Madison v. Sec'y, Florida Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 06 July 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:09-cv-444-J-34JRK
• Parties: WILLIAM RODNEY MADISON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

WILLIAM RODNEY MADISON, Petitioner,

v.SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:09-cv-444-J-34JRK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

Dated: July 6, 2012

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Madison initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition) (Doc. #1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 13, 2009, pursuant to the mailbox rule. Additionally, Madison filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of His Petition (Memorandum) (Doc. #2). He challenges a 2007 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for robbery on five grounds. Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Respondents' Answer in Response to Order to Show Cause (Response) (Doc. #9); Exhibits (Resp. Ex.) (Doc. #10). On June 19, 2009, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and Notice to Petitioner (Doc. #7), admonishing Petitioner regarding his obligations and giving Petitioner a time frame in which to submit a reply. Petitioner submitted a brief in reply on February 19, 2010. See Petitioner's Reply to Respondents' Response (Reply) (Doc. #12). This case is ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

Petitioner was arrested for bank robbery on April 14, 2005, when a Jacksonville Sheriff's Office patrolman (Officer Porter) saw a car that matched the description of the getaway car. Resp. Ex. 1. Officer Porter observed the driver make several lane changes, accelerate at a high rate of speed, pass other cars, and make an illegal lane change on the Matthews Bridge. Resp. Exs. A at 1; I at 262 (Officer Porter's September 21, 2005 trial testimony). After initiating a traffic stop, Officer Porter informed Madison that he had made an illegal lane change on the bridge, that his vehicle fit the description of a getaway car involved in an Arlington bank robbery, and that he matched the description of the robbery suspect. Resp. Ex. I at 266-67.

At the request of detectives at the crime scene, Officer Porter transported Madison back to the bank for a show-up identification. Id. at 267. Kathleen Kirkland, the bank teller who was robbed, was unable to make a positive identification of Madison, as the robber. Resp. Exs. I at 233-34, 238-39, 241 (Kirkland's September 21, 2005 trial testimony); H at 73-75, (Kirkland's August 18, 2005 deposition). However, Tot Gill, another bank employee, did identify Madison as the robber. Resp. Ex. I at 251-53 (Gill's September 21, 2005 trial testimony). Police officers then transported Gill over the Matthews Bridge to a convenience store parking lot, where he identified Madison's whiteOldsmobile as the getaway car. Id. at 254-55. During an inventory of Madison's car, a large amount of money was found in a brown paper bag stuffed into a tan gym bag. Resp. Ex. A at 2.

On May 5, 2005, the State of Florida charged Madison with two counts of robbery. Id. at 8-9, Information. After jury selection, Madison proceeded to a jury trial on count one, and the State later dismissed count two. Id. at 126. At the conclusion of the trial, a jury found Madison guilty of robbery. Id. at 53, Verdict. On October 20, 2005, the trial court sentenced Madison to a term of imprisonment of twenty-two years. Id. at 73-78, Judgment.

On appeal, Petitioner, through counsel, filed an Initial Brief, arguing that the trial court erred in deeming Petitioner "co-counsel" without first warning him of the dangers of self-representation, thereby depriving him of his rights to due process of law and to the effective assistance of counsel. Resp. Ex. F. On February 20, 2007, the appellate court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case to the circuit court, stating: "We are constrained to reverse Appellant's conviction and remand this case for a new trial because the trial court designated Appellant as co-counsel without conducting an inquiry under Faretta[¹ ] . . . , and without advising Appellant of the dangers of self-representation." Madison v. State, 948 So.2d 975, 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citation omitted); Resp. Ex. G.

On remand, at a pretrial hearing, Petitioner agreed to plead no contest to robbery, reserving the right to appeal the court's order denying his motion to suppress. Resp. Ex. I at 339-54. The trial court sentenced Petitioner, as a habitual violent felony offender, to a term of imprisonment of ten years. Id. at 283-88.

On appeal, Petitioner, through counsel, filed an Initial Brief, arguing that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion to suppress out-of-court identification, in-court identification and physical evidence, thereby depriving him of his rights to be free from illegal searches and seizures and to due process of law. Resp. Ex. J. On March 13, 2008, the appellate court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence per curiam without issuing a written opinion. Madison v. State, 976 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Resp. Ex. K. The mandate issued on March 31, 2008.² Resp. Ex. K. Petitioner did not seek review in the United States Supreme Court.

On September 18, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 motion). Resp. Ex. L at 1-44. In his request for post conviction relief, as ground one, Petitioner asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment and impose the sentence because the Information was fatallydefective. Additionally, he alleged that his counsel (Karl Green) was ineffective because he: failed to file an adequate and timely motion to dismiss the defective Information and failed to conduct a reasonable investigation (ground two); failed to consult with Petitioner and investigate the facts prior to the suppression proceeding and conceded Petitioner's guilt at the proceeding (ground three); failed to impeach Kathleen Kirkland and Detective Padgett relating to the show-up identification and failed to object to the prosecutor's misconduct (ground four); and failed to investigate and object to the State's factual basis for the plea and to consider the availability of the lesser offense of theft (ground five). Moreover, as ground six, Petitioner asserted that he was deprived of a fair suppression hearing due to the cumulative effect of counsel's deficient performance. The circuit court denied Madison's Rule 3.850 motion on October 14, 2008. Id. at 45-48.

Madison appealed the denial and filed a brief. Resp. Ex. M. The State filed a notice that it would not file an Answer Brief.³ On April 15, 2009, the appellate court affirmed the denial per curiam, see Madison v. State, 8 So.3d 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Resp. Ex. N, and the mandate issued on May 12, 2009, see Resp. Ex. N.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

The Petition is timely filed within the one-year period of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Response at 4-5.

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

"In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Id. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034 (2004), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Standard of Review

The Court will analyze Petitioner's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is described as follows:

As explained by the Supreme Court, the phrase "'clearly established Federal law' . . . refers to the holdings . . . of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). We have held that to be "contrary to" clearly established federal law, the state court must either (1) apply a rule "that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law," or (2) reach a different result from the Supreme Court "when faced with materially indistinguishable facts." Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003).

As regards the "unreasonable application" prong of § 2254(d)(1), we have held as follows:

A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established law if the state court unreasonably extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context. An application of federal law cannot be considered unreasonable merely because it is, in our judgment, incorrect or erroneous; a state court decision must also be unreasonable. Questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed denovo, as is the district court's conclusion regarding the reasonableness of the state court's application of federal law.

Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In sum, "a federal habeas court making the 'unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. at 1521. Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) commands that for a writ to issue because the state court made an "unreasonable determination of the facts," the petitioner must rebut "the presumption of correctness [of a state court's factualfindings] by clear and convincing evidence."[⁴ ] 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155-56 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 647 (2010).

Finally, for a state court's resolution of a claim to be an adjudication on the merits, so that the state court's...