Macomber, In re
| Decision Date | 26 September 1990 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 86646 |
| Citation | 436 Mich. 386,461 N.W.2d 671 |
| Parties | In re MACOMBER. KENT COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold J. MACOMBER, Respondent-Appellee, and Lucille Macomber, Respondent. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
William A. Forsyth, Kent County Pros. Atty., Timothy K. McMorrow, Chief Appellate Atty., Grand Rapids, for petitioner-appellant.
N. Garth Petersen, Grand Rapids, for respondent-appellee.
Juvenile Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan by Paul N. Baker, Bloomfield Hills, amicus curiae.
Michigan Probate Judges Ass'n, Donna T. Morris, Judge of Probate, Midland, amicus curiae.
The Legislature has given a broad grant of authority to the probate court to protect children who come within its jurisdiction.
We disagree with the reading of chapter XIIA of the probate code by the dissent to the extent it would limit the authority of the probate court to those orders expressly listed in Sec. 18. Our reading of the provisions granting and describing the jurisdiction of the probate court persuades us that probate court power extends beyond Sec. 18.
The jurisdiction of the probate court, a court of limited jurisdiction, is defined by the Legislature. M.C.L. Sec. 600.847; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.847 provides in pertinent part:
"In the exercise of jurisdiction vested in the probate court by law, the probate court shall have the same powers as the circuit court to hear and determine any matter and make any proper orders to fully effectuate the probate court's jurisdiction and decisions."
To determine the breadth of the power granted to the probate court by chapter XIIA of the Probate Code, the "jurisdiction vested in the probate court by law" must be delineated.
Fairly characterized, the paramount purpose of the juvenile section of the Probate Code is to provide for the well-being of children. To this end, M.C.L. Sec. 712A.1(2); M.S.A. Sec. 27.3178(598.1)(2) provides:
"This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that each child coming within the jurisdiction of the court shall receive the care, guidance, and control, preferably in his or her own home, as will be conducive to the child's welfare...." (Emphasis added.)
In 1944, in a further move to provide for the well-being of children coming within the jurisdiction of the court, the Legislature enacted Sec. 6 of chapter XIIA, which states:
"The juvenile division of the probate court shall have jurisdiction over adults as hereinafter provided and may make such orders affecting adults as in the opinion of the court are necessary for the physical, mental, or moral well-being of a particular child or children under its jurisdiction: Provided, that such orders shall be incidental to the jurisdiction of the court over such child or children." M.C.L. Sec. 712A.6; M.S.A. Sec. 27.3178(598.6) (emphasis added).
A plainer, more straightforward statement of the authority conferred on the probate court to fashion necessary orders to protect children who come within its jurisdiction would be difficult to imagine.
We are persuaded that this section provides clear authority for the court to make orders which are necessary for the well-being of a child. The dissent interprets the phrase that the court has "jurisdiction over adults as hereinafter provided" to limit jurisdiction over adults to the orders in Sec. 18. P. 682. However, in reaching this conclusion, the dissent ignores the word "and" after "hereinafter provided." Thus, contrary to the view expressed by the dissent, we conclude that the probate court has "jurisdiction over adults as hereinafter provided and may make such orders affecting adults as [are necessary for the physical, mental, or moral well-being of a particular child]." 1 (Emphasis added.)
Section 18 of chapter XIIA was enacted at the same time as Sec. 6. Thus, it is fair to say that the Legislature intended the two sections to be interpreted consistently with each other. The appellee's argument that Sec. 18 was later amended to exclusively limit the court's power to Sec. 18, and that the specific nature of the orders in Sec. 18 negate the broad grant of power in Sec. 6 is not persuasive.
