Madison v. Morovitz

• Decision Date: 01 December 1936
• Citation: Madison v. Morovitz, 122 Conn. 208, 188 A. 665 (Conn. 1936)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MADISON v. MOROVITZ.

188 A. 665

122 Conn. 208

MADISON v. MOROVITZ.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 1, 1936

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Patrick B O'Sullivan, Judge.

Action by Martin W. Madison against Morris Morovitz to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant.From a judgment in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appeals.

Error and new trial ordered.

Albert M. Herrmann, of New Haven (Daniel D. Morgan, of New Haven, on the brief), for appellant.

Adrian W. Maher, of Bridgeport (Martin E. Gormley, of New Haven, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, AVERY, and BROWN JJ.

AVERY Judge.

The questions raised on this appeal involve the correctness of the instructions of the trial court with reference to certain sections of the Motor Vehicle Law and amendments thereto appended in the footnote.^[1] On November 6, 1934, at about 11 p m., the plaintiff was driving a motor vehicle in an easterly direction on the Milford Turnpike in the town of Orange, and while so operating he approached from the rear a commercial motor truck, owned and operated by the defendant, proceeding in the same direction.

On the trial of the case to the jury, the plaintiff claimed that as he approached the defendant's truck it attempted to turn to its left or northerly side of the road for the purpose of entering a gasoline station, and while the truck was in the act of turning the plaintiff's motor vehicle collided with its rear, causing the plaintiff's injuries.The plaintiff claimed that at the time of the collision, the defendant's truck did not display a red light from behind nor was it equipped with a reflector; and, further, that before making the turn, the defendant gave no warning signal.The plaintiff further claimed that the truck was so constructed that the operator was prevented from having a free and unobstructed view of the highway immediately to the rear and at the sides of the truck, and although the truck was equipped with a mirror, so attached, located and adjusted as to give the defendant a clear, reflected view of the highway directly to the rear of or on a line parallel to the side of the body of the motor vehicle, the defendant failed to keep a constant observation of the approach of vehicles from the rear and, when approached or overtaken by the plaintiff's motor vehicle, failed to drive to the extreme right of the highway as promptly as safety would permit, giving the plaintiff's automobile approaching from the rear opportunity to pass in safety.The defendant, however, claimed to have turned on an illuminated direction arrow prior to making the turn; that his truck was equipped with a reflector, and illuminated in the rear with a red light.

The plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury that the statutes of this state require that each motor vehicle operated upon its highways during the period from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise shall display a red light from behind and, further, that any commercial motor vehicle shall, in addition to such rear light, be equipped with a reflector of such size, color, and type as shall be approved by the commissioner of motor vehicles, so located at the rear of such vehicle as to reflect rays of light thrown upon such reflector; and that if the jury found that the motor vehicle of the defendant was not equipped with such a red light or such a reflector, such failure would constitute negligence.Upon this point, the court instructed the jury among other things as follows: " If there was a red light, lighted of course, there would be no breach of the statutory rule of conduct; on the other hand, merely because the red tail light was out would not mean that there was a breach of the rule of conduct which would require you to find the defendant negligent.To require the operator of any automobile to have his tail light constantly lighted would be to make of the operator an insurer, and everybody knows that tail lights may occasionally go out without any fault of the operator of the car.Consequently even if you find the tail light was off, that is unlighted, it would not necessarily be negligent for this defendant to operate his car, if the tail light had gone out for a cause over which the defendant had no control, and provided that at all times he was acting the part of a reasonably prudent person in watching out for the condition of the lights upon his automobile.In other words, if the tail light was out and it was out not because of the failure of this defendant to exercise reasonable care-that is, the care of an ordinarily prudent person similarly situated-it would not be negligence."

The trial court undoubtedly had in mind the case of Romansky v. Cestaro,109 Conn. 654, 145 A. 156, 157, where we had before us for interpretation the meaning of section 40 (a) of chapter 400 of the Public Acts of 1921, providing that every motor vehicle shall be provided with at least two independent systems of brakes of sufficient power to lock the wheels of the motor vehicle while such motor vehicle is in motion.The majority of the court were of the opinion that this provision did not impose liability upon the operator of the vehicle where the defect in the brakes developed while the vehicle was running, regardless of whether the defect was one which the owner or operator knew of or should have known of.We said (109 Conn. 654, at page 658, 145 A. 156, 157): " If, then, the brakes, or one of them, become defective and that is due to the negligence of the owner or operator for any cause, liability must follow.But if the defect be the result of an accident *** which cannot be traceable to the negligence of the owner or operator, responsibility ought not to be imposed upon them."And we added (109 Conn. 654, at page 659, 145 A. 156, 157): " The motor vehicle statute also requires every car to have a tail light; a like construction must lead to a like result.The owner must insure against the light going out, and, if it did, as occasionally happens, through an accident resulting without fault on his part, or otherwise, he would be liable for the resulting damage."The minority of the court were of the opinion that it was the legislative intent to impose upon the operator of the vehicle the duty to see that at all times the brakes complied with the statute, even though the application of the rule might conceivably bring about a liability where some defect in one of the braking systems developed suddenly and unexpectedly.It was said that such an interpretation was, in the opinion of the judges who dissented, necessary for the protection of the general public in the use of the highways and that this was " of infinitely more consequence than the rare case in which individual liability might result through a deficiency in brakes which, but for the statute, might be regarded as not attributable to lack of reasonable care."

That decision was made in March, 1929.An act approved June 11 1929, amended the statute by adding a requirement that the brakes " shall, at all times, be maintained in good working order."Public Acts 1929, c. 297, § 18.By this amendmentthe Legislature in effect made the statute conform to the view expressed in the minority opinion in the Romansky Case, and indicated its intent that the liability of an operator would arise if at any time his brakes ceased to be in good working order without regard to negligence on his part.We cannot regard that change in the statute otherwise than as adopting the view of such regulations which was advanced in the minority opinion in the Romansky Case.In view of that clear indication of legislative intent, we must regard the statute...