Madewell v. Division of Employment Sec.

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Per Curiam
• Citation: Madewell v. Division of Employment Sec., 72 S.W.3d 159 (Mo. App. 2002)
• Decision Date: 26 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. WD 60106.,WD 60106.
• Parties: Hope MADEWELL, Appellant, v. DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Respondent.

72 S.W.3d 159

Hope MADEWELL, Appellant, v. DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Respondent.

No. WD 60106.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Submitted December 5, 2001.

Decided March 26, 2002.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied April 30, 2002.

Samuel I. McHenry, Kansas City, for Appellant.

Sharon Ann Willis, Kansas City, for Respondent.

Before JAMES M. SMART, JR., HAROLD L. LOWENSTEIN, and JOSEPH M. ELLIS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Hope Madewell appeals from a final order of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission of Missouri on her claim for unemployment benefits. The Commission affirmed the appeals tribunal's decision that Madewell voluntarily left her employment. After a hearing on Madewell's appeal from an adverse decision by a deputy with the Missouri Division of Employment Security on March 16, 2001, the appeals referee entered findings of fact and conclusions of law that Madewell quit her employment voluntarily without cause related to her work or employer within the statutory language contained in § 288.050.1, RSMo 2000. She now appeals to this court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Madewell began working as a customer service representative for AT & T in August, 1996. In April of 2000, as a result of manic depression, Madewell applied for and was granted a medical leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. Her last day of active work was on April 21, 2000. The leave was initially granted for the period from April 18, 2000, through May 19, 2000. It was thereafter extended for an indefinite period. Madewell's disability leave benefits were provided by MetLife.

On the evening of October 2, 2000, Madewell, while picking up one of her children at an after-school function, met the employer's attendance manager, who happened to be there at the same time. He told her that she needed to report to work the next day, October 3, 2000. That same evening, Madewell contacted the agency, MetLife, to which she was directed by the employer when the leave was granted and was told by MetLife representatives, she said, that she could not return to work until she received a release from her physician.

On October 3, 2000, according to Madewell, she attempted to contact the employer's attendance manager by telephone about her status, and left a message for him to call her, but her message was not returned. Also, on October 3, 2000, Madewell made an appointment with her physician for October 4, 2000, in order to be released to return to work without restrictions as of that date. However, on October 4, 2000, Madewell received a letter from the employer dated October 3, 2000, stating that she was terminated because she did not report to work on October 3, 2000, as directed by the employer's manager. Madewell made no further effort to contact the employer. That letter, signed by Steve Hitchye, AT & T Attendance Manager, stated:

As stated in my letter sent to you on September 26, your absence from work since September 11, 2000 is considered unauthorized. An unauthorized absence is a form of misconduct that can result in discipline up to and including dismissal.

Therefore, since you did not report to work by October 3, 2000 as directed by me, I have terminated your employment with AT & T effective immediately for misconduct.

Madewell received a "Family and Medical Leave of Absence (FMLA) Notification," which stated that Madewell met the eligibility requirements of FMLA, with total FMLA remaining during the applicable 12 month period of 32 days. The form stated "Concurrent with disability until RTW [return to work] or 12 weeks used." Madewell also received a letter from her employer concerning her leave under the FMLA. It stated that the FMLA period was from April 18, 2000, through May 19, 2000. The May 19, 2000, date had a diagonal line drawn through it, and Madewell testified that the leave was later extended. The letter also stated, in bold type, "Concurrent with disability until RTW date or when 12 weeks used. Notify FMLA if disability becomes non-certified."

On January 10, 2001, a deputy from the Division of Employment Security determined under the Missouri Employment Security Law that Madewell was disqualified for benefits until she had earned wages for insured work after October 4, 2000, equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, on a finding that Madewell left work voluntarily on that date without good case attributable to the work or the employer. Madewell appealed to the appeals tribunal.

