Madden v. Amazon.com Servs.
| Docket Number | 1:23-cv-14163 |
| Decision Date | 21 December 2023 |
| Parties | MAURA MADDEN, Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
1
MAURA MADDEN, Plaintiff,
v.
AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC, Defendants.
No. 1:23-cv-14163
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
December 21, 2023
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
FRANKLIN U. VALDERRAMA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Defendant Amazon.com Services LLC (Amazon) owns and operates an approximately 140,000 square foot warehouse (the Facility) on the westside of the City of Chicago, where it receives, stores, and delivers goods intrastate. Plaintiff Maura Madden (Madden), a Chicago resident and homeowner, lives within 1,200 feet of the Facility. Madden filed this suit in state court seeking a declaration that Amazon's use of the Facility is a Freight Terminal for which Amazon needs, but does not have, a special use permit, in violation of the City of Chicago's Zoning Ordinance (CZO).
Amazon removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). R. 1, Notice of Removal. Before the Court is Madden's motion for a preliminary injunction against Amazon, to enjoin the operation of the Facility until Amazon receives a special use permit. R. 1-1,[1] Exh. A at 29 (Motion). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Madden's Motion.
Background
Amazon owns and operates an approximately 140,000 square foot Facility at 1260 North Kostner, in Chicago, Illinois. R. 1-1, Exh. A at 3 (Compl.) ¶¶ 1, 5. The Facility sits along Division Street between Kostner Avenue and Kilbourn Avenue. Id. ¶ 17. Madden is a Chicago resident and homeowner whose home is located less than 1,200 feet from the property line of the Facility. Id. ¶ 2.
In December 2020, Venture One Development, LLC executed a building permit application (the Application) to build a “44 foot high, 141,360 square foot industrial building for the receiving, storage, and shipping of commercial products.” Compl. ¶ 22. The Application lists the proposed zoning use as “Industrial Use Group -Warehouse and Freight Movement (except as more specifically regulated).” Id. ¶ 25. The building permit was submitted on behalf of Amazon. Id. ¶ 23. The City of Chicago's building permit application contains a section where the applicant must describe in narrative form the proposed use for structures and facilities to be built. Id. ¶ 26. In the Application, the applicant's use narrative reads, in total, “[Receiving, storage, and shipping of commercial products.” Id. On June 14, 2021, the property was conveyed to Amazon. Id. ¶ 11.
In a statement made to the Chicago Sun Times published on August 28, 2023, the Facility was described as being designed to receive, store and ship common household items that people want quickly. Compl. ¶ 27. When Amazon answered the Complaint, it admitted that it would receive and store goods at the Facility and deliver them intrastate. R. 10, Answer ¶ 30. Based upon the briefing of this Motion,
the Court understands the description of the Facility by Amazon is no longer prospective, as the Facility is currently in operation. R. 11, Resp. at 3.
The Facility sits in Planned Manufacturing District (PMD) #9, also known as the “Northwest PMD.” Compl. ¶ 20. A PMD is a zoning designation used for complex or high-intensity industrial uses, with specific zoning, density, use, and building guidelines applicable to developments within that district. Id. ¶ 21. The CZO “includes ‘use tables' which indicate what uses are permitted uses, as indicated by a ‘P' in the use table, meaning allowed to be built and operated without further approval other than building and engineering permits[.]” Id. ¶ 33 (emphasis in original). The CZO also lists prohibited uses, “indicated by a ‘-' in the use table, meaning not allowed to be built or operated under any circumstances[.]” Id. The CZO also lists special uses, “indicated by an ‘S' in the use table, meaning allowed only via a ‘special use process,' whereby a project must be approved by the City's Zoning Board of Appeal (‘ZBA').” Id.
The ZBA's “special use process requires, among other things, notice be sent certified mail to residents within a certain distance; that notice be posted at the property site; that the project meet a variety of criteria; and that the ZBA vote to grant the special use permission.” Compl. ¶ 34. A special use permit is a discretionary permit. Id. ¶ 35. Amazon admits it has neither applied for nor received any special use permit for the Facility. Answer ¶ 44.
The CZO lists “Freight Terminal” as a special use in the PMD-9 one. Compl. ¶ 36. The “Freight Terminal” use is a specific subcategory listed under the general
category of “Warehouse and Freight Movement (except as more specifically regulated).” Id. ¶ 37 (emphasis in original). The CZO defines “‘Freight Terminal' as “[a] building or area in which freight is collected and/or stored for in intrastate or interstate shipment.” Id. ¶ 38. The word “freight” is not defined in the CZO. Id. ¶ 39. However, the CZO provides that “[w]ords that are not defined in Chapter 17-17 have the meaning given in the latest edition of Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary.” Id.