We find nothing in the 1972, 1982, or 1988 amendments to support this argument. The amendments did not alter the meaning of the section to exclusively limit the court's power to Sec. 18. 2 Since the amendments of Sec. 18 did not alter the meaning of the section to specifically provide for exclusivity, Sec. 6 and Sec. 18 are still to be considered consistent as the Legislature intended in 1944. Another indication that Sec. 18 is to be read in light of Sec. 6 are the words "as hereinafter provided" in the latter section. By acknowledging other relevant provisions in Sec. 6, we conclude that the Legislature has clearly indicated its intent that the related sections be interpreted consistently with each other rather than intending that one section override the other. 3
In the instant case, while Sec. 6 provides strong support for the orders given in the probate court, Sec. 18 can also be read to justify the probate court's orders. Section 18(1)(b) authorizes an order placing a child under supervision in the child's own home:
(Emphasis added.)
In addition, Sec. 18(1)(g) provides:
"(g) Order the parents, ... to refrain from continuing conduct which ... has caused or tended to cause the child to come within or to remain under this chapter...."
In analyzing the foregoing sections, it is significant to note that these dispositional orders are stated in broad, general terms. The court may provide "reasonable rules for the conduct of the parents [designed for the well-being of the child]." Also, the court may order parents to discontinue conduct which, "in the opinion of the court," causes a child to come within the court's jurisdiction. Thus, we hold that the Legislature has conferred very broad authority to the probate court. There are no limits to the "conduct" which the court might find harmful to a child. The Legislature intended that the court be free to define "conduct" as it chooses. Moreover, in light of the directive that these provisions are to be "liberally construed" in favor of allowing a child to remain in the home, we find these sections supportive of the court's order prohibiting the father from living with his daughter. The court could have found that the conduct which "tended to cause" the daughter's sexual victimization was the proximity of the father to the daughter. Thus, the court could order the father to refrain from conducting himself, at all, in the presence of the child.
Certainly, the immediate conduct which "caused" the child to come within the jurisdiction of the court was the sexual behavior of the father. However, the court could well have found that such an order prohibiting the father from touching his daughter may not have been effective in assuring the safety of the child. However, it is not only conduct which immediately "causes" the abuse which can be prohibited, but also conduct which tends to cause the abuse. The court could properly find that the living arrangements, father and daughter under the same roof, tended to cause, or led to the misconduct.
Although the dissent would find that the probate court did not have the authority to order the appellee to support his family, it states that "[s]ection 18 spells out the kinds of orders that the probate court is authorized to enter...." P. 682 (emphasis added). This statement seems to contemplate that the authority extends beyond the four corners of Sec. 18. Yet, despite the dissent's acknowledgment that Sec. 18 represents the "kinds of orders" allowable, it does not find the support order proper. We do not agree.
Sections 18(2) and 18(3) provide that the court may order reimbursement by a parent to the court for the costs of services and care to a child. While Sec. 18(2) concerns costs for placement outside of the home, Sec. 18(3) concerns reimbursement for costs incurred by a child in the child's own home. Certainly, these were the "kinds of orders" which were issued in this case. Under Secs. 18(2) and 18(3), a court can take jurisdiction of a child, incur costs in caring for the child, and order a parent to reimburse for those costs. The order in this case is similar in that it ordered a parent to provide financial support for the family. Both orders direct a parent to pay for the care of a child within the jurisdiction of the court.
There is evidence in other sections of chapter XIIA that the Legislature intended to give the probate court broad powers and flexibility in providing for the well-being of children. Section 18f(2) directs agencies to write case service plans for the use of the court and the parties. Section 18f(3)(b) states that case service plans shall include "[e]fforts to be made by the child's parent[s] to enable the child to return to his or her home." Under Sec. 18f(4), "the court may order compliance with all or any part of the case service plan as the court considers necessary." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, under Sec. 18 the court may order parents to refrain from conduct, or to act affirmatively, in the interest of the child. Under Sec. 18f(3)(b), case service plans are to include efforts by the parents to enable a child to return home. An effective "effort" in this regard might consist of outside counseling or therapy aimed at reforming an abusive parent. 4 Under Sec. 18f(4), a probate court may order compliance with the plan if...
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