Madigan v. Hous. Auth. of the E. Hartford
| Decision Date | 07 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 35682.,35682. |
| Citation | 113 A.3d 1018,156 Conn.App. 339 |
| Parties | Terrence J. MADIGAN v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the TOWN OF EAST HARTFORD. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Matthew Popilowski, with whom, on the brief, was Donn A. Swift, New Haven, for the appellant (defendant).
Leon M. Rosenblatt, with whom, on the brief, was Richard J. Padykula, West Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).
BEACH, ALVORD and PELLEGRINO, Js.
The defendant, the Housing Authority of the Town of East Hartford, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Terrence J. Madigan. The plaintiff was awarded $109,257.45 in economic damages for breach of contract and $100,000 in noneconomic damages for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in connection with the termination of his employment as the defendant's executive director. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied its motion to set aside the verdict on the ground that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to prove a breach of contract, (2) instructed the jury on the element of just cause for termination, (3) instructed the jury on emotional distress damages, (4) admitted into evidence a final decision issued by the Freedom of Information Commission, and (5) precluded evidence of the low morale among the defendant's staff, employees and directors. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The plaintiff began his employment as the defendant's executive director on January 25, 2002. His initial contract provided for a term of three years. Subsequently, he signed a written employment agreement (agreement) with the defendant to continue serving as the defendant's executive director for an additional five year period that expired on January 25, 2010. Paragraph 14 of the agreement listed the circumstances under which the plaintiff's employment could be terminated. Subsection (c) provides: “The [defendant] may terminate the employment and remove [the plaintiff] from his position at any time for those activities constituting misfeasance or nonfeasance or for any other just cause, in accordance with applicable Federal, State or local law.”
As the executive director, the plaintiff was responsible for the general supervision of the defendant's operations, including the hiring and firing of staff. The plaintiff reported to the board of commissioners (board) and served as its secretary. Between four and five department directors reported directly to the plaintiff.
Staff employees, thirty-nine at the time of his departure, worked under the direction of the department directors. Staff employees and their managers were members of a union; directors were exempt nonunion employees.
Beginning in 2006 and continuing into 2007, major changes in the defendant's operations were occurring primarily because of various housing directives and a decrease in funding by the federal government. The plaintiff implemented “asset management,” pursuant to the operating program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and began to explore ways to generate income by entering into partnerships or other ventures to finance the defendant's projects. During this same time period, union negotiations, which included demands for salary increases, and a computer conversion project were negatively impacting the morale of the defendant's employees. Morale at the defendant's central office had been poor at times throughout the plaintiff's tenure, but had reached very low levels by mid–2007.
At board meetings held in the latter part of 2006 and into early 2007, the plaintiff discussed the need for the defendant to hire someone to pursue opportunities for future development projects. In March, 2007, the board gave the plaintiff permission to create a job description and to find a qualified individual to fill the new position.
The commissioners, although concerned about the defendant's financial situation, agreed with the plaintiff that funding for the new position was necessary in order to generate additional income for the defendant. The plaintiff contacted people he knew in the industry, advertised the position in the Hartford Courant, and placed a notice on the defendant's website. Seven applications were received, and three individuals were interviewed. One individual, who already was employed by the defendant as an asset manager, did not have the requisite skills. The second individual who applied had recently been terminated from his position at another housing authority. One of the board's commissioners, Robert Keating, who was the chairman, told the plaintiff not to hire that candidate because of the bad publicity surrounding the termination. The third applicant, Marlene Walsh, was known and liked by three of the commissioners, namely, Keating, James Kate and Wanda Franek.
After receiving verbal approval from the board, the plaintiff hired Walsh as the director of policy and affordable housing development. Her employment commenced on August 15, 2007, and her initial salary was $69,750. By the provisions of her written employment agreement, the term of her employment was indefinite, her salary was to be reviewed “at least annually” by the board, and the defendant could terminate her employment for “activities constituting misfeasance or nonfeasance or for any other just cause....” Although the defendant's staff knew that Walsh was a director, they did not fully understand the responsibilities of this new position. They reacted negatively to Walsh, particularly because they did not receive an increase in pay that year and Walsh was being compensated at the starting salary for a director. Morale suffered, and the employees became angry and disgruntled.
Rumors circulated among the staff that the plaintiff and Walsh were involved in an inappropriate personal relationship. In January, 2008, an anonymous letter was sent to the mayor of East Hartford and the board. The letter expressed serious concerns about the plaintiff's behavior, including the suggestion of an inappropriate personal relationship with Walsh. Keating and Kate, the board's vice chairman, discussed the contents of the letter with the plaintiff. Because of the letter's allegations, they informed the plaintiff that the board had decided to conduct a short investigation. The receipt of the anonymous letter also prompted Keating to circulate a survey among the employees in February, 2008, requesting feedback and suggestions pertaining to the work environment and the defendant's policies. Those who responded to the survey questions were not required to identify themselves.
Responses to the survey were returned by sixteen of the thirty-nine employees. Of the sixteen responses, two were signed. The plaintiff was told that there were five negative comments about him in the survey responses, but Keating denied the plaintiff's request to review the results. During an executive session held at the end of the board's regular meeting on March 18, 2008, the plaintiff was questioned by various commissioners about the allegations contained in the anonymous letter and the survey results. The plaintiff, unaware that these matters were to be discussed, believed that he was being attacked, and he indicated that he needed time to review the information that had just been provided to him. When he asked if the commissioners had any further questions of him and no one answered, the plaintiff said, “ ‘good night,’ ” and left the meeting.
On March 20, 2008, the plaintiff scheduled a staff meeting to discuss various issues. Toward the end of the meeting, the plaintiff related some of the comments that he had received from the board at the March 18, 2008 meeting. He also read aloud the anonymous letter that had been sent to the board in January, 2008. The plaintiff appeared frustrated and upset, and he raised his voice at times while referring to the allegations made against him and Walsh.
The board scheduled an emergency meeting for April 1, 2008. The agenda for that meeting stated the emergency to be the plaintiff's demeanor and its impact on the morale of the employees. No notice of the meeting was posted, and the plaintiff was not told of the meeting or invited to attend. At the conclusion of the commissioners' discussion, they voted to place the plaintiff and Walsh on administrative leave with pay.
Ralph Alexander, the defendant's legal counsel, had prepared the notice for the emergency meeting and was in attendance. After the meeting concluded, Alexander telephoned the plaintiff and informed him of the board's decision. Alexander told the plaintiff not to come to the office the next day because a police officer would be there to prevent the plaintiff's entry into the building. Alexander instructed the plaintiff to contact Walsh to tell her that she, too, had been placed on administrative leave, and Alexander said that the board would like the plaintiff “to go away quietly.”
Subsequently, the board conferred with Alexander about conducting a further investigation of the plaintiff to determine what action should be taken with respect to his continued employment. Alexander contacted other attorneys who had more experience with such matters, and they recommended that the board retain an independent investigator. After receiving the names of three potential investigators, Alexander recommended David J. Dunn to the board. Dunn, a management consultant in labor relations and personnel services, was selected by the board on April 7, 2008, to review and investigate the defendant's operations. The investigation was to include issues concerning poor employee morale, the hiring process and funding of the position for Walsh, and the plaintiff's behavior at the March 18, 2008 executive session and March 20, 2008 staff meeting.
In July, 2008, Alexander contacted Bernard E. Jacques, an...
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