Macy v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 September 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 73-1080-M.
• Citation: 381 F. Supp. 142
• Parties: Michael J. MACY v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., a body corporate.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

381 F. Supp. 142

Michael J. MACY v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., a body corporate.

Civ. A. No. 73-1080-M.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

September 3, 1974.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Harvey J. Siegel, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

H. Thomas Howell, Joseph A. Schwartz, III, and Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

JAMES R. MILLER, Jr., District Judge.

This is a suit in which the plaintiff, Michael J. Macy, seeks damages from Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for alleged libelous and defamatory statements made concerning him by an employee and agent of the defendant. Jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment.

The cast of characters consists of the plaintiff who, apparently, worked on a ramp at the Friendship International Airport in Baltimore, Maryland, as an employee of the defendant, TWA; W. H. Buxton, who was a supervisor of ramp services for TWA; Jack Burton and one Mr. Martinek, who were co-employees of Macy; Mr. Barton, who was a union shop steward, as was Mr. Thomas L. Yoder; and Mr. C. J. Cox, manager of customer services for the defendant.

The pleadings, affidavits, and depositions now on file establish the following facts in the record without contradiction:

At the air freight facility of TWA at the Friendship Airport an hydraulic fitting on a Dortech loader was found to have been damaged in early October, 1972. Mr. Cox directed Mr. Burton and Mr. Martinek to make an investigation of the damage. Mr. Burton and Mr. Martinek reported on either October 4 or October 5, 1972, to Mr. Cox that they had made an investigation, that they believed the fitting had been sabotaged deliberately and that Mr. Macy, the plaintiff herein, was the only person in the vicinity of the fitting at or near the time when the damage had to have occurred.

Mr. Cox, according to his deposition, upon receipt of said investigative report, contacted his superiors in Philadelphia and a decision was reached to suspend Macy pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the defendant and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, said agreement being filed as Exhibit A to the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

According to the deposition of Mr. Cox, the practice was to suspend an employee orally at or shortly before the end of that employee's shift and for the suspension to be made by the employee's supervisor. The shift of Macy ended at 2:30 p. m., on October 5, 1972. On that day, Mr. Buxton, acting at the direction of Mr. Cox, subsequent to 2 p.m., told plaintiff in the presence of Mr. Barton that he was suspended in approximately the following words: "You are suspended for sabotaging ground equipment. A letter will be mailed to you stating the hearing date and the charges."

Thereafter, Buxton sent a letter to plaintiff dated October 6, 1972, which stated in part as follows:

"The charge against you is ground equipment sabotage; specifically, damage to a hydraulic fitting located on the right forward stabilizer behind the driver's cab on the Dortech loader at the air freight facility."

A copy of said letter was sent to Yoder.

Subsequently a hearing was held by C. J. Cox under the provisions of Article 11(b)(8) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.¹ On October 16, 1972, Mr. Cox directed a letter to the plaintiff containing the following language in part:

"After reviewing the testimony presented at your discharge hearing, I have concluded that the evidence presented placed you in the area where the damage occurred at a time when there were no other personnel in the area. It is, therefore, my opinion that the charge against you has been substantiated and your services with TWA are terminated effective October 5, 1972."

Copies of that letter were sent to Yoder, the Union shop steward, and to certain personnel of TWA.

Plaintiff contends that Buxton's statement of October 5, 1972, is slanderous and that the letters of October 6 and October 16, 1972, are libelous. Defendant contends that the actions complained of were absolutely privileged and, alternatively, if only qualifiedly privileged, that no malice has been shown sufficient to establish an abuse of said privilege.

In this Circuit all inferences which can be drawn reasonably for the party opposing a motion for summary judgment must be drawn. Even where there is no dispute as to demonstrable historical facts, summary judgment cannot be granted if differing inferences can be drawn from those undisputed historical facts sufficient to create a material dispute of fact. Phoenix Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 381 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1967).

This court is of the view that the motion for summary judgment should be granted and, without belaboring the point, I will briefly set forth the reasons.

