Maddin v. Gte of Florida, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 January 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-1648-CIV-T-17A.,97-1648-CIV-T-17A.
• Citation: 33 F.Supp.2d 1027
• Parties: Lorna G. MADDIN, Plaintiff, v. GTE OF FLORIDA, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

Page 1027

33 F.Supp.2d 1027

Lorna G. MADDIN, Plaintiff, v. GTE OF FLORIDA, INC., Defendant.

No. 97-1648-CIV-T-17A.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

January 27, 1999.

James David Acosta, Acosta & Rose, P.A., Tampa, FL, for plaintiff.

Gregory Alan Hearing, Thomas M. Gonzalez, Richard L. Bradford, Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez, P.A., Tampa, FL, for defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KOVACHEVICH, Chief Judge.

This cause comes before the Court on Defendant, GTE OF FLORIDA, INC. [GTE]'s, motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum (Docket Nos. 11-12), filed October 1, 1998; and Plaintiff, LORNA G. MADDIN [Maddin]'s, response (Docket No. 16), filed October 13, 1998.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A material fact is one which "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

The evidence presented must be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and that party must receive the benefit of all favorable inferences that can be drawn from that party's evidence. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Evans v. Meadow Steel Products, Inc., 579 F.Supp. 1391, 1394 (N.D.Ga.1984). The Court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment should be granted. See Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1538 (11th Cir.1989) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

BACKGROUND

The facts as stated are taken from the complaint (Docket No. 1), filed July 1, 1997; Maddin's deposition (Docket No. 13), filed October 1, 1998; Maddin's affidavit (Docket No. 18), filed October 13, 1998; Bob Mathis' affidavit (Docket No. 13), filed October 1, 1998; and Mathis' deposition, (Docket No. 15), filed October 8, 1998. Where there are conflicts in the evidence, they are resolved for purposes of this motion in favor of Maddin as the non-moving party.

Maddin began her employment with GTE in 1983 and worked in several different positions with GTE, becoming a customer service representative in 1988. The problems alleged in her complaint began in 1995, at which time she worked in GTE's Customer Contact Center in Tampa, Florida. There, customer service representatives answer calls regarding billing and payment from customers from across the southeastern United States. The representatives are broken up into groups, and each group has a supervisor. In 1995, Maddin was in a group of approximately twenty associates supervised by Joe Miller. Sarah Legault later became her supervisor. Throughout the time in question, Maddin's supervisor reported to a section manager, Bob Mathis, who oversaw nine supervisors.

Between March and October 1995, Maddin had ongoing medical problems relating to a pregnancy and miscarriage. As a result of these problems, Maddin took leave several times under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 [FMLA], 29 U.S.C. § 2601. Maddin alleges that Miller was not properly trained in filling out FMLA paperwork, and that several times he lost the paperwork she filled out. Miller called her at home while she was recovering from a miscarriage and asked her to fill out additional paperwork. As a result of Miller's problems with the paperwork, Maddin was initially recorded as being absent rather than on leave for the time she missed. Maddin was not credited with all of her FMLA leave until January 1996. GTE limits the number of unscheduled absences employees may have, but does not count FMLA leave as an unscheduled absence. Miller's mistake meant that Maddin was prevented from being considered for several transfers she applied for, because her absenteeism rate was too high. Further, she was threatened several times with losing her job if she missed any more work. In August 1995, Maddin had a meeting with Miller and Mathis at which she was required to answer detailed and embarrassing questions about her medical condition.

Maddin also alleges that during this time Mathis addressed her by such terms as "gorgeous," "babe," "doll," "good-looking," "honey," "sweety," and "beautiful." He played with her hair while she was talking to a customer. On one occasion he told her "You know, in another life you and I would have been lovers." She also alleges that her work was subject to greater scrutiny than the work of other associates. Finally, Maddin states that Mathis oversaw a meeting of her work group that became quite argumentative and hostile. During that meeting, Mathis put his hand over her face, touching her face, and told her to "shut up."

GTE has a progressive discipline system. An infraction of GTE's rules or policies is first met with a verbal warning, followed by a worksheet, an on-job contact, a written reminder, and finally a decision-making leave. An employee who violates GTE's rules or policies following a decision-making leave would ordinarily be terminated. After having already gone through the earlier steps in GTE's progressive discipline system, Maddin was placed on a one-day decision-making leave on June 27, 1996 for tardiness in returning from breaks, rudeness to customers, and placing customers on hold for excessive lengths of time.

On August 4, 1996, Maddin took a leave of absence pursuant to the FMLA. She was scheduled to return to her job on October 20, 1996, but never returned. GTE attempted to contact Maddin on October 18, 1996 and October 21, 1996, but she did not return the calls. On October 31, 1996, GTE sent Maddin a letter informing her that her employment with GTE was terminated for job abandonment. Although Maddin received this letter, she did not understand from it that her employment with GTE was actually terminated, because at the time, her doctors and the union were attempting to have her placed in a different position. Through her union, Maddin filed a grievance over her termination, but the grievance was eventually dropped by the union.

GTE provided sexual harassment training to its employees and supervisors. Additionally, throughout the time in question, GTE had a policy against sexual harassment. The policy was posted on employee bulletin boards on every floor of GTE's Customer Contact Center. Victims of sexual harassment were told that they should report the harassment to their supervisor, the Human Resources Department, Security, or the GTE Business Conduct Concerns Line. Nonetheless, Maddin did not take advantage of any of these options. Instead, she told her union steward, a fellow customer service representative, what had happened. She did not, however, ever file a grievance over Mathis' actions, even though she filed at least eleven other grievances between 1994 and 1996.

Maddin filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. She received a right to sue letter on April 4, 1997, and filed this action on July 1, 1997. Maddin's complaint contains two counts. Count I is a claim for sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e [Title VII], alleging that Maddin received disparate treatment based on her sex and that she was subjected to a hostile and abusive working environment. Count II is a claim for battery under Florida law, alleging that Mathis acted within the scope and course of his employment when he placed his hand on her face during the May 24, 1996, meeting. GTE now moves for summary judgment as to both counts.

ANALYSIS

I. Count I

Title VII authorizes redress of sex-based employment discrimination under any of a number of theories. Maddin proceeds under several of these. Her complaint seeks remedies based on the theories of disparate treatment and sexual harassment. Maddin's response to GTE's motion for summary judgment also discusses recovery under a theory of constructive discharge.

A. Disparate Treatment

Although her complaint is not entirely clear in this respect, Maddin's disparate treatment claim appears to be based on the handling of her FMLA leave. To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment sex discrimination, a plaintiff must allege and prove that: (i) she is a member of a protected class; (ii) she suffered an adverse employment action; (iii) she and a similarly situated non-protected person were dissimilarly treated; and (iv) the employment action was causally related to her protected status. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976).

Maddin satisfies only the first two prongs of this test. As a woman, Maddin is a member of a protected class. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir.1982). The failure to promote is an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Chrysler First, Inc., 861 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir.1988). However, Maddin provides no instances in which a male GTE employee was treated differently with regard to FMLA leave. Further, the only...