Madison General Hosp. v. Haack

• Decision Date: 24 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. 83-1595,83-1595
• Citation: Madison General Hosp. v. Haack, 124 Wis.2d 398, 369 N.W.2d 663 (Wis. 1985)
• Parties: , 53 A.L.R.4th 1235 MADISON GENERAL HOSPITAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bruce A. HAACK and Debra Hughes Haack, Defendants-Respondents, Donald J. Hughes, Defendant.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 663

369 N.W.2d 663

124 Wis.2d 398, 53 A.L.R.4th 1235

MADISON GENERAL HOSPITAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bruce A. HAACK and Debra Hughes Haack, Defendants-Respondents Donald J. Hughes, Defendant.

No. 83-1595.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued April 30, 1985.

Decided June 24, 1985.

Steven J. Schooler, Madison (argued), for plaintiff-appellee; John Walsh and Brynelson Herrick, Gehl & Bucaida, Madison, on the brief.

Joseph F. Preloznik, Madison (argued), for defendants-respondents; Preloznik & Associates, S.C., Madison, on brief.

ABRAHAMSON, Justice.

This appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane County, Richard W. Bardwell, circuit judge, is before the court on certification by the court of appeals pursuant to sec. 809.61, Stats.1983-84, 367 N.W.2d 225.

Madison General Hospital, the plaintiff, sued Debra Haack (nee Debra Hughes), Bruce Haack (Debra Haack's husband), and Donald J. Hughes (Debra Haack's father) for $2,319.08, the unpaid balance of a hospital bill totaling $4,613.91. This unpaid balance was for medical services rendered to Debra Haack in connection with the birth of her infant. Medicaid had paid the portion of the bill directly related to the care of the infant. The suit against Donald J. Hughes was dismissed for failure to obtain service.

The issue presented is whether either Debra Haack, who was an unwed minor at the time the medical expenses were incurred, or Bruce Haack, who is the father of the infant and was an unwed adult at the time the medical expenses were incurred, or both are liable for the hospital charges for the medical care of Debra Haack relating to the delivery of the infant by caesarean section and relating to postoperative treatment.

The circuit court dismissed the claim against Debra Haack, stating,

"At the time Debra received the medical services in question, she was a dependent as defined by sec. 49.01 (4), Wis.Stats. Consequently, the hospital had a cause of action against both Mr. & Mrs. Hughes for the necessary medical costs incurred by their dependent daughter. Section 52.01(1) Wis.Stats. The hospital for one reason or another failed to fully pursue its claim against the parents and now seeks recovery against the minor daughter who never, in the court's view, impliedly agreed to pay the bill and certainly never consented to make payment after she attained her majority."

We affirm this part of the judgment.

The circuit court also dismissed the action against Bruce Haack, holding that "Mr. Haack cannot be held responsible for Debra's medical expenses incurred before the marriage ..." since "[u]nder Wisconsin law ... marriage, which here occurred after the birth of the child, does not make a husband liable for his wife's prenuptial obligations." We reverse this part of the judgment.

The facts giving rise to this appeal are undisputed. When Debra Hughes, accompanied by her mother, was admitted to the hospital on February 3, 1976, she was 16 years old, apparently was living with her parents, and had no financial assets of her own. She was 34 weeks pregnant and suffering from severe labor convulsions. She delivered the infant by caesarean section on February 16, 1976, and, after postoperative treatment, was released on February 22, 1976.

On April 12, 1976, Bruce Haack and Debra Hughes (hereafter referred to as Debra Haack) were married. Pursuant to sec. 245.25, Stats.1975, the child "thereby became legitimated and enjoy[ed] all the rights and privileges of legitimacy" as if the child had been born during the marriage of the parents. See also sec. 767.60, Stats.1983-84.

The hospital attempted to collect from Medicaid the cost of the delivery and the cost of the care of Debra Haack, but Medicaid covered only the costs associated with care of the infant. The hospital then attempted to collect the remainder of its bill from Donald J. Hughes's health insurer. The insurer did not pay. The hospital then commenced this action to collect payment from Debra Haack, Bruce Haack, and Donald J. Hughes. The hospital did not commence action against Dorothy Hughes, Debra Haack's mother. The hospital never served Donald J. Hughes, and the suit against him was dismissed.

We will consider first Debra Haack's liability for the remaining portion of the hospital bill and then Bruce Haack's liability. Since Debra Haack's father was not served with the summons and complaint and Debra Haack's mother was not named as a defendant, the liability of Mr. and Mrs. Hughes for the medical expenses in question is not directly before the court. Mr. and Mrs. Hughes's liability is, however, relevant to a determination of Debra Haack's liability and will be considered in that context.