On August 29, 2023, Madden filed this suit in state court against Amazon seeking a declaratory judgment under 65 ILCS 5/11-13-15 that Amazon's Facility is in ongoing violation of the CZO. Compl. ¶ 1. Two weeks later Madden filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief against Amazon, asking the Court to enjoin Amazon from its continuing violation of the CZO. Mot. ¶¶ 3-4. This fully briefed Motion is before the Court.
Jurisdiction
Before the Court addresses Madden's substantive arguments, the Court must first examine the basis for federal jurisdiction. Although not raised by Madden, “[i]t is the responsibility of a court to make an independent evaluation of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in every case.” Foster v. Hill, 497 F.3d 695, 696-97 (7th Cir. 2007).
This case arises under Illinois law, specifically 65 ILCS 5/11-13-15 (the Enforcement Statute).[2]However, Amazon removed this action on the basis of federal
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). To meet the requirements of diversity jurisdiction, the matter in controversy must exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and there must be complete diversity of citizenship of the parties. Id.
Here, based on the Verified Complaint, and the information provided by Amazon in its Notice of Removal, the Court is satisfied that Madden and Amazon are citizens of different states. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10; Notice of Removal ¶ 7.
Amazon contends the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000, relying upon the “either viewpoint rule,” which permits the Court to assess the amount-in-controversy by “looking at either the benefit to the plaintiff or the cost to the defendant of the requested relief[.]” Notice of Removal ¶ 9 (citing Uhl v. Thoroughbred Tech. & Telecomm., Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Smith Prod. Co. v. Baldwin, 106 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 1997) (unpublished) (cleaned up)[3](“In a declaratory judgment action, we measure the amount in controversy by the value of the ‘object of the litigation.' Under the ‘either viewpoint rule,' we can calculate the value of the object of the litigation from the viewpoint of either party.”)). Given the nature of the requested relief by Madden-enjoining Amazon from using the Facility-Amazon maintains that its damages in complying with the relief sought, including the time it
would take to secure a special use permit, and the resulting lost sales if the Facility is non-operational, would far exceed $75,000. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 12-13.[4]
Madden does not take a position on whether the requirements of diversity jurisdiction are met. Nor did she file a motion to remand.
The Court agrees with Amazon that in applying the “either viewpoint rule,” the cost to Amazon in complying with the requested injunctive relief would exceed $75,000. See Uhl, 309 F.3d at 983. Therefore, the Court finds that Amazon satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement.
The Court, having satisfied itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, now turns to analyzing what standard applies to evaluating Madden's Motion.
Legal Standard
Before the Court can delve into the merits of the motion, the Court must resolve the applicable preliminary injunction standard.
Madden argues that the Enforcement Statute creates a modified legal standard for the granting of a preliminary injunction. R. 1-1, Exh. A at 32 (Memo.) at 3. A complaint that seeks an injunction based on a statute, submits Madden, need not allege all of the factors for a preliminary injunction. Id. Specifically, she argues, a plaintiff is not required to plead or prove irreparable harm and an inadequate
remedy at law. Id. (citing Riverdale v. Allied Waste Transp., 777 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ill.App.Ct. 2002); People v. Fiorini, 574 N.E.2d 612, 623 (III. 1991); County of DuPage v. Gavrilos, 834 N.E.2d 643, 648-49 (Ill.App.Ct. 2005)). Rather, Madden submits that she need only show that the statute was violated, and that the statute allows injunctive relief. Id. at 3-4. The Enforcement Statute, posits Madden, allows for private individuals to step into the shoes of a municipality to enjoin violations of a zoning code. Id. at 4. And the plain text of the statute, contends Madden, supports the proposition that she need only show a likelihood of success in showing the underlying violation to obtain an injunction. Id.
Predictably, Amazon disagrees, arguing that contrary to Madden's suggestion, federal courts apply the familiar four-factor test in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction. Resp. at 7-8 (citing Holbrook Mfg. LLC v. Rhyno Mfg. Inc, 497 F.Supp.3d 319, 333 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2020)). The exception cited by Madden, asserts Amazon is only applicable where the movant in an Enforcement Statute action is a unit of government and not a private...
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