Madison v. State
| Decision Date | 29 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | CR-05-0052. |
| Citation | 999 So.2d 561 |
| Parties | Vernon MADISON v. STATE of Alabama. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Gordon C. Armstrong III, Mobile; and Patrick McCann, Houston, Texas, for appellant.
Troy King, atty. gen., and John J. Davis, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Vernon Madison, appeals the circuit court's summary denial of his petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P.
In 1985, Madison was convicted of murdering Captain Julius Schulte of the Mobile Police Department while Capt. Schulte was engaged in the line of duty and during the performance of an official or job-related act. Madison's conviction was reversed because the prosecutor had removed black prospective jurors from the jury venire without having race-neutral reasons for doing so, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). See Madison v. State, 545 So.2d 94 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). Madison was tried a second time and was again convicted of capital murder. Madison's second conviction was reversed because of the erroneous admission of expert testimony concerning Madison's mental condition at the time of the murder. See Madison v. State, 620 So.2d 62 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). In 1994, Madison was tried a third time and was again convicted of capital murder. The circuit court found that the murder was committed while Madison was on parole for another offense and that Madison had previously been convicted of a crime of violence. Based on the existence of these aggravating circumstances, the circuit court overrode the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and sentenced Madison to death. Madison's conviction and sentence of death were affirmed on direct appeal. See Madison v. State, 718 So.2d 90 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997), aff'd, 718 So.2d 104 (Ala.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1006, 119 S.Ct. 521, 142 L.Ed.2d 432 (1998). This Court issued its certificate of judgment on July 10, 1998.
In June 1999, Madison filed a timely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., attacking his conviction and death sentence. After Madison filed his petition, the State filed its response and a motion to dismiss the petition. Madison then requested discovery. An evidentiary hearing was scheduled for February 23, 2000, but was continued on Madison's motion. In February 2003, the State moved that a hearing date be set. In August 2005, the State renewed its July 1999 motion to dismiss the Rule 32 petition. On August 25, 2005, the same day that the State filed its motion to dismiss, the circuit court adopted the State's proposed order summarily denying Madison's Rule 32 petition. This appeal followed.
At trial, the State's evidence tended to show that on the evening of April 18, 1985, Capt. Schulte was dispatched to Etta Avenue in Mobile to investigate a missing-child complaint. When Schulte arrived, the child's mother, Cheryl Green, and Madison were in the middle of a domestic dispute. Green had thrown Madison's personal items out of the house earlier that same day. Schulte was sitting in his car when Madison and Green came out to talk with him. Madison then appeared to leave the residence. In actuality, Madison snuck around the corner, came up behind Schulte's car, pointed a gun at Schulte, and shot Schulte twice in the back of the head at point-blank range. He then shot Green in the back.
This is an appeal from the summary denial of a petition for postconviction relief. Rule 32.3, Ala.R.Crim.P., states that: "The petitioner shall have the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief."
On direct appeal, we reviewed the guilt phase and penalty phase of Madison's trial for plain error. See Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P. However, the plain-error standard of review does not apply to an appeal in a Rule 32 proceeding. See Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So.2d 763 (Ala.2001). Also, the procedural bars contained in Rule 32.2, Ala.R.Crim.P., apply to all cases, even those involving the death penalty. State v. Tarver, 629 So.2d 14 (Ala. Crim.App.1993). Last, "If the circuit court is correct for any reason, even though it may not be the stated reason, we will not reverse its denial of the petition." Reed v. State, 748 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999).
Madison argues that the circuit court erred in adopting the State's proposed order denying relief on the day that it was filed without first providing him the opportunity to respond to the motion.
A review of the history of the proceedings in the circuit court is necessary in order to evaluate this claim. The record shows the following sequence of events:
June 18, 1999—Madison filed his Rule 32 petition in the Mobile County Circuit Court.
July 14, 1999—The State filed its answer to Madison's petition.
July 14, 1999—The State filed a motion for partial dismissal based on Madison's failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 32.7(d), Ala.R.Crim.P.
September 3, 1999—Madison filed a motion for discovery of the prosecution's files.
September 3, 1999—Madison filed a response to the State's motion to dismiss and request to amend the Rule 32 petition.
February 23, 2000—Entry on the case action summary sheet indicating that Madison's attorney was called to active military service until August 2000 and that case was reset for a hearing on the pending motions.
May 23, 2001—The circuit court issued an order notifying Madison that the Rule 32 petition would be dismissed if counsel did not contact the court within 30 days. The case action summary sheet indicated that counsel had not contacted the court since the motion for a continuance was granted in February 2000.
June 18, 2001—Circuit court received letter from petitioner's counsel stating that discovery would be completed by the fall of that year. He requested that a hearing date be set after Christmas and New Year holidays.
October 11, 2001—Hearing date set for February 2002.
November 19, 2001—Madison moved for a continuance stating that counsel had been mobilized for military service for one year.
January 7, 2002—Notice of appearance filed by Madison's new attorney.
February 26, 2003—The State filed motion to set the case for a hearing.
August 25, 2005—The State renewed its motion to dismiss the Rule 32 petition.
August 25, 2005—The State filed proposed order denying the Rule 32 petition.
August 25, 2005—The circuit court issued order dismissing Madison's Rule 32 petition.
October 3, 2005—Madison filed timely notice of appeal.
Initially, we note that it was not error for the circuit court to adopt the State's proposed order when denying relief. As we have repeatedly stated:
" "
Hunt v. State, 940 So.2d 1041 (Ala.Crim. App.2005), quoting Coral v. State, 900 So.2d 1274, 1288 (Ala.Crim.App.2004), overruled on other grounds, Ex parte Jenkins, 972 So.2d 159 (Ala.2005).
Nor do we agree with Madison's assertion that he was not given notice or an opportunity to respond to the State's motion for dismissal. The record shows that within 30 days of the filing of the Rule 32 petition the State responded to the petition and filed a motion to dismiss. In both the response and the motion to dismiss, the State asserted that Madison had failed to comply with the specificity requirements of Rule 32.6(b), Ala.R.Crim.P., because Madison failed to assert a factual basis for each claim. The State also asserted that many of Madison's claims were procedurally barred because they could have been, but were not, raised at trial or on appeal. See Rules 32.2(a)(3) and (a)(5), Ala.R.Crim.P. Madison was placed on notice in July 1999 of the State's defense to the Rule 32 petition and had over six years to amend the petition or to take other action. Madison failed to pursue the case.
The Supreme Court has held: "`Where a simple reading of the petition for post-conviction relief shows that, assuming every allegation of the petition to be true, it is obviously without merit or is precluded, the circuit court [may] summarily dismiss that petition without requiring a response from the district attorney.'" Bishop v. State, 608 So.2d 345, 347-48 (Ala.1992) ().
Madison relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte MacEwan, 860 So.2d 896 (Ala.2002), to support his contention that he was denied an opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss and that, therefore, the case must be remanded to the circuit court to give him that opportunity. However, in MacEwan, the State filed a motion to dismiss...
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