Macomb County Taxpayers Ass'n v. L'Anse Creuse Public Schools, Docket No. 172066

Decision Date25 August 1995
Docket NumberDocket No. 172066
Citation540 N.W.2d 684,213 Mich.App. 71
Parties, 105 Ed. Law Rep. 696 MACOMB COUNTY TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION, Michael Sessa, Philis Desaele, Charles Anglin, Walter Graves, and Joyce Fitch, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Dearborn Public Schools and Grosse Pointe Public Schools, Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. L'ANSE CREUSE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Center Line Public Schools, Fitzgerald Public Schools, Fraser Public Schools, Lake Shore Public Schools, Lakeview Public Schools, South Lake Public Schools, Utica Community Schools, Warren Consolidated Schools, and Warren Woods Public Schools, Jointly and Severally, Defendants-Appellees, and Michigan Department of Treasury, Michigan Department of Education, and Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of the State of Michigan, Intervening Defendants-Appellants. John C. HART, a Taxpayer of the L'Anse Creuse Public Schools, and L'Anse Creuse Public Schools; Joseph Coach, a Taxpayer of the Center Line Public Schools, and Center Line Public Schools; Donald S. Durant, a Taxpayer of the Fitzgerald Public Schools and Fitzgerald Public Schools; Deuane Martin, a Taxpayer of the Lake Shore Public Schools, and Lake Shore Public Schools; Kenneth N. Eggly, a Taxpayer of the Lakeview Public Schools, and Lakeview Public Schools; Dale Cunningham, a Taxpayer of the South Lake Schools, and South Lake Schools; Gerald H. Schmidt, a Taxpayer of the Warren Woods Public Schools, and Warren Woods Public Schools; Cross-Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellees, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, Michigan Department of Education, and Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of the State of Michigan, Cross-Defendants/Cross-Appellants.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Sawyer, Johnston & Chmura by John Chmura, Mount Clemons, for Macomb County Taxpayers Association and others.

Hardy, Lewis, Pollard & Page, P.C. by Dennis R. Pollard and Neil H. Goodman, Birmingham, for L'Anse Creuse Public Schools and others.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Paul J. Zimmer, Assistant Attorney General, for Department of Treasury and others.

Before TAYLOR, P.J., and McDONALD and COLLINS, * JJ.

TAYLOR, Presiding Judge.

Intervening defendants, Michigan Department of Treasury, Michigan Department of Education, and Michigan Department of Attorney General (state defendants), appeal as of right the trial court's order awarding attorney fees to individual defendants who are school board members, and to individual plaintiffs who are members of the Macomb County Taxpayers Association. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Macomb County Taxpayers Association, a voluntary unincorporated association, and several of its members originally brought this action against twelve out-of-formula Macomb County school districts, seeking an injunction to prevent them from participating, pursuant to the school district commercial and industrial property tax base sharing act, 1991 P.A. 108, M.C.L. § 380.751; M.S.A. § 15.4751, in tax base sharing, and also to bar the school districts from making any payments to poorer in-formula school districts. State defendants intervened and filed a cross-claim against the school districts, requesting that the court compel tax base sharing or order reimbursement of state aid accepted by the school districts. The association and its members then filed an amended complaint against state defendants alleging the act was unconstitutional. By stipulation of the parties, on March 24, 1992, the court entered an order allowing eight of the school districts to each add one taxpayer from its school district as a cross-claim plaintiff for the purpose of asserting cross-claims against state defendants. 1 In a two-count cross-complaint against state defendants, cross-claim plaintiffs, individual school board members, asserted that the act violated the fifteen-mill limitation on general ad valorem taxes, Const. 1963, art. 9, § 6, and improperly reduced the state financing for an existing activity required of local government by state law. Const. 1963, art. 9, § 29.

Following motions for summary disposition, the trial court found that the basic mechanism of tax base sharing was constitutional, but reserved plaintiffs' and the school districts' claims under a portion of the Headlee Amendment, Const. 1963, art. 9, § 29, for later decision. Upon completing its consideration of those claims, the court concluded that the act was unconstitutional because its sanction for not sharing tax revenues, namely, loss of state aid, violated § 29.

