Madison v. State
| Decision Date | 26 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 78598-8.,78598-8. |
| Citation | 163 P.3d 757,161 Wn.2d 85 |
| Parties | Daniel MADISON, Beverly Dubois, and Dannielle Garner, Respondents, Sebrina Moore and Larence Bolden, Plaintiffs, v. STATE of Washington; Christine O. Gregoire, Governor; and Sam Reed, Secretary of State, in their official capacities, Appellants. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
¶ 1 Respondents/cross-appellants Daniel Madison, Beverly DuBois, and Dannielle Garner (respondents) are convicted felons seeking reinstatement of their voting rights. Respondents challenge the constitutionality of Washington's disenfranchisement scheme because it denies the right to vote to convicted felons who have not completed all of the terms of their sentences, including full payment of their legal financial obligations (LFOs).1 Respondents argue that the scheme violates the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because it denies them the right to vote based on wealth. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that the scheme is unconstitutional as to felons who, due to their financial statuses, are unable to pay their LFOs immediately. The State sought direct review and requests that this court reverse the trial court's order and enforce Washington's Constitution and statutes as written. Respondents cross-appeal and ask this court to hold that all felons who have satisfied all the terms of their sentences except for full payment of their LFOs be allowed to vote, regardless of their financial statuses.
¶ 2 We hold that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme does not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. We also hold that respondents lack standing to bring their cross-appeal, and we deny respondents' request for attorney fees because they are not the prevailing party. We reverse the trial court.
¶ 3 The facts are undisputed. Daniel Madison was convicted of third degree assault in King County Superior Court in 1996. His sentence included an order to pay $483.25 in restitution, $200.00 in victim assessment fees, and $100.00 in court costs, for a total of $783.25 in LFOs. Madison is disabled due to mental illness, and his social security payments constitute his only regular monthly income. A court order set his monthly payment at $15, which he regularly makes. The court waived the payment of interest. Although Madison has paid at least $530.00 toward his LFOs, he still owes approximately $245.25. Madison has satisfied all of the terms of his sentence, with the exception of full payment of his LFOs.
¶ 4 Beverly DuBois was convicted of manufacturing and delivering marijuana in Stevens County Superior Court in 2002. Her sentence included an order to pay $1000 to the Stevens County Drug Enforcement Fund, a $500 victim assessment fee, and $110 in court costs, for a total of $1,610 in LFOs. DuBois sustained a permanent disability from a 2000 car accident and her social security payments, disability payments, and food stamps constitute her only monthly income. In compliance with the court's payment plan, she regularly makes $10 payments toward her LFOs. Although she has paid at least $190.00, DuBois now owes approximately $1,895.69 due to interest accrual. DuBois has satisfied all of the terms of her sentence, with the exception of full payment of her LFOs.
¶ 5 Dannielle Garner was convicted of forgery in Skagit County Superior Court in 2003. Her sentence included an order to pay a $500 victim assessment fee and $110 in court fees, for a total of $610 in LFOs. Garner is permanently disabled due to mental illness, and her social security payments constitute her only monthly income. Garner regularly makes $10 payments toward her LFOs in compliance with a court order. The court also noted that once Garner pays the principal in full, the court may waive interest. Although she has paid at least $250 toward her LFOs, she still owes approximately $360. Garner has satisfied all of the terms of her sentence, with the exception of full payment of her LFOs.2
¶ 6 Respondents filed a complaint for declaratory relief in King County Superior Court arguing that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the privileges and immunities clause and article I, section 19 of the Washington Constitution. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme "is invalid as to all felons who have satisfied the terms of their sentences except for paying legal financial obligations, and who, due to their financial status, are unable to pay their legal financial obligations immediately." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 433. The court granted respondents' summary judgment motion, denied the State's summary judgment motion, and ordered that Madison, DuBois, and Garner were "entitled to register to vote." CP at 434.
¶ 7 The Commissioner granted direct review on an accelerated basis and denied the State's motion to stay the trial court's order pending appeal without prejudice. The State did not move for reconsideration or appeal the denial of the stay.
A. Whether Washington's felon disenfranchisement scheme violates the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution.
B. Whether Washington's felon disenfranchisement scheme violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
C. On cross-appeal, whether the trial court erred by limiting its order to only individuals who could not pay their LFOs immediately.
