Madison v. Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game

Decision Date22 February 1985
Docket NumberNos. 6824,s. 6824
Citation696 P.2d 168
PartiesGene MADISON, Lucy Casey, Ken McGahan, Sr., Andy Johnson, Margie Kivi, J.W. Ware, Dick Francis, Don Groleske, Ken Jordon and Shirley Devault, Appellants, v. ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, and Alaska Board of Fisheries, Appellees, and The Alaska Federation of Natives, Intervenor. ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, Ronald Skoog, Alaska Board of Fisheries, Appellants, v. Louis GJOSUND, Dora Mulch, and Kachemak Bay Subsistency Group, Inc., Cross-Appellees. /7181, 7410.
CourtAlaska Supreme Court

Martin Friedman, Homer, Arthur Robinson, Soldotna, for appellants/cross-appellees.

Larri Irene Spengler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norman C. Gorsuch, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellees/appellants.

Donald C. Mitchell, Anchorage, for intervenor/amicus curiae.

Before RABINOWITZ, C.J., and BURKE, MATTHEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.

OPINION

MOORE, Justice.

This case arises as a consolidated appeal of two cases. It concerns the validity of a Board of Fisheries' (hereafter board) regulation designed to identify eligibility for subsistence fishing in the Cook Inlet region.

Appellants (hereafter Madison and Gjosund) are two groups of Alaskan residents who live along the Kenai coastline and near Homer. For many years, they have fished with set nets for salmon for their personal and family use. Nonetheless, the board denied subsistence permits to Madison and Gjosund because their use of salmon did not meet the board's regulatory definition of subsistence. Both Madison and Gjosund challenged the regulation as exceeding the scope of the state's subsistence law. In both cases, the trial courts upheld the regulation as consistent with the statutory grant of authority. We hold the regulation invalid since it is inconsistent with AS 16.05.251(b), AS 16.05.940(22) and AS 16.05.940(23) and contrary to the legislature's intent in enacting the 1978 subsistence law.

I. SUMMARY OF FACTS

Records indicate that subsistence fishing in Cook Inlet was minimal through the mid-1970s. 1 However, a core group of residents of each Cook Inlet community has traditionally fished for Cook Inlet salmon for subsistence. Participation in the subsistence salmon fishery is most visible in the smaller, more isolated villages, where the subsistence group represents a larger percentage of the population.

In 1977 the board established a comprehensive management policy for Cook Inlet, 5 AAC 21.363, which essentially allocated specific salmon stocks to sports fishermen and commercial fishermen on the basis of seasonal fish movements. See Kenai Peninsula Fisherman's Cooperative Ass'n v. State, 628 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1981). Although the policy did not specifically refer to subsistence uses of salmon in Cook Inlet, it had a substantial impact on subsistence fishing. Commercial fishermen, accustomed to taking subsistence salmon from their commercial catch, instead obtained subsistence salmon fishing permits in order to fish for their personal and family use after the commercial season was over.

Before 1978, subsistence fishing was defined in AS 16.05.940(17) as fishing for "personal use and not for sale or barter." 2 In 1978, the Alaska State Legislature enacted ch. 151 SLA 1978 (hereafter the 1978 subsistence law). Subsistence fishing was redefined as fishing for "subsistence uses." 3 Subsistence uses were defined as "customary and traditional uses ... for direct personal or family consumption, and for the customary trade, barter or sharing...." AS 16.05.940(23). 4 Furthermore, the legislation required the board to adopt regulations permitting "subsistence uses" of fish stocks, absent a showing that this use would jeopardize the sustained yield principle. AS 16.05.251(b). 5 Under AS 16.05.251(b), subsistence uses have priority over sport and commercial uses if the board finds it necessary to restrict the taking of fish to assure the maintenance of fish stocks or to assure the continuation of subsistence uses. If further restrictions are necessary after giving priority to all subsistence uses, the legislature established specific criteria to restrict subsistence uses based on the subsistence user's customary and direct dependence on the resource, local residency and availability of alternative resources. Id. As a result, the board could no longer allocate for subsistence uses at its discretion pursuant to AS 16.05.251(a). 6 The legislature mandated in AS 16.05.251(b) that the board regulate for the protection of subsistence uses as the priority use of fish and game.

