Mactavish v. Adsit
| Decision Date | 12 December 1899 |
| Citation | 80 N.W. 1086,122 Mich. 242 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | MACTAVISH v. ADSIT, Circuit Judge. |
Application on relation of Maggie Mactavish, for mandamus against Allen C. Adsit, circuit judge of Kent county, to compel the dissolution of an injunction. Denied.
Lee E. Joslyn, for relator.
Wanty & Knappen, for respondent.
The relator brought an action upon a fraternal society beneficiary certificate in the circuit court for the county of Bay. Subsequently the defendant in that action filed the bill in this case for cancellation of the certificate upon the ground of fraud alleged to have been committed in procuring the certificate, and an injunction pendente lite was issued by the Kent circuit court, sitting in chancery restraining the plaintiff in the original action from further prosecuting said action. An affidavit was filed, denying the fraud, in conjunction with a motion to dissolve the injunction; and, said motion being denied, we are asked to compel the circuit court to dissolve the injunction. The grounds that seem to be relied on by counsel for relator appear to be: (1) That the bill alleges that the society assumed to cancel and annul the certificate, and therefore it is unnecessary to invoke the aid of equity to the same end. (2) That the material allegations of the bill are denied by affidavit, and that this entitled the relator to a dissolution of the injunction. (3) That the court had no jurisdiction to grant the injunction, (a) because the pleadings in the original case were not fully set up in the bill; (b) because it failed to allege injury or want of complete remedy at law.
It is an established rule that the court will not interfere with the discretion of a circuit judge in relation to injunctions. Instances are rare where appellate courts will compel lower courts to issue them, and they will seldom compel a dissolution unless the injunction has been issued, or dissolution refused, in contravention of law.
The first and second propositions require only a passing notice. The relator does not admit the binding force of the company's attempt at cancellation, and the company is compelled to submit the question of its right to a cancellation to some court of justice. It is true that there is a general rule that when a defendant answers fully, and denies all of the allegations of the bill, a preliminary injunction will usually be denied. There are, however, cases where this rule is not followed, and it is a matter of judicial discretion.
The failure of the bill to allege the state of the pleadings in the action at law is unimportant. Doubtless, counsel brought the subject to the attention of the circuit court in chancery on the motion to dissolve; and, if not, he has only himself to blame.
If the allegation of inadequacy of remedy at law is wanting, the point should have been raised by demurrer.
The principal effort of counsel appears to be directed towards inducing us to overrule the case of Insurance Co. v. Dick, 114 Mich. 337, 72 N.W. 179, and, failing in that, to show a distinction between that case and the present, inasmuch as the injunction is issued from the court of a different county from that in which relator's action was brought. The case of Insurance Co. v. Dick was carefully considered. The question there was not whether it was a hardship upon the plaintiff to be compelled to try the question of fraud in equity, rather than before a jury, but--First, whether equity has jurisdiction to cancel a contract obtained by fraud; and, second, whether such jurisdiction is cut off by the institution of a prior action at law upon the writing. There is but one answer to these questions. The jurisdiction of equity for cancellation is well settled, and courts cannot curtail such jurisdiction because the same evidence that would justify a decree of cancellation may constitute a defense to an action upon the instrument. The authority to restrain the pending action at law is based upon the equitable jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits, and this is as well established as any other jurisdiction of equity. Then, the fraternal society had the right to sue in equity, and the court must entertain the suit. It might or might not restrain the beneficiary from prosecuting the pending action at law. That was a matter for the discretion of that court, and not for us. These propositions are elementary, and, as shown in Insurance Co. v. Dick, are fortified by authorities. The briefs in this case furnish additional support to the...
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