Debra Haack's liability. The hospital urges several theories under which Debra Haack may be held liable for payment of the medical expenses. First, the hospital asserts that Debra Haack is liable under the common law doctrine that when a minor contracts for necessaries, the minor cannot disaffirm the contract. See E.A. Farnsworth, Contracts section 4.5, p. 221-23 (1982); 2 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts section 240, p. 51 (3d ed.1959); J.D. Calamari & J.M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts, section 128, p. 215 (1970). Cf. Halbman v. Lemke, 99 Wis.2d 241, 244-45, 298 N.W.2d 562 (1980); Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 39 Wis.2d 20, 23, 158 N.W.2d 288 (1968); Schoenung v. Gallet, 206 Wis. 52, 54-55, 238 N.W. 852 (1931). Emergency medical services are generally considered necessaries, and this point is not in dispute in this case.

For Debra Haack to be liable under this "doctrine of necessaries," she had to have entered into a contract, express or implied in fact, to pay for the medical services. Neither party cites Wisconsin case law, and we could find none, declaring a minor liable for emergency health care service provided the minor in the absence of the minor's contracting for the service. The common law rule appears to be that a minor is not liable if necessaries were furnished to the minor on someone else's credit. ¹

The circuit court found that Debra Haack did not enter a contract with the hospital for her medical care. The circuit court characterized Debra Haack's testimony as follows: "At the trial Debra testified without contradiction that she herself was indigent, that she was very ill when she entered the hospital and in no condition to agree to anything. In other words, she states that she in no way ever impliedly agreed to pay the medical bill." In light of the circuit court's finding that the minor did not enter into an express or implied in fact contract, we conclude that the common law doctrine that a minor may be liable for necessaries furnished on the credit of the minor is not applicable here.

The essence of the hospital's argument is that Debra Haack is liable for the medical expenses under a theory of unjust enrichment, that is, a quasi-contractual obligation imposed by law. ² Express contracts and contracts implied in fact rest on the assent of the parties; a quasi-contractual obligation does not. A quasi-contractual obligation is imposed by law on grounds of justice and equity to prevent unjust enrichment. In the Matter of the Estate of Stromsted, 99 Wis.2d 136, 139, n. 1, 142, n. 5, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980). The law may require a person enriched by a benefit to compensate the person furnishing the benefit when it would be inequitable to allow retention of the benefit without payment. Titus v. Polan, 72 Wis.2d 23, 25, 240 N.W.2d 420 (1976); Nelson v. Preston, 262 Wis. 547, 549-50, 55 N.W.2d 918 (1952). See Restatement (Second) of Restitution section 3, comment (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983).

The hospital asserts that Debra Haack received medical care necessary to save her life and the life of her infant; that she knew and appreciated that such care was necessary; that she accepted the care which the hospital was required to render, ³ and that she has refused to pay for these benefits. These facts, argues the hospital, satisfy the elements of a cause of action in equity for unjust enrichment. See Puttkammer v. Minth, 83 Wis.2d 686, 688-89, 266 N.W.2d 361 (1978).

The hospital's theory of Debra Haack's liability under the doctrine of unjust enrichment, however, overlooks the fact that when a minor has not contracted for necessaries, the law has traditionally imposed a quasi-contractual liability on a minor's father, not on the minor, under the doctrine of necessaries. In Monk v. Hurlburt, 151 Wis. 41, 45, 138 N.W. 59 (1912), this court stated that "the law implies a promise [that a parent will pay] where a parent, with full knowledge of the facts and without objection, allows and approves of his child being furnished with necessaries." See also Hoard v. Gilbert, 205 Wis. 557, 559, 238 N.W. 371 (1931). A parent's quasi-contractual obligation, under the doctrine of necessaries, arises because a third party has fulfilled the legal obligation of the parent to support the minor. Traditionally the law imposed the duty of support for the minor on the male parent. Today the wife shares with the husband the legal duty of support for the family. In re Estate of Stromsted, supra, 99 Wis.2d at 143, 299 N.W.2d 226 (citing sec. 767.08, Stats.1983-84).

In this case Mr. and Mrs. Hughes were under a duty to provide their daughter with medical services. Mrs. Hughes knew that Debra Haack needed medical attention, accompanied her to the hospital, consented to the medical procedures by signing a form authorizing treatment, and knew that the hospital would expect payment for the services. Aside from this authorization of treatment, no express agreement exists between the hospital and Mrs. Hughes, Mr. Hughes, or Debra Haack. Under the common law doctrine of necessaries, the party or parties unjustly enriched by the medical care provided Debra Haack and liable for payment of the medical expenses appear to be one or both of Debra Haack's parents. Cf. Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J....