Maddox v. Clackamas County School Dist. No. 25
| Decision Date | 27 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 25,No. 78-5-275,25,78-5-275 |
| Citation | 643 P.2d 1253,293 Or. 27 |
| Parties | , 3 Ed. Law Rep. 1114 William K. MADDOX, Petitioner on Review, v. CLACKAMAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 25, a public body corporate; Robert Jackson, Charles Zeek, John Weygandt, Jesse Lantz and Harold Gibboney, individually and as members of the District School Board of Clackamas County School District; and Richard Bailey, Respondents on Review. ; CA 17281; SC 27822. * |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
James C. Tait, Oregon City, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Hibbard, Caldwell, Canning, Bowerman & Schultz, Oregon City.
This is a claim in contract and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by an elementary school teacher whose employment was terminated one month into his one school-year term as a probationary teacher. He seeks damages from the employer school district for breach of contract and from the school district and the school board members individually for deprivation without due process of law of his property interest in continued employment. The trial court dismissed the claim and the Court of Appeals affirmed. There are two issues: The first is whether a probationary teacher whose contract is expressly subject to ORS 342.835 has a claim for breach of contract to challenge a termination under that statute during the term of his contract. The second is whether a probationary teacher hired for a fixed term has a "property" interest in his job of which he cannot be deprived without due process of law, and if so, what process is due.
The facts are stipulated. Plaintiff was hired for the 1976-77 school year. About one month into the school year, the school principal informed plaintiff by letter that he intended to recommend plaintiff's dismissal to the district school board at a special meeting to be held two days later. 1 The letter listed the reasons for the principal's recommendation, informed plaintiff that he would be welcome at the meeting and that he would be afforded an additional hearing "depending upon the direction the board takes."
At the meeting, plaintiff characterized the charges against him as untrue, exaggerated and not grounds for dismissal, but he did not comment further on the specific charges. He asked the board to delay its decision in order to give him and his lawyer an opportunity to prepare an adequate response. He requested a public hearing, at which he would be allowed to call and cross-examine witnesses. The board denied plaintiff's request to continue the proceedings and, following an executive session, voted to terminate his employment effective immediately. Plaintiff was informed by letter that he was dismissed as of the date of the meeting.
Upon plaintiff's request, an informal public hearing was held several weeks later. Witnesses were not sworn, but plaintiff was apparently free to question the principal who recommended his dismissal and to have witnesses speak in his behalf. Afterward, the board voted to confirm its decision to terminate plaintiff's employment.
Plaintiff then brought this action for damages for breach of his employment contract, and for deprivation of his property interest in his one-year contract without due process of law. 2 Defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. The circuit court dismissed both causes of action because plaintiff had a statutory remedy under ORS 342.835(3), infra, by which to challenge the board's decision. It is not clear whether the court viewed the statutory remedy as being exclusive or as one which must be exhausted before other remedies would be available. At any rate, the court concluded that the only remedy then available to plaintiff was to pursue his statutory right of appeal from the board's decision. Summary judgment was denied.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. It held that the contract claim was We allowed review to clarify the remedies available to a probationary teacher who is dismissed during the term of the contract. On somewhat different reasoning, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
properly dismissed because plaintiff may not avoid the limited statutory review granted under ORS 342.835(3) by bringing an action for breach of contract. In addition, it held that the § 1983 claim was properly dismissed because plaintiff did not have a property interest in his contract which was protected by the United States Constitution or the Oregon Constitution.
The employment relationship between school district and teacher has many aspects, each subject to various sources of regulation, such as statute (e.g. ORS ch. 342), administrative rules, and individual or collective contracts. Work hours, for example, may be determined administratively. Duties to be performed and compensation for performance are normally controlled by express or implied contract.
The aspect involved in this case is termination. We have held that in the absence of agreement or other regulation (and disregarding constitutional requirements), either the employer or the employee may terminate employment at any time for any reason, Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone, 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980); Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 655, 576 P.2d 356 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 216, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). 3 Here, those prerogatives are restricted. The duration of employment is governed by both contract and statute. The term of employment is established by contract as one year but, as the contract acknowledges, that term is subject to termination pursuant to statute.
The contract specified the parties, school year, salary and required teacher certification. It then listed several "conditions of employment," including:
Under the "laws of the State of Oregon" to which this contract was subject, the school district was not free to terminate employment of probationary teachers such as plaintiff at will. 4 Termination of probationary teachers' employment was governed by ORS 342.835, which at all pertinent times provided:
(a) The procedures at the hearing;
(b) Whether the written copy of reasons for dismissal required by this section was supplied; and (c) In the case of nonrenewal whether notice of nonrenewal was timely given. " (See n.5, post.)
Under that statute, school districts were authorized to dismiss probationary teachers for any cause their board "in good faith" deemed sufficient. The probationary teacher is entitled to written reasons for the dismissal and, upon request, a hearing by the board. The statute also provides for an appeal from the hearing. In Henthorn v. Grand Prairie School Dist., 287 Or. 683, 601 P.2d 1243 (1979), we construed ORS 342.835 to provide that the appeal was by writ of review, which review was limited to the procedures used in the dismissal process. 5 The intent of ORS 342.835 was to give to probationary teachers a limited measure of procedural protection from arbitrary termination, but to leave the substantive determination to terminate with the school districts, to allow flexibility in probationary teacher decisions and to avoid embroilment in extended termination procedures. 6
In sum, the contract provides for a contractual term of employment subject to statutory termination provisions. Termination is not elsewhere dealt with in the contract. Although the contract is for a specified term, it does not purport to eliminate or modify the controlling effect of ORS 342.835. (We need not consider whether that can lawfully be done by contract.) This contract purports only to jointly acknowledge that the terms of the agreement of the parties are subject to state laws, of which ORS 342.835 governing termination is one. In other words, termination grounds and procedures are governed by a source other than the contract and the contract notes the existence and controlling effect of that other source.
Those interests of the parties which exist by virtue of the contract (e.g., compensation) may be protected by contract remedies. Plaintiff's freedom from improper termination, however, does not arise from the contract. That interest exists by virtue of the statute. His remedies also exist by virtue of the statute. The contract only acknowledges that its provisions (e.g., term) are "subject to," among other things, the termination provisions of ORS 342.845. No additional contract right or remedy to enforce the statute is created by the "subject to" provision.
Plaintiff argues that we should construe ORS 342.835 to allow for alternative remedies because the statutory remedy is inadequate. Specifically, he argues that we should recognize a contract remedy because a probationary teacher who is successful in the writ of review proceeding may not be awarded damages. Statutes need not create a complete remedy for vindication of statutorily created interests, see, for example, ...
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