Macnutt v. Temple University Hosp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 321 EDA 2005.,321 EDA 2005.
• Parties: Paul MacNUTT and Mary Ann MacNutt, Appellants v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, INC., Satoshi Furukawa, M.D., and Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

932 A.2d 980

Paul MacNUTT and Mary Ann MacNutt, Appellants v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, INC., Satoshi Furukawa, M.D., and Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education, Inc., Appellees.

No. 321 EDA 2005.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 8, 2007.

Filed September 7, 2007.

Laurence M. Kelly, Montrose, for appellants.

Ira W. Bushman, Philadelphia, for appellees.

BEFORE: JOYCE,^* STEVENS, LALLY-GREEN, TODD, KLEIN, BENDER, GANTMAN, McCAFFERY and PANELLA, JJ.

OPINION BY GANTMAN, J.:

¶ 1 Appellants, Paul MacNutt and Mary Ann MacNutt, appeal from the judgment entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, in favor of Appellees, Temple University Hospital, Inc., and Satoshi Furukawa, M.D.,¹ in Appellants' medical malpractice action, following the denial of Appellants' post-trial motion for a new trial. Specifically, Appellants ask us to determine whether the trial court erred in precluding Appellants from presenting their medical malpractice case at trial based on a res ipsa loquitur theory of negligence. Appellants also challenge the trial court's denial of their request for a jury instruction on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. We hold the court properly precluded Appellants from presenting their case at trial under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. We also hold the court correctly denied Appellants' request for a res ipsa loquitur jury instruction, because the evidence did not support that instruction. Accordingly, we affirm the court's decision to deny Appellants a new trial.

¶ 2 The trial court opinion sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows:

[Appellant], Paul MacNutt, brought this action against [Appellees] based upon allegations of medical malpractice. [Appellant] sought medical treatment for Thoracic Outlet Syndrome, a condition that rendered his arms cold and paralyzed on an intermittent basis. [Appellee], Satoshi Furukawa, M.D., performed two surgeries to correct [Appellant's] condition. [Appellant] alleged that during the second of these two surgeries in May of 2001, he suffered a chemical burn to the left side of his shoulder. He alleged that this chemical burn caused, and continues to cause, him severe pain to the extent that he is dependant on drugs to manage this pain. He further alleged that the burn [led] to the loss of life's pleasures and decreased his earning capacity. [Appellant], Mary Ann MacNutt, made a claim for loss of consortium.

It was [Appellants'] intention to proceed to trial based upon a standard theory of negligence, as well as a theory of res ipsa loquitur. [Appellants] supported their standard theory of negligence by offering the expert testimony of Dr. Lynn W. Whelchel. Dr. Whelchel opined that [Appellant] suffered a chemical burn as a result of lying in an unconscious state for an extended period of time in a surgical preparatory cleansing solution composed of Betadine and alcohol that pooled under his body. [Appellants] intended to support their res ipsa loquitur theory by having Dr. Whelchel state that a burn of this nature would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence.

[Appellees] argued that [Appellant] had not suffered a chemical burn during the surgery at issue. [Appellees] offered the expert testimony of Dr. Stuart R. Lessin, who diagnosed [Appellant] as suffering from an outbreak of shingles or herpes zoster. He stated that these outbreaks can often cause scarring and permanent pain. He also stated that these conditions can often be misdiagnosed. [Appellees] further attacked the credibility of Dr. Whelchel by pointing out the lack of factual basis for his opinion that Betadine pooled under [Appellant] during surgery. [Appellees] also argued that Betadine could not cause a third-degree burn of the nature [allegedly] suffered by [Appellant].

At the close of [Appellants'] case-in-chief, this court found that [Appellants] had produced adequate evidence to support a cause of action based on a standard theory of negligence without relying on a theory of res ipsa loquitur. This court precluded [Appellants] from proceeding on a theory of res ipsa loquitur.

Following a Defense verdict, [Appellants] filed post-trial motions alleging that they were prejudiced by this court's ruling. [Appellants] raised three grounds for a new trial as follows:

1. The [c]ourt erred when, at the close of [Appellants'] case-in-chief, it precluded them from proceeding on a theory of res ipsa loquitur.

2. The [c]ourt erred when, at the close of [Appellants'] case-in-chief, it did not hold oral argument prior to ruling that [Appellants] could not proceed on a res ipsa loquitur theory of negligence.