I

Assuming that there is no overriding federal policy which would require the application of federal law to the issues here presented, the case would then be required to be decided under Maryland law. In a diversity case, the District Court applies the conflicts rules of the forum state. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). The Maryland rule of conflicts applicable here is lex loci delicti, the place of the tort is the law to be applied. Dersookian v. Helmick, 256 Md. 627, 261 A.2d 472 (1970).

Maryland has not explicitly, through its courts, adopted the doctrine of absolute privilege for quasi-judicial proceedings. Maryland has, in a number of circumstances, adopted the doctrine of qualified privilege. Under Maryland law a communication arising out of an employer-employee relationship enjoys a qualified privilege, which can be negated by the existence of malice on the part of the declarant of allegedly libelous or defamatory words. Under Maryland law it is the responsibility of the court to determine whether allegedly libelous words were written on a privileged occasion. Hanrahan v. Kelly, 269 Md. 21, 29, 305 A.2d 151 (1973); Peurifoy v. Congressional Motors, Inc., 254 Md. 501, 512, 255 A.2d 332 (1969); Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87, 93-94, 20 A. 774 (1890).

The qualified privilege exists in this type of case. Peurifoy v. Congressional Motors, Inc., supra; Stevenson v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc., 250 Md. 482, 243 A.2d 533 (1968); Henthorn v. Western Maryland Railroad Co., 226 Md. 499, 174 A.2d 175 (1961). Where a conditional privilege exists, the burden, under Maryland law, is on the plaintiff to show actual malice in order to escape the results of the qualified privilege. Hanrahan v. Kelly, supra; Stevenson v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc., supra.

In Stevenson, supra, and Peurifoy, supra, directed verdicts were upheld for the defendant. In Henthorn, supra, the court upheld a summary judgment for the defendant.

In Orrison v. Vance, 262 Md. 285, 277 A.2d 573 (1971), the Maryland Court of Appeals also upheld a directed verdict for the defendant. In that latter case the court said at 294:

"Orrison has the burden of proving not only actual malice but also that the statements are false. . . . And he argues also that ordinarily actual malice is a jury question . . ., but we see nothing in this record which suggests the presence of actual malice sufficient to defeat Vance's privilege or even to justify the submission of the issue to a jury."

The Court of Appeals in Orrison v. Vance went on to say, quoting 1 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, § 5.27 (1956), with approval, that "'Actual malice' really does not exclusively mean ill-will. It is better described as an improper purpose, i. e., a purpose inconsistent with the social policy which it is the purpose of the law to secure by the technical device of privilege." 262 Md. at 295, 277 A.2d at 577; Judge McWilliams, speaking for the court, also said:

"All that Orrison has come up with is the fact that Vance does not like him, pointing to other litigation . . ., and Vance's statement to that effect. (Footnote omitted). Clearly Orrison is not a hero to Vance and there is little doubt Orrison considers Vance a low fellow. But, in these circumstances, this is not evidence of ill-will."

262 Md. at 295, 277 A.2d at 578.

Although the opportunity to do so has existed, and plaintiff has not, by any request for admissions, through interrogatories nor through depositions nor affidavits, established any dispute of material fact relating to the circumstances under which the suspension of Macy occurred.

No factual dispute exists but that there was something wrong with an hydraulic fitting; nor is there a dispute of fact as to Burton and Martinek being requested to investigate; nor a dispute of fact that they did investigate and pointed the finger at Macy as a deliberate saboteur; nor is there a dispute of fact that Cox received the investigative report and called his superiors in Philadelphia about the report; nor is there a dispute of fact that the decision to suspend Macy was reached in or immediately after that telephone call.

What happened thereafter, resulting in the specific statements which are the subject of the suit, were statements made under procedures established by Article 11(b)(8) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. There is absolutely nothing in the record to demonstrate that the words spoken or written were excessive or abusive by either Buxton or Cox under the circumstances. Buxton confined the words spoken and written to a specific and informational description of the charge against Mr. Macy which was relevant to the occasion and which was required by the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The initial charges, the October 5, 1972, words and the October 6, 1972 letter, were not made in...