Madrigal v. Kleberg Cnty. & Edward Mata

• Decision Date: 06 September 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 2:15-CV-345
• Parties: CORINA MADRIGAL, Plaintiff, v. KLEBERG COUNTY and EDWARD MATA, SHERIFF OF KLEBERG COUNTY, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

CORINA MADRIGAL, Plaintiff, v. KLEBERG COUNTY and EDWARD MATA, SHERIFF OF KLEBERG COUNTY, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 2:15-CV-345

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

September 6, 2016

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Corina Madrigal ("Madrigal") brings claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and the Equal Protection Clause. See Pl.'s Orig. Compl. ¶¶ 1-6, 14-23, Dkt. No. 1. She names as defendants Kleberg County, Texas ("the County") and its sheriff, Edward Mata ("Mata"); Madrigal brings at least some of her claims against Mata in his individual capacity, including claims under Texas law for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Compl. ¶¶ 4-5, 50, 61-68. In her live complaint, Madrigal alleges that Mata sexually harassed her and that Defendants subsequently retaliated against her for complaining to other County employees and filing a complaint of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, culminating in her constructive discharge. See Compl. ¶¶ 13-24, 50.

The Court has before it Madrigal's motion for leave to file an amended complaint, Dkt. No. 18, and Defendants' motion for leave to file a surreply to that motion, Dkt. No. 24. Madrigal seeks to amend her complaint to add retaliation allegations premised on Defendants' changing her work schedule and the assertion that Mata filed a defamation suit against her in the 105th Judicial District Court of Kleberg County, Texas, on May 27, 2015. See Dkt. No. 18 ¶ 2; Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 27, Dkt. No. 18 Ex. A. Madrigal also proposes to allege that Mata voluntarily dismissed his defamation action. Dkt. No. 18 ¶ 2; Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 28 (omitting date on which defamation action was dismissed).¹ The County responds that adding the proposed allegations about Mata's defamation action would be futile. Based on Fifth Circuit precedent that continues to bind this Court in the wake of a subsequent Supreme Court decision, the Court denies Madrigal's motion for leave to amend in part. See Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 323 F.3d 528, 532-33 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).

I. Legal Standard

Because Madrigal filed her motion to amend before the deadline to amend pleadings set in the scheduling order, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) governs her motion. Rule 15(a)(2) provides that, with exceptions not facially applicable here, "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires." A district court "properly exercises its discretion under Rule 15(a)(2) when it denies leave to amend for a substantial reason, such as undue delay, repeated failures to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice, or futility." United States ex rel. Spicer v. Westbrook, 751 F.3d 354, 367 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 270-71 (5th Cir. 2010); see Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Absent such factors, 'the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 'freely given.'" (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962))).

Defendants assert that amending the complaint as Madrigal proposes would be partially futile. A proposed "amendment is futile if it would fail to survive a Rule 12(b)6) Motion" to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir.2003)); accord Rio Grande Royalty Co., Inc. v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 620 F.3d 465,468 (5th Cir. 2010) ("The trial court acts within its discretion in denying leave to amend where the proposed amendment would be futile because it could not survive a motion to dismiss." (citing Briggs, 331 F.3d at 508)). Accordingly, the Court analyzes Madrigal's proposed amended complaint "under 'the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).'" Marucci Sports, 751 F.3d at 378 (quoting Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000)).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also, e.g., United States v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 775 F.3d 255, 263 (5th Cir. 2014) ("Rule 12(b)(6) does not require the [plaintiff] to present its best case or even a particularly good case, only to state a plausible case."); In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010. "A claim is plausible if 'the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 775 F.3d at 260. The requirement that the claim be plausible on its face "is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Put another way, "the complaint's 'factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" In re Great Lakes, 624 F.3d at 210 (brackets omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Supreme Court has opined that the well-worn maxim that a complaint must not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief," Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), "has earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.

When performing a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint must be accepted as true, and the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. S.E.C. v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 553 (5th Cir.2010); In re Great Lakes, 624 F.3d at 210 (citing Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)). Nonetheless, "conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, [and] legal conclusions" need not be accepted as true. Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)); accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662; In re Great Lakes, 624 F.3d at 210. The plausibility standard, however, is not a "license to look behind [a complaint's] allegations and independently assess the likelihood that the plaintiff will be able to prove them at trial." Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 775 F.3d at 260 (quoting Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 803 n.44 (5th Cir. 2011)).

II. Analysis

To make out a Title VII retaliation claim, Madrigal must show: (1) she participated in protected activity; (2) her employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) her participation in the protected activity caused the adverse employment action. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 523 (5th Cir. 2008)) (listing elements of prima facie case). The Supreme Court has held that Title VII's "antiretaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006). The employee in Robinson v. Shell Oil, for instance, alleged that his former employer retaliated against him by giving a negative reference to another employer to which he had applied. 519 U.S. 337, 339 (1997). Reasoning that it "would undermine the effectiveness of Title VII by allowing the threat of postemployment retaliation to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, and would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring Title VII claims," id. at 347. The Supreme Court decided that Title VII's antiretaliation provision applied to former employees like the plaintiff, id. at 347-48.

The County gives three reasons why it believes adding Madrigal's proposed retaliation claims would be futile. See Dkt. No. 19 at 2-4. First, the County contends that Madrigal does not allege that she suffered any damages, especially given her allegation that Mata voluntarily dismissed the defamation action. Id. at 4. Second, the County maintains that filing a defamation action is not an adverse employment action under controlling Fifth Circuit law. Id. at 3. Because the Court finds the County's second contention dispositive, it does not reach the third.

A. Madrigal's Proposed Complaint States A Claim For Nominal Damages

The County argues that Madrigal's proposed amended complaint fails to allege plausibly that Mata's filing of the defamation suit caused her any damages. See Dkt. No. 19 at 3-4. The County's response asserts that Madrigal did not make an appearance in the defamation action during its pendency. Dkt. No. 19 at 3. Madrigal's proposed complaint alleges that Mata filed the defamation action and subsequently dismissed it voluntarily. Dkt. No. 19 Ex. A ¶¶ 27-28. Thus, regardless of Madrigal's allegations that she experienced mental anguish as a result of Mata's conduct, see Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 38, determining how, if at all, Madrigal participated in the defamation action would require the Court to go beyond the four corners of the proposed complaint and transform its Rule 12(b)(6) analysis into a summary-judgment proceeding. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

Furthermore, the County overlooks the availability of nominal damages for retaliation. "To recover more than nominal damages for emotional harm, a plaintiff must provide proof of actual injury resulting...