Madison v. Craven

• Decision Date: 15 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. 33710.,33710.
• Citation: 169 P.3d 284,144 Idaho 696
• Parties: Carl Lewis MADISON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Olivia CRAVEN, Ed Chenney and David Trial, Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

169 P.3d 284

144 Idaho 696

Carl Lewis MADISON, Petitioner-Appellant, v.Olivia CRAVEN, Ed Chenney and David Trial, Respondents.

No. 33710.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

August 6, 2007.

Review Denied October 15, 2007.

Carl Lewis Madison, Boise, pro seappellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; William M. Loomis, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

LANSING, Judge.

Carl Lewis Madison, a prison inmate, filed an action against the Executive Director of the Commission of Pardons and Parole("Commission") and two therapists at the Idaho Department of Correction, requesting that certain information be removed from his prison record and not considered in any future parole proceedings because the information was allegedly obtained through violations of his privilege against self-incrimination.The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the action, and Madison appeals.

I.BACKGROUND

In 1997, Madison was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen, Idaho Code § 18-1506, for which he received a sentence of fifteen years with three years determinate.During the course of his incarceration, Madison participated in a sexual offender therapy program.He contends that during that program, he was forced to falsely¹ admit a sexual attraction to the victim, his daughter, and was later terminated from the group when he accused the therapists and Department of Correction personnel of colluding to make him appear to be a serial pedophile.In May of 1999, he was denied parole.The minutes of that parole hearing contain a notation that Madison had molested fifteen victims.Madison later asserted that this statement in the minutes was false and that he had only one victim.

On November 14, 2003, Madison filed a prisoner civil rights complaint asserting that the therapists' acts and the allegedly false information in the parole hearing minutes violated his civil rights.The district court treated Madison's complaint as a habeas corpus petition and dismissed it when Madison did not pay the filing fee.He appealed, and in Madison v. Craven,141 Idaho 45, 105 P.3d 705(Ct.App.2005), we reversed and remanded.After remand, Madison amended his complaint.

The nature of the claims that Madison intends to be presenting in his pro se complaint and subsequent filings is difficult to discern or characterize.His general claim seems to be that various post-trial admissions he made, including those contained in the presentence investigation report (PSI), and statements made at the parole hearing and during sexual offender treatment, were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and must therefore be purged from his record and not considered in any future therapy or parole proceedings.He also contends that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, and raises several other related claims.

The district court initially characterized the amended complaint as a habeas corpus petition before deciding to handle it as an action for violation of civil rights.Ultimately, the district court dismissed the action on the respondents' summary judgment motion.Madison appeals, asserting that the district court misinterpreted one of his claims, did not address several others, and misapplied the law.

II.ANALYSIS

A.Standard of Review

Summary judgment may be entered only if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).See alsoAvila v. Wahlquist,126 Idaho 745, 747, 890 P.2d 331, 333(1995);Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene,126 Idaho 740, 742, 890 P.2d 326, 328(1995).On review, this Court liberally construes the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson,125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367(1994).If the evidence reveals no material disputed factual issues, however, only a question of law remains over which this Court exercises free review.Roell v. Boise City,130 Idaho 199, 200-01, 938 P.2d 1237, 1238-39(1997).

In this case, there are no disputed issues of fact; the respondents' summary judgment motion did not challenge Madison's allegations that the minutes of the parole hearing erroneously state that he had fifteen victims or that Madison's therapist required him to make statements regarding his sexual attraction toward the victim.Therefore, the issue presented is whether these alleged events violated certain of Madison's constitutional rights.Because we exercise de novo review over this legal issue, Madison's assertions that the district court misinterpreted his arguments or erred in its legal analysis need not be specifically addressed.

B.Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-incrimination

Madison's primary argument on appeal is that information elicited after his conviction—including the statement in his parole hearing that he had fifteen victims, statements made during therapy regarding his sexual attraction to his daughter, and information in the PSI report—was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and must therefore be purged from his record.The thrust of his argument is that these statements were elicited to make him appear to be a serial pedophile, which he contends has undermined his ability to trust his therapists and participate in therapy.He notes that this will make it difficult for him to be paroled, and speculates that if this characterization of his criminal nature remains in his record, it could be used against him in future matters.

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."It has long been held that this prohibition not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also "privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."Lefkowitz v. Turley,414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 38 L.Ed.2d 274, 281(1973).See alsoMinnesota v. Murphy,465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1141, 79 L.Ed.2d 409, 418(1984).The availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites."In re Gault,387 U.S. 1, 49, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1455, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 558(1967).A witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until the witness is granted immunity from the use of the compelled answers in any subsequent criminal case in which the witness is a defendant.Murphy,465 U.S. at 426, 104 S.Ct. at 1141, 79 L.Ed.2d at 418.If he or she is nevertheless compelled to answer without immunity, the answers are inadmissible against the witness in a later criminal prosecution.Id.An individual does not lose this protection by reason of conviction of a crime; notwithstanding that a person is imprisoned at the time he or she makes incriminating statements, if those statements are compelled they are inadmissible in a subsequent criminal trial of that person.Id.;State v. Curless,137 Idaho 138, 143, 44 P.3d 1193, 1198(Ct.App.2002).

1.Statement that Madison had fifteen victims

To the extent that Madison contends that the inclusion of the statement at the parole hearing that he had fifteen victims violated his right against self-incrimination, this argument is undermined by Madison's own assertions.He does not suggest that he was unlawfully compelled by the parole board to admit this fact, but claims that he did not say it.Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not implicated here.

2.Statements contained in the PSI

Madison also argues that any statements he made to the presentence investigator should be purged from his record.A defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies both at the sentencing hearing and in presentence evaluations.Estrada v. State,143 Idaho 558, 563, 149 P.3d 833, 838(2006);State v. Wilkins,125 Idaho 215, 217-19, 868 P.2d 1231, 1233-35(1994);State v. Lankford,116 Idaho 860, 871, 781 P.2d 197, 208(1989).However, if a defendant desires the protection of the Fifth Amendment, he generally must claim it or it will be lost.That is, if one who is being questioned does not assert the privilege and instead voluntarily responds without protest, the responses are not considered to have been compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.Murphy,465 U.S. at 427-28, 104 S.Ct. at 1142-43, 79 L.Ed.2d at 419-20;Curless,137 Idaho at 143, 44 P.3d at 1198(holding that the defendant's failure to assert the Fifth Amendment during a psychosexual evaluation precluded him from asserting the privilege on appeal).In this case, Madison has presented no evidence suggesting that during the preparation of the PSI, he claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege and was nevertheless compelled to answer, nor that compulsion prevented him from asserting the privilege.Because Madison never asserted the privilege, he is not entitled to its protections, and his claim that the presentence investigation interview violated his Fifth Amendment privilege therefore fails.

3.Statements made during therapy

We next examine whether Madison's Fifth Amendment rights were implicated by the allegedly compelled admission, during treatment by a Department of Correction therapist, that he was sexually attracted to his daughter who was the victim of his crime.We hold that this claim is without merit for at least two reasons.First,...