Madeja v. MPB Corp.
| Decision Date | 23 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2002–197.,2002–197. |
| Citation | 149 N.H. 371,821 A.2d 1034 |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | Michelle MADEJA v. MPB CORPORATION d/b/a Split Ballbearing. |
Upton & Hatfield, LLP, of Concord (Robert Upton, II and Heather M. Burns, on the brief, and Mr. Upton orally), for plaintiff.
Craig L. Staples, of Concord, by brief and orally, for defendant.
The defendant, MPB Corporation d/b/a Split Ballbearing, appeals a jury verdict in Superior Court (Morrill , J.) awarding the plaintiff, Michelle Madeja, compensatory and punitive damages for the sexual harassment and retaliation claims she brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) (Title VII), and RSA chapter 354–A.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erroneously: (1) instructed the jury regarding employer liability for co-worker sexual harassment; (2) instructed the jury regarding employer liability for co-worker retaliation; (3) denied the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the plaintiff's sexual harassment, retaliation and punitive damages claims; (4) submitted a special verdict form that did not include the defendant's affirmative defenses; (5) admitted evidence regarding Sprague's subsequent termination for sexual harassment; and (6) declined to admit evidence that the plaintiff's immediate prior employer received complaints about her poor attitude. Additionally, the defendant argues that this court should set aside or reduce the punitive damages award because it violates the defendant's federal due process rights. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. We note, at the outset, that the defendant does not challenge whether the evidence that the conduct constituted sexual harassment was sufficient. We affirm.
The jury could have found the following facts. The defendant manufactures ball bearings. On July 27, 1998, it hired the plaintiff to be a full-time pre-assembly inspector of ball bearings. On August 3, one of the plaintiff's co-workers complained to Rose Henry, the senior shift supervisor, that the plaintiff verbally harassed and pulled the hair of another employee. Henry advised the plaintiff that the company would not tolerate this kind of behavior and that it might discipline her if she engaged in it again.
On August 29, another co-worker complained to a different supervisor, Larry Sprague, that the plaintiff "was being rude [and] making sarcastic remarks to her." Sprague told the plaintiff to stop this behavior.
On Friday, September 11, Ernie Danyew, the plaintiff's trainer, told Sprague that he could not work with the plaintiff because of her "smart ass attitude toward everyone in the room." After consulting with the factory manager, Michael Santaniello, Sprague told the plaintiff that she had one week to demonstrate "a very distinct change in her attitude" and that if she failed to do so, the company "would not put any more effort into her."
The following Monday, September 14, the plaintiff told Sprague that she believed she knew why Danyew complained about her. She said that "a long time ago," Danyew had asked for her address, which she gave him, and had asked if he could stop by sometime with a six-pack of beer. Because she thought he was kidding, she said, "sure." A few days later, she learned that he had come by her apartment when she was not home.
Earlier in the week beginning September 4, 1998, Danyew told her that he still had the six-pack of beer and asked if he could come by after she brought her son to school. When she said she was busy, Danyew asked if he could come by over the weekend. When she again said that she would be busy, Danyew protested that it would only be for a few minutes. The plaintiff said " no."
The plaintiff also told Sprague that, in the past, every time Danyew walked by her, he rubbed her shoulders. Although Danyew had stopped doing this, on Friday, September 11, at break time, he sat a few inches from her on a picnic bench. She got up and left the bench because the "whole thing made her feel creepy." She asked Sprague not to do anything to Danyew because she believed he now understood that she was not interested in him. Sprague told the plaintiff that he would document their conversation and that if it happened again, she should come to him right away. Sprague then documented the conversation and the plaintiff signed his recitation of it.
Sprague reported the plaintiff's complaint to his direct supervisor, Bruce Richardson, the area manager, who in turn, reported it to his supervisor, Santaniello. Richardson and Santaniello discussed the plaintiff's complaint with Richard Ackerman, the human resources manager.
