Madely v. Radioshack Corp.

• Decision Date: 23 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2006AP2918.,2006AP2918.
• Parties: William MADELY and James Borland, on behalf of themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RADIOSHACK CORPORATION, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

742 N.W.2d 559

2007 WI App 244

William MADELY and James Borland, on behalf of themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RADIOSHACK CORPORATION, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 2006AP2918.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs August 30, 2007.

Opinion Filed October 23, 2007.

On behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Robert K. O'Reilly of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, of Cudahy.

On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Bernard J. Bobber of Foley & Lardner LLP, of Milwaukee, and Robert S. Brewer, Jr. and James S. McNeill of McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP of San Diego, CA.

Before BROWN, C.J., CURLEY, P.J., and WEDEMEYER, J.

¶ 1 CURLEY, P.J

William Madely and James Borland appeal from a judgment dismissing their claims that they were improperly classified as exempt from overtime payments, denying their motion for partial summary judgment, and granting summary judgment to RadioShack. Madely and Borland argue that: (1) the trial court erred by weighing the evidence in RadioShack's favor where there were disputed questions of material fact; and (2) a trial is required because a jury could find that RadioShack Y¹ store managers do not exercise discretionary power and do not have the requisite authority regarding personnel matters.

¶ 2 We disagree and conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 802.08(6) (2003-04) because the class of Y store managers were appropriately designated as falling within Wisconsin's executive exemption.² Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND.

¶ 3 Madely and Borland are former Y store managers for RadioShack. They claim, on behalf of a class consisting of Y store managers, that RadioShack violated Wisconsin's statutory overtime law by improperly classifying them as exempt employees under the Department of Workforce Development's exemption regulation found at WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD 274.04.³

¶ 4 Madely and Borland filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that RadioShack could not prove two of the six elements required to establish that the class members were exempt from Wisconsin's overtime regulations. Specifically, they argued that RadioShack could not meet its burden of showing that Y store managers have the requisite personnel authority to qualify for the executive exemption, in accordance with WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD 274.04(1)(a)3.; or that they "customarily and regularly exercise[ ] discretionary powers," pursuant to WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD 274.04(1)(a)4.

¶ 5 With respect to WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD 274.04(1)(a)3., Madely and Borland provided numerous examples of situations where Y store managers lack authority to act on personnel issues. For example, Y store managers cannot make final hiring and firing decisions; rather, they conduct "prescreening reviews" of prospective employees and make recommendations as to terminations. Madely and Borland assert that the district sales manager is the person responsible for making personnel decisions, not the store manager, as the role of a store manager is that of lead salesperson. They argued that "RadioShack sales managers [i.e., Y store managers] clearly do not have the authority to hire or fire other employees, and their suggestions and recommendations about the hiring, firing, advancement or promotion or any other change of status of other employees are not given particular weight."

¶ 6 To support their position as to WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD 274.04(1)(a)4., Madely and Borland relied, in large part, on RadioShack's Store Operations Manual (the Manual), which establishes mandatory policies. They contend that the all-encompassing Manual "dictates the policies and procedures down to the minutia of how their desk is organized, how to change light bulbs, how to resolve plumbing problems, telephone problems, roof leaks, and landlord issues, and how a sales manager should schedule his or her own hours." (Record citations omitted.) According to Madely and Borland, any discretion that is exercised in following the prescribed procedures is minimal and distinguishable from the actual exercise of discretion. In addition, Madely and Borland rely upon RadioShack's "Assistant Manager Training Program Instructor's Guide," which describes the company's "SEVEN-ONE-ONE" management method. This method directs store managers to schedule "7 hours of selling, 1 hour on training, and 1 hour of paperwork each day." They argue that this shows that Y store managers are trained and instructed to spend the majority of their employment time as salespersons; therefore, they argued that "the most RadioShack can suggest is that sales managers occasionally exercise discretionary powers," which is insufficient to satisfy § DWD 274.04(1)(a)4.

¶ 7 In its opposition materials, RadioShack addressed each of the elements of Wisconsin's executive exemption to support its argument that Y store managers qualify. RadioShack then requested that the trial court deny Madely and Borland's motion for summary judgment and instead grant summary judgment in its favor, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 802.08(6).

