Madison Cnty. Dep't of Human Res. v. K.O.D. (Ex parte Madison Cnty. Dep't of Human Res.)
Decision Date | 17 November 2017 |
Docket Number | 2160883,2160884 |
Citation | 261 So.3d 381 |
Parties | EX PARTE MADISON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES (In re: Madison County Department of Human Resources v. K.O.D., Sr.) |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Steve Marshall, atty. gen., and Sharon E. Ficquette, chief legal counsel, and Karen P. Phillips, asst. atty. gen., Department of Human Resources, for petitioner.
Submitted on petitioner’s brief only.
These mandamus proceedings involve the jurisdiction of the Madison Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") to enter orders granting a new trial in actions after it had granted the petitions of the Madison County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") to terminate the parental rights of K.O.D., Sr. ("the father"). Because we determine that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the father's untimely filed postjudgment motions seeking a new trial, we direct the juvenile court to vacate the orders granting a new trial.
On June 20, 2017, the juvenile court entered separate judgments terminating the father's parental rights to two children. On July 6, 2017, the father, with the assistance of counsel, filed a motion in each case seeking a new trial in which he asserted the following:
On July 10, 2017, the juvenile court entered an order in each case setting the father's postjudgment motions for a hearing to be held on July 13, 2017. On July 14, 2017, the juvenile court granted the father's motions for a new trial and set the cases for a termination-of-parental-rights trial to be held on July 28, 2017.
On July 18, 2017, DHR filed motions seeking to have the juvenile court set aside its orders granting a new trial. DHR asserted, in part:
On July 26, 2017, the juvenile court denied DHR's motions. On July 27, 2017, DHR filed a motion seeking to stay the termination-of-parental-rights trial, which the juvenile court granted. On August 3, 2017, DHR filed a single notice of appeal to this court, referencing both of the underlying cases. This court docketed two separate appeals and then ordered the appeals consolidated. The father has not filed anything with this court.
DHR asserts that its motions seeking to set aside the July 14, 2017, orders that granted the father's motions for a new trial were filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P. A party may appeal from the denial of relief under Rule 60(b)(4). See Insurance Mgmt. & Admin., Inc. v. Palomar Ins. Corp., 590 So.2d 209, 212 (Ala. 1991). This court has explained, however, that A.S. v. T.R.B., 246 So.3d 963, (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). The juvenile court's orders granting the father's motions for a new trial and setting the cases for a new termination-of-parental-rights trial were interlocutory orders. See J.A.K. v. R.B., 238 So.3d 675, (Ala. Civ. App. 2017) ( ).
Although § 12–22–10, Ala. Code 1975, provides for an appeal "from an order granting or refusing a motion for a new trial by the circuit court," this court has held that § 12–22–10 is inapplicable to juvenile-court orders granting a new trial. J.A.K., 238 So.3d at 677. Thus, the proper method of seeking review of an interlocutory order granting a new trial is by filing a petition for the writ of mandamus. See Ex parte A.M.P., 997 So.2d 1008, 1014 (Ala. 2008) (citing Ex parte McInnis, 820 So.2d 795 (Ala. 2001) )("A petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy for challenging an interlocutory order."). See also Ex parte Limerick, 66 So.3d 755, 756 (Ala. 2011) (" ‘A petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper method for obtaining review of a trial court's authority to rule on a posttrial motion beyond the time period set forth in Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.’ " (quoting Ex parte Jackson Hosp. & Clinic, Inc., 49 So.3d 1210, 1211 (Ala. 2010) ).
An appellate court may treat an appeal that was improperly filed from an interlocutory order as a petition for the writ of mandamus. Meadwestvaco Corp. v. Mitchell, 195 So.3d 290, 294 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). Accordingly, we have elected to treat DHR's appeals as petitions for the writ of mandamus, and we have restyled these matters. Generally, a mandamus petition must "be filed within a reasonable time." Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P. The presumptively reasonable time for filing a petition for the writ of mandamus is the same as the time for taking an appeal, which, in a juvenile action, is within 14 days of the entry of the challenged order. See Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., and Ex parte R.W., 41 So.3d 800, 804 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).
DHR filed its petitions on August 3, 2017, which was more than 14 days after the entry of the July 14, 2017, orders granting the father's motions for a new trial. Although DHR filed motions seeking to set aside the juvenile court's July 14 orders, this court has explained that, " ‘unlike a postjudgment motion following a final judgment, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order does not toll the presumptively reasonable time period that a party has to petition an appellate court for a writ of mandamus.’ " Ex parte C.J.A., 12 So.3d 1214, 1216 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (quoting Ex parte Onyx Waste Servs. of Florida, 979 So.2d 833, 834 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007), citing in turn Ex parte Troutman Sanders, LLP, 866 So.2d 547, 549–50 (Ala. 2003) ). Thus, DHR's petitions were not filed within the presumptively reasonable time, and the petitions failed to "include a statement of circumstances constituting good cause for the appellate court to consider the petition, notwithstanding that it was filed beyond the presumptively reasonable time." Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P.
Our supreme court has held, however, that a petition for the writ of mandamus that challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court to enter the order sought to be vacated need not be filed within the presumptively reasonable period prescribed by Rule 21. See Ex parte K.R., 210 So.3d 1106, 1112 (Ala. 2016) ( ). See also Ex parte J.B., 223 So.3d 251, 254 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). Therefore, DHR's petitions are properly before us.
Ex parte A.M.P., 997 So.2d at 1014.
Pursuant to Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P., "[a]ll postjudgment motions [in a juvenile-court proceeding] ... must be filed within 14 days after entry of order or judgment." After 14 days, the juvenile court loses jurisdiction and cannot consider untimely filed motions. See D.V.P. v. T.W.P., 905 So.2d 853,...
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