The appeals tribunal heard the matter on March 16, 2001. On April 2, 2001, the appeals referee entered findings of fact and conclusions of law that claimant quit her employment voluntarily without cause related to her work or employer. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission affirmed this judgment on May 23, 2001. Madewell appeals the Commission's decision to this court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case is governed by Chapter 288, the Missouri Employment Security Law. In reviewing a decision of the Commission, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment on factual matters for that of the Commission. Section 288.210 provides that the Commission's findings of fact, if supported by competent and substantial evidence and absent fraud, shall be conclusive. Substantial evidence is evidence which has probative force on the issues, and from which the trier of facts can reasonably decide the case. Nettie's Flower Garden, Inc. v. S.I.S., Inc., 869 S.W.2d 226, 231 (Mo.App.1993). This court is not bound by the Commission's conclusions of law, including statutory interpretation. Division of Employment Sec. v. Hatfield, 831 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Mo. App.1992). It is the court's duty to interpret and determine the legislative intent of the Missouri Employment Security law. Division of Employment Sec. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 617 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Mo.App.1981). Section 288.210, RSMo, Supp.1996, like § 287.495, RSMo 1994, provides that the reviewing court may grant relief only when 1) the commission acted without or in excess of its powers, 2) the decision was procured by fraud, 3) the facts found by the commission do not support the award, or 4) there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award. In view of the fact that § 288.210, Supp.1996, and § 287.495, RSMo 1994, prescribe exactly the same grounds for the granting of relief on appellate review, we regard Davis v. Research Medical Center, 903 S.W.2d 557 (Mo.App.1995) (a worker's compensation case) as applicable to employment security decisions as well as worker's compensation decisions.

In Davis, which dealt with review of worker's compensation decisions, we said:

Findings and awards of the Commission which are clearly the interpretation or application of the law, as distinguished from a determination of facts, are not binding on the court and fall within the court's province of independent review and correction where erroneous. And, where the findings of ultimate fact are reached not by a process of natural reasoning from the facts alone, but rather by application of law, it is a conclusion of law and subject to reversal by the court.

Id. at 571. Thus, to the extent this appeal involves issues of law, we do not defer to the Commission. To the extent that it involves evaluating evidence supporting findings of the Commission, there is a two-step process set out in Davis. In the first step, the court examines the whole record, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the award, to determine if the record contains sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award. If not, the Commission's award must be reversed. If there is competent and substantial evidence supporting the award, the court moves to the second step, where it views the evidence in the light most favorable to the award, but must consider all evidence in the record, including that which opposes or is unfavorable to the award, take account of the overall effect of all of the evidence, and determine whether the award is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Davis v. Research Medical Center, 903 S.W.2d 557, 571 (Mo.App.1995).

Because the basic facts in this case are not disputed, and yet the significance of the facts can be viewed in different ways, this case involves primarily the application of the law to the facts.

The Commission's determination of whether an employee voluntarily left her employment or was discharged is a factual determination, and we will defer to the Commission as to its finding that the claimant left her employment voluntarily. Sokol v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 946 S.W.2d 20, 24 (Mo.App.1997). The question of whether the claimant had good cause to leave her employment is a legal issue and thus we do not defer to the Commission's determination on the matter. Id. at 26.

POINT I:

In her sole point on appeal, Madewell asserts that the Commission erred in affirming the appeals referee's decision that Madewell voluntarily left her employment, because the facts found by the Commission do not support the award denying benefits, and there was insufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant such a decision by the Division.

Madewell argues that the evidence showed she was disqualified as a result of failing to report to work on a specific date and time. She argues that she had "undisputed good cause" for not reporting as ordered.

Madewell points out that she alone presented evidence,¹ and the Division referee offered no findings that he found her testimony lacking in credibility, only that he found her conclusion that she needed a physician's authorization to return to work to be unreasonable.

The hearing officer did not indicate that any of Madewell's testimony was disbelieved. Nor did the hearing officer indicate why it should be disbelieved as is required if the hearing officer makes a finding contrary...