¶ 8 The trial court subsequently denied Madely and Borland's request for summary judgment, and concluded that RadioShack was entitled to partial summary judgment with respect to WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD 274.04(1)(a)2.-6. The trial court then took the issue of whether RadioShack was entitled to partial summary judgment pursuant to § DWD 274.04(1)(a)1. under advisement. It subsequently determined that RadioShack was entitled to summary judgment as to all of the elements set forth in § DWD 274.04(1)(a) and dismissed Madely and Borland's claims that they were improperly classified as exempt.⁴ This appeal follows. Additional facts are provided in the remainder of the opinion as needed.

II. ANALYSIS.

¶ 9 "When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, appellate courts independently apply the same methodology as the trial court. That methodology has been set forth numerous times, and we need not repeat it here." Fore Way Express, Inc. v. Bast, 178 Wis.2d 693, 701, 505 N.W.2d 408 (Ct.App.1993) (citations omitted). We do, however, point out that a motion for summary judgment is not a motion free of adverse consequences, in that a court may grant a request for summary judgment when made by a party opposing another party's motion. See WIS. STAT. § 802.08(6) (allowing that summary judgment maybe be awarded in the opponent's favor, "[i]f it shall appear to the court that the party against whom a motion for summary judgment is asserted is entitled to a summary judgment").

¶ 10 Madely and Borland filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that RadioShack could not meet its burden of showing that Y store managers have the requisite personnel authority to qualify for the executive exemption, in accordance with WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD 274.04(1)(a)3.; or that they exercise discretionary powers, pursuant to WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD 274.04(1)(a)4. A motion for summary judgment amounts to an "`explicit assertion that the movant is satisfied that the facts are undisputed and that on those facts he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Grotelueschen v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 171 Wis.2d 437, 446, 492 N.W.2d 131 (1992) (citation omitted); see also Fore Way, 178 Wis.2d at 702, 505 N.W.2d 408. So long as "only one reasonable inference can be drawn from those undisputed facts as a matter of law, reciprocal motions for summary judgment waive the right to a jury trial." Grotelueschen, 171 Wis.2d at 447, 492 N.W.2d 131.

¶ 11 On appeal, Madely and Borland now contend that "[b]oth parties here have submitted facts that would allow a jury to decide this action either way, and different inferences may be drawn from those facts." We disagree and conclude that only one reasonable inference can be drawn as to WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD 274.04(1)(a)3. and 4. See generally Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2005 WI App 28, ¶ 10, 278 Wis.2d 698, 693 N.W.2d 89, rev'd in part on other grounds, 2006 WI 103, 294 Wis.2d 274, 717 N.W.2d 781 ("Whether an inference is reasonable and whether more than one reasonable inference may be drawn are questions of law."). Thus, as explained below, we reject as waived any challenges raised by Madely and Borland on appeal concerning what they now allege are disputed material facts entitling them to a jury trial as to § DWD 274.04(1)(a)3. and 4. By filing their motion for partial summary judgment, Madely and Borland conceded that the material facts as to §§ DWD 274.04(1)(a)3. and 4. were undisputed.⁵ See Grotelueschen, 171 Wis.2d at 446, 492 N.W.2d 131 ("A motion for summary judgment carries with it the explicit assertion that the movant is satisfied that the facts are undisputed and that on those facts he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (citation and quotation marks omitted)). When RadioShack filed a reciprocal motion for summary judgment addressing §§ DWD 274.04(1)(a)3. and 4. (along with the other elements), Madely and Borland's right to a jury trial was waived given our conclusion that only one reasonable inference can be drawn as to those facts. See Grotelueschen, 171 Wis.2d at 447, 492 N.W.2d 131 (concluding that "when only one reasonable inference can be drawn from those undisputed facts as a matter of law, reciprocal motions for summary judgment waive the right to a jury trial").

¶ 12 Notwithstanding the waiver of Madely and Borland's arguments as to WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD 274.04(1)(a)3. and 4., further analysis is required as to the other elements of Wisconsin's executive exemption. See § DWD 274.04(1)(a). Our determination of whether RadioShack's Y store managers qualify for the executive exemption "involves interpretation and application of statutes and regulations to undisputed facts, which is a question of law appropriate for summary judgment." Fore Way, 178 Wis.2d at 701, 505 N.W.2d...