Madison Bd. of Educ. v. S.S. ex rel. R.S.
| Decision Date | 04 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-14090 (MAH) |
| Parties | MADISON BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff, v. S.S. and D.S. o/b/o R.S., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
In this civil action arising under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 to 1482, Plaintiff Madison Board of Education ("Plaintiff" or "the District") seeks relief from an Administrative Law Judge's Order requiring Plaintiff to reimburse Defendants S.S. and D.S. for the costs associated with their child R.S.'s placement at SEARCH Learning Group, "a center-based applied behavior analysis provider." Compl. ¶ 3, June 20, 2019, D.E. 1. This matter comes before the Court by way of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The Court held oral argument on August 28, 2020. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is granted, and Plaintiff's motion is denied.
Congress enacted the IDEA "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related servicesdesigned to meet their unique needs . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). "The IDEA offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment: to furnish a 'free appropriate public education'—more concisely known as a FAPE—to all children with certain physical or intellectual disabilities." Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 748 (2017) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)). "[A] FAPE comprises 'special education and related services'—both 'instruction' tailored to meet a child's 'unique needs' and sufficient 'supportive services' to permit the child to benefit from that instruction." Id. at 748-49 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(9), (26), (29)). "Under the IDEA, an 'individualized education program,' called an IEP for short, serves as the 'primary vehicle' for providing each child with the promised FAPE." Id. at 749 (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988)). "If parents believe that an IEP fails to provide their child with a FAPE, they may seek an administrative 'impartial due process hearing.'" Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)). If the school district is unable to provide a FAPE, parents may unilaterally place their child at a private institution and seek reimbursement. See id.
R.S., Defendants' son, has been diagnosed with autism, and is eligible for special education and related services from Plaintiff under the classification of preschool child with a disability. See Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 1, 9; Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 3, 28, 33. On March 30, 2016, when R.S. was about two-and-a-half years old, Defendants enrolled him at SEARCH Learning Group ("SEARCH") for the purpose of providing him with "intensive full-time services based on the Science and Principles of Applied Behavior Analysis [("ABA")]." Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 2; see also Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 4, 19.
On November 1, 2016, Plaintiff proposed an IEP that offered a preschool disabled program classroom within the school district. See Pl.'s SOF ¶ 11; Defs.' SOF ¶ 34. Two weeks later, Defendants advised Plaintiff that they were rejecting the IEP and continuing R.S.'s placement at SEARCH. See Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 16, 18; Defs.' SOF ¶ 43.
On February 7, 2017, Defendants filed for a petition for due process with the New Jersey Department of Education, asserting that the proposed IEP was unsatisfactory and that they should be reimbursed for all costs associated with R.S.'s placement at SEARCH. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 20; Defs.' SOF ¶ 7. The matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law, and assigned to the Honorable Kelly J. Kirk, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 22-23. The District filed a motion for partial summary decision on whether R.S.'s private placement was eligible for reimbursement as a non-school entity. See id. ¶ 24; Defs.' SOF ¶ 8. The ALJ denied the motion, finding the issue to be a factual question tied up with the issue of whether Plaintiff provided R.S. a FAPE. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 25; Defs.' SOF ¶ 10.
The matter proceeded to a hearing conducted over the course of six days between May 2018 and September 2018. See Pl.'s SOF ¶ 27; Defs.' SOF ¶ 11. The ALJ heard testimony from D.S.; Carrie Kahana, the founder of SEARCH; as well as various therapists and behaviorists. See ALJ Decision at 3. By way of a fifty-four-page decision dated March 22, 2019, the ALJ determined that the district had not provided R.S. with a FAPE, and ordered that Plaintiff reimburse Defendants for the cost of R.S.'s placement at SEARCH for the 2016-2017 school year.2 See ALJ Decision at 49, 54; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 37; Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 12-13.
The ALJ found that "[t]he credible testimony and the documentation from SEARCH reflect that SEARCH's ABA program was appropriate for R.S. and allowed him to make meaningful educational progress." ALJ Decision at 49. The ALJ rejected Plaintiff's "arguments that [Defendants] are barred from reimbursement because SEARCH is not accredited or approved by the State of New Jersey." Id. The ALJ noted that "a parental placement may be found to beappropriate by a court of competent jurisdiction or an [ALJ] . . . for placements in unapproved schools, even if it does not meet the standards that apply to the education provided by the district board of education." Id. at 49-50 (citing N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-2.10(b)).
On June 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed this civil action, appealing only the portion of the ALJ's decision ordering the reimbursement of costs associated with SEARCH. See Compl. ¶ 26 (). Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the ALJ's Decision "as to Defendants' entitlement to full reimbursement for their out-of-district placement at SEARCH and their associated transportation expense from November 18, 2016 to the end of the 2016-2017 school year[.]" Id. ¶ 85. The parties have now cross-moved for summary judgment.3
Plaintiff seeks to set aside the portion of the ALJ's Order requiring reimbursement of the costs associated R.S.'s placement at SEARCH on two grounds. According to Plaintiff, reimbursement is permitted only for "unilateral school placements—not full-time placements with center-based behavior service providers, as occurred here." Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summary J. ("Pl.'s Moving Br.") at 1, May 27, 2020, D.E. 22-1 (emphasis in original). Second, Plaintiff contends that Defendants did not comply with the relevant notice requirements or act in an otherwise reasonable manner prior to the unilateral placement. See id. at 1-2. It submits that "the ALJ erred by failing to address Defendants' failure to satisfy notice requirementsas a precondition of reimbursement." Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summary J. ("Pl.'s Opp'n Br.") at 5, June 24, 2020, D.E. 29.
Under the IDEA, "'[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision' made in the administrative proceeding 'shall have the right to bring a civil action' in state or federal court." Ridley Sch. Dist., 680 F.3d at 270 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)). The Court "(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C).
As a general matter, "[s]ummary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 835 F.3d 388, 402 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). The Court applies a different standard in IDEA cases. See Millburn Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. J.S.O., No. 13-1208, 2014 WL 3619979, at *3 (D.N.J. July 21, 2014). "[W]hen there is no new evidence presented to the district court, as in this case, a motion for summary judgment is simply the procedural vehicle for asking the judge to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record." M.A. ex rel. G.A. v. Voorhees Twp. Bd. of Educ., 202 F. Supp. 2d 345, 359 (D.N.J. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 65 F. App'x 404 (3d Cir. 2003). "Such review, although denominated as a motion for summary judgment, is not an ordinary Rule 56 motion, but is more akin to an appeal." D.S. v. Parsippany Troy Hills Bd. of Educ., No. 17-9484, 2018 WL 6617959, at *9, n.11 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2018); see also D.B. ex rel. H.B. v. Gloucester Twp. Sch. Dist., 751 F. Supp. 2d 764, 769 (D.N.J. 2010) , aff'd, 489 F. App'x 564 (3d Cir. 2012).
"When considering a petition for review challenging a state administrative decision under the IDEA, a district court applies 'a nontraditional standard of review, sometimes referred to as modified de novo review.'" Ridley Sch. Dist., 680 F.3d at 268 (quoting D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010)). The Court gives "due weight" to the ALJ's findings. Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)). "Factual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct." S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of the City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003). "[I]f a reviewing court fails to adhere to them, it is obliged to explain why." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. See P.N. v. Greco, 282 F. Supp. 2d 221, 235 (D.N.J. 2003).
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