Madrid v. Homeland Sec. Solutions Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2015
• Docket Number: CASE NO.: 1:14-CV-29 (WLS)
• Citation: 141 F.Supp.3d 1351
• Parties: Kelli Madrid, Plaintiff, v. Homeland Security Solutions Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

141 F.Supp.3d 1351

Kelli Madrid, Plaintiff,
v.
Homeland Security Solutions Inc., Defendant.

CASE NO.: 1:14-CV-29 (WLS)

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Albany Division.

Signed September 30, 2015

141 F.Supp.3d 1354

Regina S. Molden, Alexander C. Macinnes, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Ashley Zeiler Hager, Patrick J. Schwedler, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

ORDER

W. LOUIS SANDS, Senior Judge

Before the Court is Defendant Homeland Security Solutions, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Kelli Madrid. (Doc. 44.) For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Defendants Homeland Security Solutions, Inc., Holly David, and Sean Lamonzs. (Doc. 1.) Therein, Plaintiff claims Defendants created a hostile work environment as a result of their sexual harassment, that Defendant Homeland Security Solutions, Inc. retaliated against Plaintiff after she reported to the Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") office at the Albany Marine Corps Base that she was sexually harassed, and that Defendants negligently and wrongfully retained employees in violation of Georgia law. (Id. ) On March 31, 2014, the Court approved Plaintiff's Stipulation voluntarily dismissing Holly David as a party. (Doc. 10.) On April 17, 2015, Defendant Lamonzs filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 13.) On November 10, 2014, the Court granted Defendant Lamonzs's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 37.) As a result, the only remaining Defendant in this case is Homeland Security Solutions, Inc. ("Defendant").

On February 20, 2015, Defendant filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 44.) On March 13, 2015, Plaintiff filed her Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Undisputed Facts. (Doc. 54.) On April 13, 2015, Defendant filed a Reply. (Doc. 58.) Since the briefing period has closed, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion is ripe for review.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 allows a party to move for summary judgment when a party contends no genuine issue of material fact remains and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

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with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Chow v. Chak Yam Chau , 555 Fed.Appx. 842, 847 (11th Cir.2014) (citing Maddox v. Stephens , 727 F.3d 1109, 1118 (11th Cir.2013) ). "A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor." Grimes v. Miami Dade Cnty. , 552 Fed.Appx. 902, 904 (11th Cir.2014) (citing Chapman v. AI Transp. , 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.2000) ). "An issue of fact is 'material' if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case." Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). "It is 'genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH – Siegen , 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir.1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ).

The movant bears the initial burden of showing, by reference to the record, that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Barreto v. Davie Marketplace, LLC , 331 Fed.Appx. 672, 673 (11th Cir.2009). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no genuine dispute of material fact, or by demonstrating to the district court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. See Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant has met its burden, the nonmoving party is required "to go beyond the pleadings" and identify "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than summarily deny the allegations or 'show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.' " Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (citations omitted). Instead, the nonmovant must point to record evidence that would be admissible at trial. See Jones v. UPS Ground Freight , 683 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir.2012) (quoting Macuba v. Deboer , 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir.1999) ) (noting that hearsay may be considered on a motion for summary judgment only if it "could be reduced to admissible evidence at trial or reduced to admissible form"). Such evidence may include affidavits or declarations that are based on personal knowledge of the affiant or declarant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all evidence and factual inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether that evidence could reasonably sustain a jury verdict in its favor. See Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Allen , 121 F.3d at 646. However, the Court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

II. Local Rule 56

Local Rule 56 requires the following:

The respondent to a motion for summary judgment shall attach to the response a separate and concise statement of material facts, numbered separately, to which the respondent contends there

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exists a genuine issue to be tried. Response shall be made to each of the movant's numbered material facts. All material facts contained in the moving party's statement which are not specifically controverted by the respondent in respondent's statement shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate.

M.D. Ga. L.R. 56. Defendant filed a summary judgment motion with a statement of undisputed facts, as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court. (Doc. 44.) Likewise, Plaintiff timely filed her response to Defendant's statement of undisputed facts, as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court. (Doc. 54.) Having established the applicable standards, the Court will now proceed with reviewing the merits of Defendant's Motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

The facts provided to the Court by the parties offer two starkly different narratives of Plaintiff's employment with Defendant. Defendant emphasizes facts and provides a narrative to the effect that Plaintiff was unable to act in accord with Defendant's privacy policy after several warnings, which ultimately resulted in her termination. Plaintiff, on the other hand, stresses facts and provides a narrative to the effect that Plaintiff was largely applauded for her work performance in the midst of constant sexual harassment obvious to her supervisors and coworkers. After reviewing the facts relied upon by both parties, the Court concludes that the record could support the establishment of the following facts.

Defendant is a private security corporation that trains and supplies security personnel to military bases in several states. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 6.) In July 2009, Plaintiff was first employed by Defendant to work as a General Clerk at the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany, Georgia ("Albany base"). (Doc. 44-1 at ¶ 1; Doc. 52-1.) Throughout most of her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was supervised by Holly David, Defendant's Site Supervisor at the Albany base. (Doc. 44-1 at ¶ 2.) David alerted Defendant's employees that she was the "sole supervisor" at the Albany base and outlined the chain of command within Defendant's company soon after Plaintiff was hired. (Id. at ¶ 3.) On September 8, 2009, David recorded in writing a prior conversation with Plaintiff in light of "negative discussions [Plaintiff had] regarding pay and job duties within the office" and noted that she reminded Plaintiff that all classified information should remain private. (Id. at ¶ 8; Doc. 44-3 at 23.) Soon thereafter, David also informed Plaintiff that if she had any concerns about David's role as site supervisor, she could report them to Defendant's high-level managers and reiterated Defendant's chain of command. (Doc. 44-1 at ¶ 11.)

For the most part, during the early stages of her employment, Plaintiff received high marks for her performance as an employee for Defendant. (Doc. 44-1 at

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