Maddock v. Magone

• Decision Date: 12 March 1894
• Docket Number: No. 244,244
• Citation: 152 U.S. 368,38 L.Ed. 482,14 S.Ct. 588
• Parties: MADDOCK v. MAGONE, Collector
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

152 U.S. 368

14 S.Ct. 588

38 L.Ed. 482

MADDOCK

v MAGONE, Collector.

No. 244.

March 12, 1894.

This was an action at law, brought by William B. Maddock against Daniel Magone, collector of the port of New York, to recover duties paid under protest. A general verdict was directed for defendant, (41 Fed. 882,) and plaintiff brings error.

This was an action to recover duties paid under protest. The bill of exceptions, omitting formal parts, was as follows:

'The plaintiff imported, in the year 1886, into the port of New York, certain goods, consisting of mugs, plates, cups, and saucers, made of china, of small size, and claimed by him to be dutiable as toys. Duty was assessed by the defendant, and paid by the plaintiff at the rate of sixty per cent. ad valorem under protest as follows: 'Against your decision and assessment of duties as made by you, and the payment of more than 35% ad valorem on our importations below mentioned, consisting of certain china toys, claiming that under existing laws, and particularly by Sch. N, Act March 3, 1883, as toys said goods are liable at no more than 35% ad valorem, and not at 60% ad valorem, as charged by you.'

'Due appeal was made, and suit was brought in due time.

'Plaintiff further introduced evidence tending to show that the articles in question were in fact toys, and, in addition, that they were known in trade and commerce in March, 1883, and prior thereto, as toys, and were bought and sold under the denomination of toy plates, toy teas, and toy cans.

'In behalf of the defendant, evidence was introduced tending to show that these articles were not handled by toy houses, but that they were bought and sold under the name of A B C plates, A B C mugs, A B C cans, and the cups and saucers were known as Minton teas or after-dinner coffees, and were also used in restaurants to serve coffee in, and that they were used by children to eat and drink out of, and not merely for the purpose of amusement.

'The court, at the conclusion of the evidence, submitted the question to the jury as follows:

"You are to answer the question by yes or no whether these goods are or are not toys. You have heard the evidence, and all that is necessary for me to do in leaving the case in your hands is to give you the definition of the word toy: 'A toy is a plaything; a thing the main use or purpose of which is the amusement of children.' Bearing that definition in mind, and as instructed by the evidence, you will determine, as to these articles, whether they are or are not toys.'

'Thereupon counsel for plaintiff requested the court to charge that if these articles were known as toys in trade and commerce in March, 1883, and prior thereto, the plaintiff is entitled to recover; which request the court refused so to charge, and plaintiff's counsel duly excepted, and the exception was duly allowed.'

The record states that, 'after hearing the evidence for the respective parties and the argument of counsel, the jury say that they find the goods in suit are not toys, and, by direction of the court, that they find a verdict for the defendant.' Judgment was thereupon entered on the verdict in favor of the defendant, with costs, and this writ of error taken out.

Edwin B. Smith, for plaintiff in error.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Whitney, for defendant in error.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff contended that the articles in question should have been assessed under the clause in Schedule N in the tariff act of March 3, 1883, c. 121, 'Dolls and toys, thirty-five per centum ad valorem;' but the collector assessed them under Schedule B of that act, imposing a duty on 'china, porcelain, parian, and bisque, earthen, stone and crockery ware, including plaques, ornaments, charms, vases, and statuettes, painted, printed, or gilded, or otherwise decorated or ornamented in any manner, sixty per centum ad valorem.' 22 Stat. 495, 512.

After giving the ordinary definition of the word 'toy,' the court left to the jury the question whether these goods were or were not toys. No exception was reserved to this part of the charge, nor to the action of the court in that regard. The evidence on behalf of the plaintiff tended to show that the articles were in fact toys, and on behalf of the defendant that they were 'used in restaurants to serve coffee in,...