Madrid v. Justice Court
Decision Date | 06 November 1975 |
Citation | 125 Cal.Rptr. 348,52 Cal.App.3d 819 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | Jennie MADRID, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The JUSTICE COURT OF DINUBA JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF TULARE, State of California, Defendant; PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party of Interest and Appellant. Zoraido RAYMONDO and Moriano Raymondo, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. The JUSTICE COURT OF DINUBA JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF TULARE, State of California, Defendant; PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party of Interest and Appellant. Civ. 2461. |
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Roger E. Venturi and Janice Hayes, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for real party in interest and appellant.
Charles B. Flood, Tulare County Public Defender, by Walter L. Gorelick, Asst Public Defender, Visalia, for plaintiffs-respondents.
The appeal herein is a consolidated appeal by the People from the granting of a writ of prohibition restraining the Dinuba Justice Court from proceeding with the prosecution of plaintiffs and respondents for violations of Welfare and Institutions Code section 11483.
The facts in each of the consolidated cases are identical and are not disputed. Each defendant was charged by an amended information with violating section 11483 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, said section providing:
'Whenever any person has, by means of false statement or representation or by impersonation or other fraudulent device, obtained aid for a child not in fact entitled thereto, the person obtaining such aid shall be punished as follows:
'(1) If the amount obtained or retained is two hundred dollars ($200) or less, by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than six months, a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both such imprisonment and fine.
'(2) If the amount obtained or retained is more than two hundred ($200), by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than one year or more than 10 years or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year.
'All actions necessary to secure restitution shall be brought against persons in violation of this section as provided in Sections 12250 and 12850.'
Upon motion by the People and under the provisions of Penal Code section 17, each alleged violation was declared to be a misdemeanor. Each of the defendants entered pleas of not guilty and thereafter sought alternative writs of prohibition. They alleged that the bringing of the criminal actions was barred by the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code, inasmuch as prior to the filing of criminal complaints, demand for restitution had been made and defendant and respondents herein had agreed to make restitution and were making restitution by having sums withheld from current payments.
After hearing the matter, the trial court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition directing the Dinuba Justice Court to desist from any further action in the cases. The People appeal.
In each of the complaints it is charged that the respondents herein violated section 11483 of the Welfare and Institutions Code by wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently obtaining AFDC aid in excess of $200 without any legal entitlement to such aid. The appellant, real party in interest, filed a return to the petition for an alternative writ of mandate, in which is set forth a notification to each respondent that the violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 11483 consisted of failing to give a true report of income.
The trial court, in issuing a peremptory writ barring further prosecution of respondents, based its opinion solely upon the ground that no criminal prosecution under Welfare and Institutions Code section 11483 was authorized until and unless the restitution had either been sought or obtained by civil action. Chief reliance is placed upon the concluding paragraphs of sections 11250 and 12850 of the Welfare and Institutions Code ( ) which read as follows:
'It is the intent of the Legislature that restitution shall be sought by request, civil action, or other suitable means prior to the bringing of a criminal action.'
At the hearing upon the petition for a writ of mandate it was stipulated that both petitioners herein had commenced making restitution by the process of deducting from current AFDC payments certain sums to be applied against the overpayments previously received. When AFDC payments were terminated altogether petitioners stated they intended to continue making restitution.
As we noted earlier the issue presented to the trial court, and here presented, is whether criminal proceedings may be instituted against a welfare recipient who has made restitution or who promises to make restitution.
In resolving this issue we first look to the applicable statutes. Welfare and Institutions Code section 11483 is a criminal statute providing punishment for all persons who obtain aid for a child by any fraudulent statements, representations, impersonation or any other fraudulent device. If the amount so obtained is more than $200 it becomes a felony. The last paragraph of the section provides:
'All actions necessary to secure restitution shall be brought against persons in violation of this section as provided in Sections 12250 and 12850.'
In revising the Welfare and Institutions Code, the last two named sections were repealed in 1973, but this fact is of no significance inasmuch as that in their repeal no intent was expressed to make them inoperative as they effect section 11483 by incorporation by reference. (Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53, 58--59, 195 P.2d 1.) Moreover, substantially identical language is contained in a newly adopted section of the Welfare and Institutions Code (section 13200).
The litigants in this case concede that we are required to follow recognized rules of construction of statutes as set forth in Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 591, 604, 45 Cal.Rptr. 512, 520
In construing the statute here in question the trial court in its memorandum opinion stated in part:
'. . . the only way to give substance to the inhibition of the Welfare and Institutions Code regarding criminal prosecutions is to hold that if civil restitution is successfully sought, criminal prosecution is barred; and that criminal prosecutions are intended to be reserved for the situations where civil restitution cannot be successfully obtained.'
Inherent in the above statement is the expressed belief that civil restitution must be sought and if successfully sought, or is in progress of being made, criminal prosecution is barred. In the instant cases neither petitioner has made full restitution but has promised to and is currently making restitutional payments. Implicit in the court's holding is that a promise to make restitution is tantamount to complying with the requirement to make restitution.
We do not believe that the statute before us is susceptible to such an interpretation. We note that the statute does not by its terms bar prosecution even if restitution is made. This being so, it would most certainly follow that prosecution is not barred if only partial restitution is made.
It is our judicial function to ascertain and declare the true intent and meaning of the statute before us in the first instance by a consideration of its terms, not by a tortured construction or by implying hidden meanings. (Wisdom v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. (1963) 211 Cal.App.2d 602, 27 Cal.Rptr. 599.)
Welfare and Institutions Code sections 11250 and 12850 state that restitution shall be sought before criminal actions are instituted and no more. It is obviously intended to direct public agencies to seek restitution as a first resource but by its terms it does not bar criminal action thereafter. Nor are any time limits suggested in which to pursue restitution...
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