3. The [c]ourt erred when it declined to instruct the jury in accordance with [Appellants'] proposed points for charge on res ipsa loquitur.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed June 24, 2005, at 1-2) (internal citations omitted).

¶ 3 The trial court denied Appellants' post-trial motions on January 12, 2005. Appellants timely filed their notice of appeal on January 26, 2005. On October 10, 2006, a panel of this Court affirmed, with a dissent. On October 24, 2006, Appellants requested en banc reargument, which this Court granted on December 22, 2006.

¶ 4 On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues for our review:

DID THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW [APPELLANTS] TO SEEK TO PROVE THE NEGLIGENCE OF [APPELLEES] THROUGH THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR?

DID THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THEY COULD FIND [APPELLEES] TO HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR?

DID THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERR IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO CONSIDER ONLY THE INTERROGATORY, "DID [APPELLANT] ... SUSTAIN A BURN TO HIS LEFT SCAPULA AREA OF HIS BACK AS A RESULT OF LYING IN A POOL OF BETADINE AT THE TIME OF THE SURGERY ... ?" WITHOUT ALSO PROVIDING THE JURY WITH INTERROGATORIES THAT WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE JURY TO DETERMINE THAT ALL OR SOME OF [APPELLEES] WERE NEGLIGENT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR?

(Appellants' Brief at 4).

¶ 5 When presented with an appeal from the denial of a motion for a new trial, "absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court, appellate courts must not interfere with the trial court's authority to grant or deny a new trial." Harman ex rel. Harman v. Borah, 562 Pa. 455, 466, 756 A.2d 1116, 1121-22 (2000).

In Harman, the Court noted that the trial court must follow a two-step process in responding to a request for a new trial. The trial court must determine whether a factual, legal or discretionary mistake was made at trial. If the trial court determines that one or more mistakes were made, it must then evaluate whether the mistake provided a sufficient basis for granting a new trial. Moreover, the Court noted[:] "A new trial is not warranted merely because some irregularity occurred during the trial or another trial judge would have ruled differently; the moving party must demonstrate to the trial court that he or she has suffered prejudice from the mistake."

The Court then set forth an additional two-step analysis for appellate review of a trial court's determination to grant or deny⁹ a new trial. First, the appellate court must examine the decision of the trial court to determine whether it agrees that a mistake was, or was not, made. In so doing, the Court noted that the appellate court must apply the appropriate standard of review. If the alleged mistake involved an error of law, the appellate court must scrutinize for legal error. If the alleged mistake at trial involved a discretionary act, the appellate court must review for an abuse of discretion. The Court reiterated that a trial court abuses its discretion by rendering a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, or has failed to apply the law, or was motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.

^9. The Court specifically held that a review of a denial of a new trial requires the same analysis as a review of a grant of a new trial.

If the appellate court agrees with the trial court's determination that there were no prejudicial mistakes at trial, then a decision by the trial court to deny a new trial must stand and we need not reach the second prong of the analysis. If the appellate court discerns that a mistake was made at trial, however, it must analyze whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the motion for a new trial.

Ettinger v. Triangle-Pacific Corp., 799 A.2d 95, 106 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 572 Pa. 742, 815 A.2d 1042 (2003) (internal citations omitted). We will overturn the decision only where the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Colville v. Crown Equipment Corp., 809 A.2d 916, 926 (Pa.Super.2002). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner to determine "whether a new trial would produce a different verdict." Gunn v. Grossman, 748 A.2d 1235, 1239 (Pa.Super.2000), appeal denied, 564 Pa. 711, 764 A.2d 1070 (2000). "Consequently, if there is any support in the record for the trial court's decision to deny a new trial, that decision must be affirmed." Id. Further, a new trial is granted only where the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice, not where the evidence is conflicting or where the court might have reached a different conclusion on the same facts. Andrews v. Jackson, 800 A.2d 959, 962 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 572 Pa. 694, 813 A.2d 835 (2002).

¶ 6 For ease of disposition, we consider Appellants' first and second issues together. In those issues, Appellants argue the trial court should have allowed them to proceed at trial with their theory of negligence based on direct evidence and, alternatively on an inference of negligence, where the burn Appellant suffered would not have occurred in the absence of negligence. Appellants rely on Hollywood Shop, Inc....