The passage of the 1978 subsistence law, combined with adoption of the board's 1977 management policy, heightened public awareness of the state's subsistence fishing provisions. This public interest resulted in a substantial increase in the demand for subsistence permits and a corresponding increase in total catch. 7 The board responded to the permit increase by restricting subsistence fishing; it limited areas open to subsistence fishing, length of fishing periods and maximum length of gill nets. Several lawsuits were filed, all of which resulted in decisions unfavorable to the board.

In December 1980, the board held hearings to respond to the 1978 subsistence law and received a considerable amount of testimony on subsistence uses in Cook Inlet. The meeting resulted in the establishment of characteristics for identification of "customary and traditional uses" of Cook Inlet salmon. 8 In addition, the board decided to "adopt a set of criteria drawn from the characteristics ... and apply [them] to communities, subcommunities, groups and individuals who wish to continue to participate in an established customary and traditional fishing effort in Cook Inlet."

At its March 1981 meeting, the board received written testimony from the public about subsistence uses of Cook Inlet salmon stock. Subsequently, it decided to apply all of the ten criteria to determine "customary and traditional uses" eligible for the subsistence priority. When the board applied the ten criteria, it determined that no group or community in the Cook Inlet region other than Tyonek, English Bay and Port Graham satisfied all ten of the criteria. The board limited the 1981 subsistence catch to these three communities. As a result, the board eliminated from the protection of the state's subsistence statute the majority of Cook Inlet fishermen who formerly fished under subsistence regulations.

Madison and Gjosund challenged the validity of the board's subsistence criteria (now 5 AAC 01.597) on several grounds. They claimed that: (1) the criteria were inconsistent with the statutory language and legislative intent of the 1978 subsistence law; (2) the board failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act in adopting the criteria; and (3) their equal protection and due process rights were violated by the board's action. 9 Both courts issued preliminary injunctions compelling the board to authorize personal use fishing for Madison and Gjosund similar to that allowed in the previous year. The board moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' first claim. Both trial courts granted summary judgment to the board, after finding the subsistence criteria consistent with the legislative intent "to provide for and protect personal use ... by persons who reside in rural communities...."

On appeal, Madison and Gjosund seek reversal of the two trial court decisions. They claim that the board did not act within the legislative authority granted by AS 16.05.251(b) and AS 16.05.940(22) and (23) when it adopted the ten characteristics ultimately codified as 5 AAC 01.597. 10

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We first consider the appropriate standard of review for this case. The legislature enacted AS 16.05.251(b), which requires the board to adopt regulations permitting the taking of fish for "subsistence uses." The legislature then defined subsistence uses as "customary and traditional" uses in AS 16.05.940(23), but it never defined "customary and traditional." The board developed the ten criteria (now codified as 5 AAC 01.597) to identify customary and traditional uses qualifying for a subsistence priority under AS 16.05.251(b). Therefore, the board interpreted the 1978 subsistence law and devised its regulatory criteria accordingly.

In Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 917 (Alaska 1971), we stated that the "reasonable basis approach should be used for the most part in cases concerning administrative expertise as to either complex subject matter or fundamental policy formulations." However, the issues in this case concern statutory interpretation of the words "customary and traditional" and the question whether the board has acted within the scope of its statutory authority. Such issues "fall into the realm of special competency of the courts." Alaska Public Utility Commission v. Municipality of Anchorage, 555 P.2d 262, 266 (Alaska 1976). See also State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Templeton, 598 P.2d 77, 80 (Alaska 1979).

In this instance, we are dealing with a question of statutory interpretation and will apply the substitution of judgment standard.

The substitution of judgment standard is applied when the questions of law presented do not involve agency expertise, and, thus, a court need not take the deferential stance embodied in the rational basis test.... The standard is appropriate where the knowledge and experience of the agency is of little guidance to the court or where the case concerns "statutory interpretation or other analysis of legal relationships about which courts have specialized knowledge and experience."

Earth Resources Co. v. State, Department of Revenue, 665 P.2d 960, 965 (Alaska 1983), quoting Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d at 916 (emphasis added). Application of this standard allows the reviewing court to substitute its judgment about a statute's meaning for the board's interpretation, even if the board's interpretation had a reasonable basis in law. In this case, both ...

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