D. Whether the respondents are entitled to attorney fees.
¶ 8 Article VI, section 3 of the Washington Constitution disqualifies from the franchise or the right to vote, "[a]ll persons convicted of infamous crimes unless restored to their civil rights." The Washington Legislature has defined "`infamous crime'" as "a crime punishable by death in the state penitentiary or imprisonment in a state correctional facility," or in other words, any felony offense. RCW 29A.04.079. Once disenfranchised, felons may seek to restore their civil rights through a governor's pardon. RCW 9.96.010. Additionally, felons may also seek to restore their civil rights through the issuance of a certificate of discharge. RCW 9.94A.637. A court may issue a certificate of discharge only when the felon has completed "all requirements of the sentence, including any and all legal financial obligations." RCW 9.94A.637(1)(a). In order to register to vote, a felon must take an oath that states that he or she is "not presently denied [his or her] civil rights as a result of being convicted of a felony." RCW 29A.08.230.3
¶ 9 The trial court held that this disenfranchisement scheme, and in particular RCW 9.94A.637, violates article I, section 12, and article I, section 19 of the Washington Constitution4 and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because it discriminates on the basis of a felon's ability to pay his or her LFOs. We review summary judgment motions and issues of constitutional interpretation de novo. Berrocal v. Fernandez, 155 Wash.2d 585, 590, 121 P.3d 82 (2005); In re Parentage of C.A.M.A., 154 Wash.2d 52, 57, ¶ 9, 109 P.3d 405 (2005). In general, "`[a] statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging its constitutionality bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 132, ¶ 25, 110 P.3d 192 (2005) (quoting State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 769-70, 921 P.2d 514 (1996)), overruled in part on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006). Thus, the respondents bear the responsibility of proving that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. When presented with arguments under both the Washington and federal constitutions, we review the state constitutional arguments first. State v. Reece, 110...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Jones v. Governor of Fla., No. 20-12003
...of felons to vote is not fundamental.’ " (quoting Wesley v. Collins , 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986) )); Madison v. State , 161 Wash.2d 85, 163 P.3d 757, 767 (2007) ("However, Richardson clearly distinguished the right that is at stake for felons from the Court's previous holdings that......
-
Schroeder v. Steven Weighall, M.D., & Columbia Basin Imaging, P.C.
...omitted) (quoting Am. Legion Post No. 149 v. Dep't of Health, 164 Wash.2d 570, 609, 192 P.3d 306 (2008) (quoting Madison v. State, 161 Wash.2d 85, 103, 163 P.3d 757 (2007))); see also Griffin v. Eller, 130 Wash.2d 58, 65, 922 P.2d 788 (1996) (citing In re Runyan, 121 Wash.2d 432, 448, 853 P......
-
In re Dependency S.K-P.
...independent interpretation from the federal provision by analyzing the six nonexclusive, neutral Gunwall factors. Madison v. State , 161 Wash.2d 85, 93, 163 P.3d 757 (2007). If we determine that an independent analysis is warranted, we then analyze " ‘whether the provision in question exten......
-
Certification from the U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Wash. in Larry C. Ockletree v. Franciscan Health Sys., Corp.
...12 has more “bite” whenever a law confers a privilege or immunity, not just when it benefits a “minority class.” Madison v. State, 161 Wash.2d 85, 94 n. 6, 163 P.3d 757 (2007). And in two cases in 2008, the issue was settled when a majority of the court applied the Madison plurality approac......
-
LIQUIDATING THE INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE THEORY.
...(Tenn. 2008); Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W. 2d 845 (Iowa 2014); Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764 (Ind. 2011); Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757 (Wash. 2007) (en banc). (341.) Favorito v. Handel, 684 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 2009); Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2011); Chavez v. ......
-
§ 11.4 Case Law Exceptions to The General Rule
...raised by amicus curiae Ordinarily, the appellate court will not consider issues raised only by amicus curiae on review. Madison v. State, 161 Wn.2d 85, 104 n.10, 163 P.3d 757 (2007); Long v. Odell, 60 Wn.2d 151, 154, 372 P.2d 548 (1962). There are exceptions, however. See Harmon v. Dep't o......
-
Table of Cases
...P.2d 340 (1966): 5.5(1) Mader v. Health Care Auth., 149 Wn.2d 458, 70 P.3d 931 (2003): 21.2(1), 21.10(3)(a), 21.14(2) Madison v. State, 161 Wn.2d 85, 163 P.3d 757 (2007): 5.2(1), 5.2(1)(b), 11.4(10) Ma'ele v. Arrington, 111 Wn. App. 557, 45 P.3d 557 (2002): 12.7(6) Magana v. Hyundai Motor A......
-
§ 5.2 Who Initiates Review
...or by discretionary review. The courts often refer to this requirement as a party's "standing" to seek review. E.g., Madison v. State, 161 Wn.2d 85, 109-10, 163 P.3d 757 (2007) (respondents who were not aggrieved by the trial court's ruling did not have "standing" to bring cross appeal). Op......