On September 15, the following day, Sprague met with Danyew to discuss the plaintiff's complaint. Danyew admitted that he had asked the plaintiff if he could stop by her home with a six-pack of beer and that he had done so once when she was not home. He said he had intended this to be a "friendly gesture." Sprague told Danyew that it did not matter that he intended his gesture to be "friendly." Sprague informed Danyew that he would no longer be scheduled to work with the plaintiff and that he should stay away from her. He also warned Danyew not to discuss the matter with her.
Two or three days later, Sprague asked the plaintiff if Danyew was still bothering her. She said, "no." After lodging her complaint on September 14, 1998, the plaintiff and Danyew did not work together again. Danyew, however, was angry with the plaintiff for bringing what he believed was an unfounded complaint of sexual harassment.
On September 21, Sprague received a complaint about the plaintiff from another trainer, Susan Thibodeau. Thibodeau said that she did not "feel comfortable" working with the plaintiff. When asked why, Thibodeau explained that the plaintiff did not care if she made mistakes and, when confronted, she became defensive. Thibodeau also stated that when she and the plaintiff worked together on Saturday, September 19, the plaintiff was unproductive, inspecting twenty-four bearings per hour as compared to Thibodeau's 120 bearings per hour.
Thibodeau was a friend of Danyew's to whom he had spoken about the plaintiff. Danyew told Thibodeau that the plaintiff had complained that he sexually harassed her, to which Thibodeau had responded that "[i]t sounds just like her." Danyew, Thibodeau and the other trainers discussed the need for the company to fire the plaintiff. As Danyew testified, Danyew and the other trainers, including Thibodeau, said amongst themselves, "If the company is not going to get rid of her, enough of our complaints will."
After receiving Thibodeau's complaint, Sprague asked her to keep the bearings she inspected separate from those the plaintiff inspected that night. Sprague observed that the plaintiff was unproductive.
Sprague spoke with the senior shift supervisor, Henry, about the plaintiff's low productivity. Henry, who knew of neither the plaintiff's complaint against Danyew nor Danyew's complaint about the plaintiff, recommended that Sprague terminate her. Sprague recommended termination to his supervisor, Richardson, who agreed. Richardson forwarded Sprague's recommendation to Santaniello, who also agreed with it. Santaniello discussed the recommendation with Ackerman, who made the final decision to terminate the plaintiff. The defendant terminated the plaintiff's employment on September 22, 1998.
The plaintiff sued the defendant for sexual harassment and retaliation under RSA chapter 354–A and Title VII. The jury found in her favor. In addition to other damages, it awarded her $350,000 in punitive damages for her Title VII claims. The court later reduced the punitive damages award to $300,000 to comply with the cap on such awards under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b)(3)(D) (2000).
The defendant argues that the court erroneously instructed the jury regarding employer liability for co-worker sexual harassment and retaliation.
"The purpose of jury instructions is to identify issues of material fact, and to inform the jury of the appropriate standards of law by which it is to resolve them." Broderick v. Watts, 136 N.H. 153, 163, 614 A.2d 600 (1992). We review jury instructions in context and will not reverse unless the charge, taken in its entirety, fails to explain the law applicable to the case adequately so as to mislead the jury. See Simpson v. Wal–Mart Stores, 144 N.H. 571, 574, 744 A.2d 625 (1999).
The trial court instructed the jury about employer liability for co-worker sexual harassment under both RSA chapter 354–A and Title VII as follows:
The court explained that to avoid liability for co-worker sexual harassment:
The defendant's remedial action must be reasonable and adequate. Whether the defendant's remedial action is reasonable and adequate depends upon the remedy's ability to stop the individual harasser from continuing to engage in such conduct and to discourage other potential harassers from engaging in similar unlawful conduct. An effective remedy should be assessed proportionately to the seriousness of the offense.
The defendant argues that these instructions were improper because they allowed the jury to find the defendant liable for a merely negligent response to the alleged sexual harassment. The defendant asserts that mere negligence is insufficient. See Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied , ...
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