Macy v. Hopkins County Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 01 May 2006
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 4:01CV-00195-ERG.
• Citation: 429 F.Supp.2d 888
• Parties: Sharon MACY, Plaintiff v. HOPKINS COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

429 F.Supp.2d 888

Sharon MACY, Plaintiff v. HOPKINS COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:01CV-00195-ERG.

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, at Owensboro.

May 1, 2006.

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Brent Thomas Ackerson, Ackerson & Ackerson, PSC, Louisville, KY, Lyn Taylor Long, Moulton & Long, Elizabethtown, KY, for Plaintiff.

J. Keith Cartwright, Frymire, Evans, Peyton, Teague & Cartwright, Madisonville, KY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GOEBEL, United States Magistrate Judge.

BACKGROUND

Before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment (DN 46). Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to the motion (DN 50) and Defendant has filed a reply memorandum (DN 51).

In her amended complaint Plaintiff, Sharon Macy ("Macy"), alleges wrongful termination by Defendant, the Hopkins County Board of Education ("Board of Education"), in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and KRS 344.040 as well as retaliatory discharge in violation of KRS 344.280 (DN 35). Having been fully briefed, these matters are now ripe for disposition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The inquiry under Rule 56(c) is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989). "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . ." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion and demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Although the Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving party is required to do more than simply show that there is some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to present "specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial," by affidavit, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on file. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c) and (e) (emphasis added); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The substantive law governing the case will determine what issues of fact are material. Street, 886 F.2d at 1479-1480. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, the motion for summary judgment should be granted." Pitts v. Michael Miller Car Rental, 942 F.2d 1067, 1069-1070 (6th Cir.1991) (citing Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Plaintiff, Sharon Macy ("Macy"), was employed as a physical education teacher by Defendant, Hopkins County Board of Education ("Board of Education"), from August of 1981 through November 30, 2000. On June 6, 1987, Macy sustained a severe closed head injury while making a cross-country bike trek with her twin sister.¹ Remarkably, Macy returned to teaching in August of 1987 (DN 46, Exhibit 1, Deposition of Macy at 18). An automobile accident in 1995 apparently exacerbated the closed head injuries Macy suffered in 1987 (DN 35, Amended Complaint at Paragraph 6).

In 1996, the Board of Education determined Macy needed certain accommodations in the workplace as a result of her closed head injuries. Assistant Superintendent, Linda Zellich ("Zellich"), and Kevin Sloan, a teacher's advocate for the Kentucky Education Association ("KEA"), were involved in the creation of the "504 Individualized Accommodation Plan" ("504 Plan")² that set forth workplace accommodations for Macy (DN 46, Exhibit 3, Zellich Deposition at 59-68; DN 50, Exhibit 1). Ms. Zellich was also involved in subsequent modifications to the 504 Plan and overseeing the 504 Plan (DN 46, Exhibit 3, Zellich Deposition at 59-68, 84). Ms. Zellich understood the 504 Plan was being implemented due to Macy having difficulty maintaining attention, headaches, short-term memory deficits, disruptive sleep, depression, difficulty controlling irritability, outbursts with others, and anger (DN 46, Exhibit 3, Zellich Deposition at 80-81).

The 504 Plan acknowledges that Macy's disabling condition is a "post concussive syndrome" caused by a closed head injury (DN 50, Exhibit 1). It describes her symptoms as "[r]ecurrent headaches, difficulty with attention and concentration, short term memory deficits, disrupted sleep, depression and/or anxiety, irritability with others and outbursts of anger" (DN 50, Exhibit 1). If Plaintiff experienced a headache, the 504 Plan accommodated her by having a staff member take over her class while she went to an available designated area with a cot where she could recline and relax (DN 46, Exhibit 1, Macy Deposition at 20; DN 50, Exhibit 1 at Page 3). Another accommodation under the 504 Plan involved directing students going to the vocal music and band room to use the outside exit so that they do not pass through the gymnasium during Macy's physical education classes (DN 50 Exhibit 1 at 3). This accommodation was intended to "eliminate confusion, disruptions, and minimize the opportunity for horseplay" (DN 50, Exhibit 1 at 3). During her deposition, Macy indicated another accommodation under the 504 Plan involved her covering detention in the afternoons so she could avoid high noise level areas (DN 46, Exhibit 1, Macy Deposition at 20). Notably, during her deposition, Macy conceded that the 504 Plan did not allow her to engage in any criminal activity or conduct that violated Kentucky laws for teachers (DN 46, Exhibit 1 at 20).

Daryl Herring ("Herring") was the Principal of the school where Macy taught physical education. Mr. Herring understood the 504 Plan was being implemented because Macy experienced severe headaches, outbursts of anger, irritability, difficulty with concentration and memory loss (DN 46, Exhibit 4, Herring Deposition at 14-15).

There is no dispute that Macy repeatedly complained about Mr. Herring not following or carrying out provisions of her 504 Plan (DN 46, Exhibit 1, Macy Deposition at 21-22; Exhibit 3, Zellich Deposition at 82-83). Macy made her complaints to Zellich and KEA representatives (DN 46, Exhibit 3, Zellich Deposition at 85).

On February 21, 2000, Macy filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights ("The EEOC Complaint") (DN 46, Exhibit 1, Macy Deposition at 57-58). In her complaint Macy alleged the Board of Education had not made all of the agreed to necessary accommodations that address her disability (DN 46, Exhibit 1, Macy Deposition Exhibit No. 4). Additionally, Macy accused Herring, the school Principal, of singling her out for being tardy on September 1, 1999 and, after she complained to the Assistant Superintendent, retaliating against her on November 23, 1999, by sending out a letter of reprimand regarding an incident that allegedly occurred on November 5, 1999 (DN 46, Exhibit 1, Macy Deposition Exhibit No. 4). Macy alleged discrimination in violation of the ADA, KRS 344.040, and KRS 344.280 (DN 46, Exhibit 1, Macy Deposition Exhibit No. 4).

In the late afternoon of November 1, 2000, an incident occurred at school that involved Macy and nine members of the middle school basketball team. As Macy left the school building to head home, she encountered some unsupervised boy basketball players outside of the building (DN 46, Exhibit 1, Macy Deposition at 28). She directed the boys to go back inside to the gym where they would be supervised (DN 46, Exhibit 1, Macy Deposition at 28). Macy recalls giving the boys a lecture about playing outside unsupervised (DN 46, Exhibit 1, Macy Deposition at 28-29). During this lecture Macy claims she told the boys that they could have been seriously hurt or killed because they were flipping around on the poles (DN 46, Exhibit 1, Macy Deposition at 29). The boys recall Macy threatened to "kill" them if she heard them making fun of the girls and that she repeated this threat, saying that she "meant it" (DN 46, Exhibit No. 8 at Page 8).

Following the above incident, the Superintendent, James Lee Stevens ("Superintendent Stevens"), conducted an investigation with the help of Assistant Superintendents L any Woodward and Zellich, as well the Board of Education attorney, J. Keith Cartwright (DN 46, Exhibit 2, Stevens Deposition at 80-82, 99-100, 102-103). After completing the investigation, Superintendent Stevens notified Macy by letter, dated November 30, 2000, that her contract of employment was being terminated effective that date on the grounds that she engaged in conduct unbecoming a teacher (DN 46, Exhibit 2, Macy Deposition Exhibit No. 1). In relevant part, the letter reads as follows:

"Specifically, our investigation reveals that on November 1, 2000 you have threatened to kill students, you have made inappropriate remarks about the marital status of...