Madison v. State

• Decision Date: 28 February 1989
• Docket Number: No. 26S00-8711-CR-1055,26S00-8711-CR-1055
• Citation: 534 N.E.2d 702
• Parties: Tracy MADISON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 702

534 N.E.2d 702

Tracy MADISON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 26S00-8711-CR-1055.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 28, 1989.

William J. Marshall, Oakland City, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

GIVAN, Justice.

A jury trial resulted in appellant's conviction of Murder, for which he received a sentence of thirty (30) years.

The facts are: On March 16, 1986, Chris Chavis, appellant, and appellant's brother Tony went to the home of Irene Maier, appellant's girl friend, in Princeton, Indiana. Appellant's relationship with his brother had periods of volatility. When they arrived, appellant was upset with Tony, and both men were drunk.

Amber Velasquez, Shelley Jackson, and Stacey Maier were at Irene's house. While some of the group played cards, Tony went into the bedroom with Stacey.

After a short while, Stacey returned to the group and was upset because Tony hit her in the face. Irene told Tony to stop hitting Stacey, and he left. At that time, appellant took his knife from his pocket, opened it and laid it on the table, and told Irene that if she didn't stop Tony from hitting Stacey, he would. They continued the card game while they discussed Tony's problems.

Soon thereafter they heard a knock at the back door. Tony entered and swore at everyone for talking about him. He was very hostile and challenged everyone in the room to a fight. He continued his remarks, then addressed them specifically to appellant but appellant said he did not want to fight.

Tony continued his tirade and began poking and shoving appellant. Appellant and Irene testified that Tony had a small knife at this time. The others testified that they did not see Tony with a knife.

Appellant grabbed his knife from the table, and a fight ensued. Appellant testified that when he saw Tony come at him he decided to stab him first before he got stabbed. He stabbed Tony in the chest and punctured his heart which was the cause of his death.

Appellant first told police he did not know who stabbed Tony. Then he told them Chris stabbed him. Later he said he accidentally cut Tony. He stated on cross-examination that in previous fights Tony had beaten him, and he had the knife to equalize the situation.

Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury, and the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment on the evidence.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. White v. State (1986), Ind., 495 N.E.2d 725.

Appellant contends the State failed to rebut his claim of self-defense.

To establish a claim of self-defense, the defendant must show that he was in a place he had a right to be, that he acted without fault, and that he had a reasonable fear or apprehension of death or great bodily harm. Lilly v. State (1987) Ind., 506 N.E.2d 23. The burden is upon the State to negate one of the elements of self-defense. The State may carry its burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of the evidence in chief. Id.

Whether the State had disproved a claim of self-defense is a question of fact for the jury. Hill v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 1061. When the evidence is conflicting, the jury may reasonably accept or reject the claim of self-defense. A defendant's conviction in spite of a claim of self-defense can be reversed on appeal only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Lilly, supra.

Evidence existed which showed that appellant had an ongoing grievance with Tony and that he readied his knife in preparation for a fight because he was tired of Tony winning their fist fights. Police found a knife on the freezer in Maier's home which was later identified as Tony's. However, witnesses other than appellant and his girl friend testified that they saw no weapon on Tony. It was the prerogative of the jury to believe he was not armed and that appellant had no reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.

Appellant stabbed Tony with sufficient force to thrust the knife into his chest down to the handle, then he gave police three exculpatory versions of the incident. The intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Hill v. State (1985), Ind., 483 N.E.2d 746. From the evidence, the jury could find that the State negated the self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellant also argues the evidence does not support his murder conviction because Tony's threats provoked him and he acted in sudden heat; thus, his conviction should amount to only manslaughter at most.

For the offense to be reduced to manslaughter, it must be found that there was sufficient provocation to arouse the emotions of the ordinary man so as to obscure his reasoning powers. Bryan v. State (1983), Ind., 450 N.E.2d 53. The determination of whether the accused acted upon heat of passion is one for the jury. Johnson v. State (1986), Ind., 501 N.E.2d 442.

Though one may conclude that appellant became angry when Tony swore and threatened to fight him, the jury was entitled to find that the provocation was inadequate to obscure the ordinary man's reasoning or his understanding of the consequences of his actions. Such a finding is supported by the fact that appellant opened his knife in preparation for a fight, and he stated his intention to equalize the situation by using the knife. Accordingly, we find the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction.

Appellant argues the trial court erroneously refused the admission of the results of a polygraph examination taken by Irene Maier.

At a pretrial conference, the State's oral motion in limine prohibiting questioning about polygraph examinations was sustained. At trial, appellant made an offer to prove the qualifications of the polygraph examiner and the reliability of the test results. His request to present the polygraph evidence to the jury was denied. Appellant argues that because the polygraph examiner was highly qualified and he believed his examinations were very reliable, precedent disallowing the admission of such evidence should not be followed in his case.

Because the value of polygraph examinations is highly questionable and the jury may attach undue weight to their results, we refrain to diverge from our position that they are inadmissible. Kremer v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1068. The trial court is without discretion to admit or to exclude polygraph evidence until a proper waiver or stipulation has been made. Evans v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 942. We find no error.

Appellant contends the jury was erroneously instructed on the elements of murder. Final Instruction No. 9 reads:

"The crime of murder is defined by statute as follows:

A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being, commits murder, a felony.

To convict the defendant the State must have proved each of the following elements:

The defendant:

1. Knowingly or intentionally;

2. killed

3. another human being, ANTHONY W. MADISON.

If the State failed to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.

If the State did prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty of murder, a felony."

Appellant claims this instruction is faulty because it tells the jury that if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally killed another human being they should find him guilty of murder. He contends it is a mandatory instruction which nullifies his self-defense claim.

Appellant compares his case with Mundy v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 224, 214 N.E.2d 389 in which this Court reversed appellant's conviction because a defective instruction ignored his self-defense claim. The last sentence of the instruction stated that despite a finding of sudden heat, the killing was still unlawful because a man is bound to curb his passions and the offense is accordingly manslaughter.

It cannot be said that the use of the word "should" in Instruction No. 9 has the effect of precluding a self-defense claim as did the instruction in Mundy. We have held that the use of the word "should" in such a case is not improper as long as the jury is instructed upon the material allegations which the State must prove and that they are the judges of the law as well as the facts. Mitchem v. State (1987), Ind., 503 N.E.2d 889. Because the jury was so instructed in appellant's case, we find no error.

Appellant claims the trial court erroneously allowed the jury to rehear the testimony of Chris Chavis. The jury requested during deliberations a copy of Chavis's testimony. Appellant objected to the jury's request. His objection was overruled, and a tape of his testimony was replayed to the jury. Appellant asserts the trial court denied him his right to confront a witness and that undue emphasis was placed on Chavis's testimony.

Indiana Code Sec. 34-1-21-6 states that after the jury has begun deliberations, if there is a disagreement among them about part of the testimony, upon notice to the parties the information required shall be given to them.

Appellant believes his case is analogous to Shaffer v. State (1983), Ind., 449 N.E.2d 1074 (Givan, C.J. and Pivarnik, J. dissenting) in which this Court held that reversible error occurred when the trial court replayed the entire trial, which consisted of substantially conflicting testimony.

In appellant's case, the testimony replayed consisted of approximately thirty pages of the transcript and cannot be compared in volume to that replayed in Shaffer. Also, the significance of the conflicting testimony in appellant's case was not as great...