Madera v. Monongahela Railway Co.

• Decision Date: 14 April 1947
• Docket Number: 3231
• Citation: 356 Pa. 460,52 A.2d 329
• Parties: Madera, Appellant, v. Monongahela Railway Co. et al
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

52 A.2d 329

356 Pa. 460

Madera, Appellant, v. Monongahela Railway Co. et al

No. 3231

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

April 14, 1947

Argued March 27, 1947

Appeal, No. 31, March T., 1947, from decree of C.P., Fayette Co., No. 1806, in case of Helen Madera v. The Monongahela Railway Co. et al. Decree affirmed.

Same case below: 52 D. & C. 216.

Bill in equity to protect employe's seniority rights and for an accounting. Before CARR, P.J.

Adjudication entered dismissing bill. Plaintiff appealed.

Decree affirmed at appellant's costs.

Eugene Charles Sloan , within him James H. Gray , for appellant.

Dean D. Sturgis, with him A. M. Donnan, Richard N Clattenburg, Joseph W. Ray, Jr ., and Willard H McEwen , for appellees.

Before MAXEY, C.J., DREW, LINN, STERN, PATTERSON, STEARNE and JONES JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE LINN

Plaintiff sued for restoration of seniority rights in her employment and for an account by defendant Monongahela Railway Company, alleging that she had been deprived of such rights by fraudulent acts of defendants. Defendants denied fraud, stated the employment relationship of the parties and pleaded that, in any event, plaintiff's claim was barred by laches. From the evidence, the learned chancellor, President Judge CARR, found the facts against the plaintiff and in accord with the contentions of defendants. The court in banc dismissed the bill after hearing plaintiff's exceptions to the adjudication. The plaintiff has appealed. We must affirm the decree.

From September 24, 1917, to some time in August, 1931, plaintiff was employed by the railway company as a clerk in the freight station at Brownsville, Pennsylvania, except for two short periods when laid off temporarily. From July, 1921, to February, 1923, her employment, as well as that of other employes, was subject to a collective employment agreement by the company and the Brotherhood which was then cancelled by mutual agreement. ^[1] That contract had provided for seniority rights. In Polanskey v. Monongahela Rwy. Co ., 342 Pa. 188, 19 A.2d 377, we observed that "it has been held that an employe 'has no inherent right to seniority in service... except as provided for in the contracts entered into and the rules adopted by the company relating thereto': Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., 267 Mich. 202, 255 N.W. 365." ^[2] Thereafter no provision on the subject existed until December 16, 1933, when, as the court found, a "new collective bargaining contract, effective on that date and expressed as superseding the contract [referred to above] was entered into in writing between the Company and the Brotherhood as representing the clerks, store and station employes of the Company..." A roster of such employes showing "the seniority standing of clerks, store, and station employes was prepared and posted on April 11, 1934, and annually thereafter, with the exceptions of the years 1938 and 1941, on none of which rosters did plaintiff's name appear..." "The seniority ratings thereby established were agreed upon in good faith for the common benefit of the Company and the employees as a whole, and were reported to the lodge [one of the defendants] at its regular meeting on February 6, 1934."

In 1942, more than eleven years after plaintiff had been laid off and her job abolished, ^[3] she applied for a position as "typist-clerk"; she was appointed and on the roster was given seniority rating as of April 27, 1942, the date on which she began working. The learned court found as a fact that she applied for the position "as a new employee." She contends that seniority rights should have been granted to her as if she had been in continuous employment from September, 1917, and as if the collective employment agreement of July 1, 1921 (amended February 1, 1922) had remained in effect. "On the seniority rosters prepared and posted by the Company since that date she has been listed as entitled to seniority rating only as of April 27, 1942."

In the brief filed on her behalf it is said, "In the memorandum (Defendant's Exhibit 25) ^[4] of the meeting of January 19, 1923, between the management and the clerks it appears that the intention was to eliminate the bargaining agent by abrogating the agreement of February 1, 1922; but that there was no intention to surrender any individual benefits incident to employment which had accrued." From our examination of the evidence we think the learned court was correct in that part of the 18th finding of fact (now challenged) which, briefly summarized, finds that the first contract was terminated February 1, 1923, ^[5] and thereafter no contract provided seniority rights until the contract of 1933 was made. Now, in 1933, plaintiff was not employed by defendant railway company and sustained no relation to it. In the brief filed on her behalf it is said that she was "furloughed" in 1931 and therefore never was out of defendant's employ; in support of this suggestion counsel quotes a provision in the Railroad Retirement Act providing "An individual is in the employment relation to an employer if he is on furlough, subject to call for service within or outside the United States and ready and willing to serve." U.S.C.A. Title 45, section 228a (d). For several reasons the suggestion must be rejected. The learned chancellor found as a fact to which no exception was taken that her employment ceased when "the position she had held [was] abolished" in August, 1931. The word "furloughed" probably got into the record because in 1943 defendant's superintendent in writing to her said she had been furloughed in 1931. If he was then thinking of the word as defined above, he misapplied it in referring to her status in 1931, the statute first containing the definition was approved in 1935, 49 Stat. 967, 45 U.S.C.A. 215.

When plaintiff was re-employed in April, 1943, her employment was based on a new application; she then became entitled to the rights specified in the collective employment agreement effective at that time; such rights have been accorded to her.

With respect to laches we much also agree with the learned court below. Three findings of fact may be quoted: "22. During the latter part of 1934, the plaintiff called at the office of the Company looking for work, at which time she was fully informed by the chief clerk to the superintendent of the collective bargaining contract then existing between the Company and the Brotherhood, of the seniority roster that had been prepared and made effective pursuant to that contract and she was then and there advised by him that because she had not been in the active service of the Company on January 1, 1933, and her name was not included in the seniority roster, consideration could not be given to re-employing her so long as persons whose names appeared on the roster could qualify and might apply for the same work. She also received information and advice to the same effect from the same source in 1936...