MacNeill v. Brownell
Decision Date | 23 May 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 88-426,88-426 |
Citation | 133 N.H. 184,574 A.2d 1375 |
Parties | Doris MacNEILL v. Wilmer L. and Mary L. BROWNELL. |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
McSwiney, Jones, Semple & Douglas, P.C., Concord, and Elizabeth Cazden, Manchester (Carroll F. Jones and Elizabeth Cazden, on the brief, and Elizabeth Cazden orally), for plaintiff.
Gallagher, Callahan & Gartrell, P.A., Concord (Donald E. Gartrell and Andrew B. Eills, on the brief, and Donald E. Gartrell orally), for defendants.
The defendants, Wilmer and Mary L. Brownell, appeal from a ruling of the Superior Court (Flynn, J.), approving a report by the Master (Robert E. Hinchey, Esq.), quieting title in the plaintiff, Doris
MacNeill, and permanently enjoining the defendants from entering onto, or asserting any claim in, the subject property. For the following reasons, we affirm.
This appeal involves a dispute over two parcels of land located in Danbury, one commonly referred to as "the island," the other known as "the ridge." In the winter of 1984, the plaintiff, self-proclaimed title holder for twenty-eight years to both the island and ridge parcels, was informed that the defendant, Wilmer L. Brownell, had been observed taking gravel from an area known as the "swimming hole" on the island parcel. In addition, it came to the plaintiff's attention that Mr. Brownell had also removed quantities of timber from the island parcel. The plaintiff's attorney contacted Mr. Brownell, advising him to stop cutting trees. Mr. Brownell, however, gave no assurances, claiming ownership of the parcels by deed dated March 21, 1984, from the heirs of George "Horse Power" Perkins. As a result of the defendant's actions in removing the gravel and cutting trees, the plaintiff filed suit seeking to have the title to both parcels quieted in her favor.
It is undisputed by the parties that both parcels were once owned by Ira Grow for a period up until two conveyances that took place in 1840 and 1842. The dispute as to the ridge parcel centers on these two conveyances. By deed dated March 23, 1840, Ira Grow conveyed a certain parcel of land to Cummings Hubbard. The transcription of this deed that was entered into evidence contained, in part, the following language:
"beginning at a certain stake and stones, which is on the south side of the ridge and south of James Smith's mills and Smith's river, and south of the mill yard, and is near one large pine stump, and is the same described in deed from one said Grow, to said Hubbard of March 4, 1840, thence an Easterly course on said Hubbard's northerly line to said Hubbard's north easterly corner, thence a northerly course until it strikes the south bank of Smith's river, adjoining land of Alexander Curtis, thence running up said river and bounded on the south bank of the South stream, which leads to Smith's mills, until it reaches as near as ten rods to where the water leaves Smith's Shingle mill below said Saw Mill, thence to strike a straight line to the first mentioned bound at stake and stones, meaning by this deed to convey to said Hubbard only what land is now held by me under deed from Samuel Pillsbury Esq. to one said Grow ... which is east of said ten rods below Shingle machines below Smith's river saw Mill, and on the south side of the south bank of the South stream leading to said Smith's Mills estimated at twelve acres be the same more or less excepting and reserving all privileges for the use of said Smith's mills ..."
The defendants claim that this language conveyed to Hubbard, the defendants' predecessor in title, a parcel of land containing the disputed ridge property. The defendants argue that their survey properly recognizes certain monuments referred to by the deed and should be favored over the plaintiff's interpretation because the plaintiff relies upon descriptions contained within other deeds to locate and lay claim to the ridge property. See Mastin v. Prescott, 122 N.H. 353, 355, 444 A.2d 556, 558 (1982).
The plaintiff, on the other hand, claims that the monumentation relied upon by the defendants to locate the mill yard is inconsistent with other deed descriptions and is incompatible with the topography of the area. In particular, the plaintiff claims that the defendants have mistakenly assumed that the mill yard buildings were located adjacent to the old mill dam in an area "unsuitable" for such structures. The plaintiff claims that these buildings were located six-to-eight-hundred feet upstream from the old mill dam in an area that is flat and more appropriate for a mill yard and connecting roadways. The plaintiff, in support of her position, looks to a deed in which Hubbard conveyed the property he had received to Iddo Brown. The plaintiff argues that in order for the court to accept the defendants' claim as to the location of the old mill yard, it would have to read the Hubbard-Brown deed to describe a right-angle turn in a counter-clockwise direction, a result that is contrary to the express language of the deed.
On appeal, the defendants carry the burden of showing that the master's conclusions and recommendations are unsupported by the evidence, Seward v. Loranger, 130 N.H. 570, 574, 547 A.2d 207, 210 (1988), or are erroneous as a matter of law. Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 284, 525 A.2d 276, 280 (1987). Here the defendants have failed to meet their burden. In disputes concerning boundaries of land, the sum of experience in conveyancing teaches us, that all other things being equal, monuments govern distances when the language in a deed...
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