acknowledge the receipt of this information. As a result of this termination, Dr. MacMurray was prevented from teaching at Bloomsburg State College from January 8, 1975 until September 11, 1975. MacMurray claims that his salary was also terminated as of January 8, 1975 for a period of approximately two months.

From February 28, 1975 until he was reinstated on September 11, 1975, he was paid his full salary by Bloomsburg State College as required by the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, MacMurray being one of the professors specifically covered by the provisions of this agreement. MacMurray, pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, invoked its grievance proceedings. The Secretary of Education of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, John Pittenger, according to his affidavit, responded in writing to MacMurray's grievance and denied it. As provided by the collective bargaining agreement, MacMurray submitted his claim to arbitration pursuant to Article IV, Section (d). As a result of the arbitration, he was reinstated as a professor at Bloomsburg State College.

Pittenger and the Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg have filed a motion to dismiss MacMurray's complaint contending that he has not set forth their personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation and that the Complaint is vague and conclusory as to them. The Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College has also moved to dismiss the complaint claiming that the Board partakes of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity and therefore cannot be sued in a federal court because of the terms of the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. Pittenger, McCormick, and the Board of Trustees also seek to dismiss this action and in the alternative move for summary judgment, on the grounds that MacMurray's constitutional rights were not violated and that if his rights were violated they acted in good faith. The Defendant Saini has filed a motion to dismiss MacMurray's complaint claiming that his action is barred by the statute of limitations and that the Court should not take jurisdiction over the pendant state causes of action. The Court will consider these motions seriatim.

The motion of Pittenger and the Board of Trustees to dismiss MacMurray's complaint alleges that as to them it is conclusory and does not set forth facts which indicate personal involvement. Only paragraph 47 of MacMurray's complaint contains any allegation of facts relating to supposed unconstitutional acts by Pittenger and the Board of Trustees. Paragraph 47 states that Pittenger and the Board of Trustees failed to afford MacMurray a hearing prior to a summary termination on January 8, 1975 and that this was done in bad faith, was intentional, willful, and a knowing violation of MacMurray's rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Although notice pleading is generally sufficient, this Circuit has found it necessary to impose a specific pleading requirement in civil rights actions in order to identify and dismiss frivolous suits. Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1275-1276, (3d Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 846, 91 S.Ct. 93, 27 L.Ed.2d 84 (1970); Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1967). See also Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F.Supp. 946, 949 (E.D.Pa.1975); Downs v. Department of Public Welfare, 368 F.Supp. 454, 463 (E.D. Pa.1973).

The complaint fails to set forth what actions Pittenger and the Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College took to terminate MacMurray's employment and when they were taken. The complaint's one paragraph statement of the claim is broad and conclusory. Consequently, Pittenger's and the Board of Trustees' motion to dismiss will be granted.

Pittenger and the Board of Trustees also move for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b) because they contend that they were not personally involved in the decision to terminate MacMurray. Since they have submitted affidavits to support their claim, the Court will construe their motion to dismiss for lack of personal involvement as a motion for summary judgment as provided for by Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The requirement of personal involvement does not mean that an official must have committed the specific wrongful acts. When an official directs his subordinates to commit acts or when he has actual knowledge of their acts and acquiesces in them he is regarded as having been personally involved and is liable for such acts. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F.Supp. 946, 950 (E.D.Pa.1975); Moon v. Winfield, 368 F.Supp. 843 (N.D.Ill.1973). Pittenger states in his affidavit that prior to MacMurray's presentation of his grievance after MacMurray had been fired, he had no knowledge and played no role in the termination. The chairman of the Board of Trustees submitted an affidavit in which he stated that the Board of Trustees had no knowledge of the termination until January 15, 1975 and at that time took no action. MacMurray states in paragraph 47 of his complaint that the Board of Trustees and Pittenger failed to provide him with a hearing but he does not allege that they had any obligation to supervise the actions of college officials in terminating an employee. In addition, he does not state that they received periodic reports concerning such terminations before they occurred. This is not a factual situation like Fialkowski v. Shapp, supra, where Pittenger was found to be personally involved because he had general knowledge of the constitutional deprivations and had direct supervisory control which would have enabled him to prevent those violations. Here MacMurray has not alleged that Pittenger or the Board knew about his impending termination nor does he state that they had the power or the duty to do anything about it after the fact. Because MacMurray has not controverted the affidavits of Pittenger and the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, their allegations of non-involvement will be accepted as true. Tunnell v. Wiley, 514 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1975); Bryant v. Com. of Ky., 490 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1974).

In the light of the foregoing, Pittenger's and the Board of Trustees' motion for summary judgment will be granted.

Next, Pittenger, the Board of Trustees, and McCormick seek to dismiss MacMurray's complaint for failure to allege a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because Pittenger and the Board of Trustees have been dismissed from this action for the reasons stated above, this motion to dismiss will be viewed as having been made by only McCormick.

McCormick argues that the grievance procedure provided MacMurray with all the protection required by the due process clause. To determine whether this contention is correct, two questions must be answered. First, was MacMurray deprived of any property interest which required notice and a due process hearing? Second, does the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require in this factual setting that either...