Madrid v. Cal. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 16 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:16-cv-00143-AWI-JLT (PC) |
| Parties | JOHN MADRID, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
(Doc. 1)
Plaintiff alleges that, because he was falsely charged with assaulting a peace officer with a weapon, his personal and legal property was wrongly destroyed in connection with his term in the Security Housing Unit. Because his allegations fail to state any cognizable claims, the Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If an action is dismissed on one of these three basis, a strike is imposed per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and has not alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury does not qualify to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff raises three counts: (1) violation his right to petition the government and retaliation under the First Amendment as well as his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Doc. 1, pp. 5-11); (2) violation of his rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment (id., p. 12); and (3) violation of his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (id., p. 13), for which he seeks a declaration that his rights were violated, injunctive relief to prevent implementation of section 3191 of Title 15, and money damages(id., p. 14).
For background purposes,1 Plaintiff states that in 2010, Defendants Joseph Burnes and S. Pease were involved in an incident where another guard beat Plaintiff, which required him to be airlifted to a trauma center and rendered him unconscious for 18 days. (Doc. 1, p. 5.) Plaintiff states that those three officers conspired and falsely charged Plaintiff with assaulting Defendant Burnes with a weapon. (Id.) Plaintiff also states that he is a "known jailhouse lawyer." (Id.)
Under Count I, Plaintiff alleges that, on February 11, 2014, he was placed in ASU at PVSP and that Defendant Lawry used this circumstance to order Defendants I. Tasi and C. Cavasos to dispose of Plaintiff's personal and legal property. (Id., at p. 6.) On February 14th and 15th, Defendants I Tasi and C. Cavasos sorted through Plaintiff's property and claimed that he had to downsize his legal property to one banker's box and his personal property to 6 cubic feet. (Id.) Plaintiff states that his property was supposed to be stored until he was released from ASU, (id., at n. 1), but that on February 15, 2014, Defendants I. Tasi and C. Cavasos cited his black footlocker as being "unserviceable" and disposed of it and 170 pounds of legal paperwork to Plaintiff's active cases as well as his parole plan with supporting certificates and letters for use athis upcoming parole board review hearing. (Id., at p. 6.) Plaintiff states that he filed an inmate grievance on February 27, 2014 challenging disposal of his property as retaliation for his legal activities against the officers who were involved in the 2010 beating and because he helped other inmates with their legal problems. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges this grievance was denied at all levels because Defendant C. Cavasos noted that Plaintiff elected to dispose of his property rather than mail the items to friends or family; however, Plaintiff states that he did not elect to have his property destroyed, rather he did not have the funds in his account to pay the shipping costs as required under section 3191(c)(1) & (2). (Id., at p. 7.)
Plaintiff alleges that on July 7, 2014, he was transferred to CSP-Cor with 3 boxes of his personal property and 27 boxes of legal property. (Id.) On August 21, 2014, Plaintiff received a third of his personal property that had been "transpacked at PVSP," but it did not include any electrical appliances. (Id.) On September 4, 2014, additional personal and legal property was issued to Plaintiff with a notice that other items of his property (including a battery charger and batteries, hardcover law books, and family photographs) were not being provided since "Non-SHU Allowable." (Id., at p. 8.) On September 25, 2014, Plaintiff's SHU term ended, but his personal and legal property had not been disposed of yet, so Plaintiff was held in the SHU until "defendants were able to accomplish their goal of permanently depriving Plaintiff of his personal and legal property as punishment and retaliation for allegedly assaulting Defendant Burnes with a weapon." (Id.) Upon Plaintiff's release from the SHU in January of 2015, a "building by building cell search was conducted" and Plaintiff's cell was searched on March 31, 2015 at which Defendant Burnes was present. (Id.) The next day, Defendant Burnes filed a complaint that Plaintiff was a threat to Defendant Burnes' safety because of the 2010 incident. (Id.) This caused Plaintiff to be placed in a "caged 'dry' cell" for 2-3 hours while a "lock-up order" was prepared to move Plaintiff to the ASU pending his transfer to another facility. (Id.) Defendants John Doe #1 & #2 packed Plaintiff's property from in his cell, but the lock-up order was not issued so Plaintiff was returned to his cell and given back his property minus a number of toiletry items. (Id., at p. 9.) Plaintiff alleges that this targeting of his personal and legal property shows malicious intent and that it is also evident by Defendant M. Magana giving him a cracked bowl and lid that did notmatch despite the fact that the one that prison official confiscated from him were new (and presumably, matched). (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that his television was maliciously targeted a "non-SHU allowable" because of the electrical cord, but his radio with a similar cord was not. (Id., at p. 10.) Plaintiff alleges he was not in the SHU when Defendant M. Magana disposed of his property out of retaliation for allegedly having assaulted2 Defendant Burnes. (Id.)
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that on September 4, 2014, Defendant Magana came to his SHU cell and told Plaintiff that CSP-Cor uses Fed Ex to ship out inmate property. (Doc. 1, p. 12.) Plaintiff asked if his items could be held until September 26, 2014 when he would be released from the SHU, but Defendant Magana declined to do so. (Id.) Plaintiff stated a friend had offered to pay the shipping cost, but Defendant Magana stated that Fed Ex does not accept prepayment and that section 3191 states that payment is only accepted from an inmate's trust account. (Id.) On September 20, 2014, Plaintiff's friend contacted Defendant Magana requesting information on how to pay for the shipment of Plaintiff's property, but "Obviously the offer to pay postage was rejected." (Id.) On December 11, 2014, Plaintiff wrote to Fed Ex and received a response from them on January 6, 2015 indicating that they would accept prepayment for shipments. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he was permanently deprived of his personal and legal property solely because he lacked the funds for shipping. (Id.)
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that prior to the disposal of his personal and legal property he filed an inmate grievance which was declined at all levels to "rubber-stamp" the denial of his property at the lower levels. (Id., at p. 13.) Plaintiff also alleges he directly contacted CDCR Secretary, Jeffrey Beard; PVSP Warden Scott Frauenheim; CSP-Cor Warden, Dave Davey; CSP-Cor CCI, T. Wyman; PVSP Sergeant S. Pease; and CSP-Cor Sergeant D.B. Hernandez to report the incident but he received no assistance. (Id.)
Plaintiff has not stated any cognizable claims, but may be able to correct the deficiencies in his pleading so as to state a cognizable claim. Thus, he is being given the pleading requirements and legal standards for his claims and leave to file a first amended complaint.
"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). "Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.
While "plaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ," Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally and are afforded the benefit of any...
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