State defendants then filed a motion requesting the court to apply a limited construction to the act that would preserve its constitutionality. The court denied the motion. With regard to costs, the trial court stated in an order dated January 25, 1993.

Since this is a final Opinion and Order in this matter the Court should consider the matter of costs. Plaintiffs and the school districts are the prevailing parties and shall file a bill of costs within twenty-eight days. MCR 2.625(F)(2). The Headlee Amendment also provides that if a taxpayer's suit is sustained the taxpayer shall receive from the applicable unit of government his cost. This provision has been interpreted to require the payment of reasonable attorney fees. Durant v. Board [Dep't] of Education, 186 Mich App 83; 463 NW2d 461 (1990). Reasonable attorney fees that had been incurred in maintaining this suit by taxpayers may be included in their bill of costs.

The association and its individual members, as well as the school districts, and the individual school board members, filed bills of costs in which they requested attorney fees. 2

After a hearing, the court denied the school districts' and the association's request for attorney fees because they were not taxpayers. However, the court allowed the individual plaintiffs and school board members to proceed because they were taxpayers, and conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine reasonable attorney fees. The parties stipulated that the individual school board members were not contractually required to, nor did they, in fact, make any payments to the school districts or to their law firm for legal services rendered. Indeed, the retainer agreement with the law firm was with the school boards, who themselves had an internal arrangement for the payment of their fees. Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing, counsel for the school districts and the school board members acknowledged that if the court awarded attorney fees to the board members, the fees awarded would be used to reimburse the school districts.

With regard to individual plaintiffs who were members of the association, plaintiffs' counsel received only $200 from the association for legal representation in this case. Further, plaintiffs' counsel had no retainer agreement with individual plaintiffs, and no specific terms and conditions of representation were ever discussed with individual plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' counsel candidly acknowledged before this Court that he has no intention to pursue individual plaintiffs for collection of his fees in the event that they are not awarded attorney fees.

On January 7, 1994, the circuit court issued an opinion and order in which it ruled that both the school board members and the individual members of the association were entitled to recover costs, which included attorney fees, pursuant to Const. 1963, art. 9, § 32. The court then awarded the school board members fees of $10,668.75, and the individual plaintiffs fees of $5,000.

As an initial matter in this appeal, the school districts and school board members argue that state defendants have not timely appealed the trial court's January 25, 1993, ruling on costs, and, thus, have waived an appeal as of right. We disagree.

The court's order of January 25, 1993, constituted the court's final disposition of the substantive issues of this case. 3 It was not the final order with regard to costs. The final order with regard to costs was issued on January 7, 1994, with a timely appeal being filed on January 26, 1994, pursuant to MCR 7.203(A)(1).

In Gherardini v. Ford Motor Co., 394 Mich. 430, 431, 231 N.W.2d 643 (1975), our Supreme Court addressed the issue of appeals of postjudgment orders setting attorney fees. The Court held:

The fact that the judgment on the jury's verdict was appealable as of right--without regard to whether it was appealed--does not determine the appealability of the post-judgment order establishing the amount of attorney fees. The post-judgment order affected with finality rights of the parties and was, therefore, appealable as of right. Equitable Trust Co. v. Bankers [Bankers'] Trust Co, 268 Mich 394, 397-398; 256 NW 460 (1934). See Detroit Trust Co v. Blakely, 359 Mich 621, 628-634; 103 NW2d 413 (1960), where an order allowing attorney fees, entered after the entry of an order disposing of the meritorious question, was held to be appealable as of right on authority of Equitable Trust. See, also, People v. Pickett, 391 Mich 305; 215 NW2d 695 (1974), where this Court recognized that more than one "final" judgment could be entered in a criminal prosecution and an appeal as of right could be obtained from each final judgment; in that case, the first from a judgment or conviction and sentence to probation, the second from a judgment finding that a condition of probation was violated and sentence to prison.

This conclusion regarding finality, and when it attaches, is in accord with longstanding jurisprudential principles of this state. In 1879, Justice Thomas M. Cooley wrote:

It is not the stage of the case in which the order is made that determines its appealability, but ... its effect upon the rights of the parties; and that must be the test of the finality of this order. [Taylor v. Sweet, 40 Mich 736, 739-740 (1879).]

Further, this analysis is in conformity with...

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