Madlem v. Arko
Decision Date | 18 May 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 57S04-9205-CV-381,57S04-9205-CV-381 |
Citation | 592 N.E.2d 686 |
Parties | Dean MADLEM, Appellant, v. Victor ARKO and Marla M. Johnston, Appellees. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
The Court of Appeals, in an opinion reported at 581 N.E.2d 1290, affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of appellees Arko and Johnston. We also affirm the trial court, but because we do so for a reason different than that stated in the Court of Appeals' opinion, we grant transfer and set aside the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Arko is an attorney and Johnston is his secretary. Madlem and Neil Buck formed a corporation. They later retained Arko to prepare a note and a second mortgage on Buck's home in Michigan in order to secure a loan agreement between Madlem and Buck. Later, when Madlem attempted to collect on the note through a foreclosure suit, Buck defended on the ground that his wife's signature, which was purportedly notarized by Johnston, was a forgery.
The Court of Appeals held that Madlem fails in his claim because of the expiration of the statute of limitations. Citing Shideler v. Dwyer (1981), 275 Ind. 270, 417 N.E.2d 281, the Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the notarization of the purportedly forged signature of Mrs. Buck; therefore, Madlem's claim against Arko and Johnston was barred by the statute of limitations.
Since Shideler, this Court has revisited this situation, the most recent case being Wehling v. Citizens Nat. Bank (1992), Ind., 586 N.E.2d 840. There, we cited both Burks v. Rushmore (1989), Ind., 534 N.E.2d 1101 and Barnes v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc. (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 84. We observed the Indiana rule to be that "a cause of action accrues, and thus the statute of limitations begins to run, when the resultant damage of a negligent act is 'susceptible of ascertainment.' " Wehling, supra at 842.
We further observed that we perceive no significant difference between the "discovery rule" followed in some jurisdictions and the "ascertainment rule" followed in Indiana. We then stated:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Horn v. A.O. Smith Corp.
...Nat'l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840, 842 (Ind.1992) (quoting Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251, 259 (1928)); see also Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind.1992). Yet in Barnes v. A.H. Robins Co., 476 N.E.2d 84, 87-88 (Ind.1985), in response to a certified question from this court, t......
-
RTC v. O'Bear, Overholser, Smith & Huffer, Civ. No. H 83-164.
...period does not run against a plaintiff in Indiana until the plaintiff has reason to know of the negligent act. Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind.1992) (plaintiff would not know of improper notarization on mortgage until he tried to Applied to corporate entities, such as Hometown, In......
-
Fager v. Hundt, 75S05-9303-CV-341
...ordinary diligence, should have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another. Madlem v. Arko (1992), Ind., 592 N.E.2d 686, 687; Malachowski v. Bank One, Indianapolis (1992), Ind., 590 N.E.2d 559, 564; Wehling, 586 N.E.2d at 843; Burks v. Rushmore (......
-
Knox Cnty. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Davis
...(App. Vol. II at 12.) Based on this unchallenged finding, KCARC could have implemented a reasonable accommodation. See Madlem v. Arko , 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) ("Because Madlem does not challenge the findings of the trial court, they must be accepted as correct."). Thus, KCARC faile......