Madsen v. Am. Fed'n of Musicians of the U.S. & Can.
| Decision Date | 01 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5:13–CV–2519. |
| Citation | 13 F.Supp.3d 820 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
| Parties | Linda MADSEN, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, AFL–CIO/CLC, LOCAL 24, Defendant. |
S. David Worhatch, Stow, OH, for Plaintiff.
Ronald G. Macala, Thomas J. Griffith, Macala & Piatt, North Canton, OH, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Linda Madsen's motion to remand to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas (Doc. No. 8). Defendant has filed a response (Doc. No. 9), and plaintiff has filed a reply (Doc. No. 151 ). Also pending is plaintiff's motion to strike (Doc. No. 11) the affidavit and exhibits submitted by defendant in support of its opposition to the motion to remand (Doc. No. 10). For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion to remand is GRANTED. Plaintiff's motion to strike is DENIED.2
Plaintiff Linda Madsen (“Madsen” or “plaintiff”) served as the elected Secretary–Treasurer of Local No. 24 (“the Local” or “defendant”) of the American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada (“the International”). (Doc. No. 2 at 11.) At this early stage in the proceedings, Madsen's date of election as Secretary–Treasurer is unknown; however, record evidence shows that she served in this capacity as far back as October 26, 1999. (Id. at 19.) Madsen vacated the office on February 7, 2011. (Id. at 11.)
Madsen claims that the bylaws and standing resolutions of the Local set her salary at $27,469.92 annually, with vacation, holiday and sick leave benefits, as well as contributions to the Local's pension plan. (Id. at 12.) Per a resolution adopted by the Local's executive board, Madsen earned sixteen vacation days each year, which could (Id. at 21.) An April 6, 2006 audit of fiscal year 2005 determined that Madsen had accumulated $7,660.06 in vacation days neither taken by Madsen nor paid by the Local. (Id. at 24.) The Local accepted this audit on June 4, 2006. (Id. at 22.)
When Madsen vacated the Secretary–Treasurer position, she alleges that the Local owed her $13,734.96 in unpaid salary and $5,018.66 in accrued but unpaid vacation days. (Id. at 13.) She sued the Local in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, seeking $18,753.62, plus interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees. (Id. at 17.) She asserts five claims against the Local: (1) breach of contract in writing, (2) breach of implied contract, (3) promissory estoppel, (4) unjust enrichment, and (5) failure to remit wages in violation of Ohio Rev.Code § 4113.15. The Local removed the case to this Court, claiming that Madsen's claims are preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) because they involve interpretation of labor contracts—the International's constitution and the Local's bylaws. Madsen seeks remand to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, asserting that the LMRA does not apply to the contracts in dispute because her claims arise out of the Local's bylaws and standing resolutions.
A defendant may remove to federal court only state court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). As a court of limited jurisdiction, a federal district court must proceed cautiously in determining that it has subject matter jurisdiction. Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir.1996). The court must give “due regard” to the power reserved to the states under the United States Constitution to provide for the determination of controversies in the state courts. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941). Accordingly, removal statutes must be construed strictly to promote comity and preserve jurisdictional boundaries between state and federal courts. Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir.1994). “[A]ll doubts as to the propriety of removal are resolved in favor of remand.” Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir.1999). The defendant seeking removal bears the burden of proving the court's jurisdiction. See Rogers v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 871 (6th Cir.2000).
The parties agree that diversity is incomplete, and therefore cannot provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. The Court has jurisdiction over this case, if at all, if it presents a federal question, i.e., if it “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The well-pleaded complaint rule governs federal question cases, extending jurisdiction “over only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law, in that federal law is a necessary element of one of the well pleaded ... claims[.]” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiff is the master of her claim, and may avoid federal jurisdiction by relying exclusively on state law. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 12, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425 ). “In particular, the existence of a federal defense normally does not create statutory ‘arising under’ jurisdiction, and a defendant may not [generally] remove a case to federal court unless the plaintiff's complaint establishes that the cases arises under federal law[.]” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration and emphasis in original); see also Tisdale v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of U.S. & Canada, Local 704, 25 F.3d 1308, 1313 (6th Cir.1994) ().
Notwithstanding a plaintiff's well-pleaded state law complaint, a defendant may remove a case to federal court “when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-emption.” Beneficial, 539 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058. “When the federal statute completely pre-empts the state law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.” Id. In areas of complete preemption, the court must “look beyond the face of plaintiff's allegations and the labels used to describe her claims and ... evaluate the substance of plaintiff's claims.” Paul v. Kaiser Found. Plan of Ohio, 701 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir.2012) (emphasis in original). Yet, “ ‘complete preemption’ no matter how powerful when properly present in a case—is of very limited application: it is a very limited exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 553 (6th Cir.2005). It applies only when plaintiff “has chosen to plead what ... must be regarded as a federal claim,” though it masquerades as a state claim. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. 2425.
Section 301 of the LMRA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185, governs claims involving federal labor law and “both preempts certain state-law contract claims and also confers federal jurisdiction over those claims[.]”Paul, 701 F.3d at 519 (quoting Kitzmann v. Local 619–M Graphic Commc'ns Conference of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 Fed.Appx. 714, 717 (6th Cir.2011) ). First, § 301 confers federal jurisdiction and establishes venue over “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... or between any such labor organizations[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Second, its powerful preemptive force “displace[s] entirely any state cause of action for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization[,]” or between such labor organizations, even if “state law would provide a cause of action in [its] absence[.]” Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal.,
463 U.S. 1, 23, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). Displacing state law results in federal uniformity, allowing parties to labor contracts to formulate contract provisions certain that the same terms in every labor contract shall carry the same meaning. Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962).
To determine whether § 301 preempts Madsen's state law claims, the Court must first decide which, if any, of the parties' contracts invoke the Court's jurisdiction. In short, does this case involve “contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... or between any such labor organizations,” such that § 301 applies? If so, the Court must then decide whether plaintiff's particular claims are preempted by § 301.
The parties agree that no “contracts between an employer and a labor organization” are relevant to this dispute. Instead, defendant identifies two contracts between labor organizations: the International's constitution and the Local's bylaws. Plaintiff agrees that the International's constitution is a contract between labor organizations, correctly contends that the Local's bylaws...
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...v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994)). 2. See also Madsen v. Am. Fed'n of Musicians of the U.S. & Canada, AFL-CIO/CLC, Local 24, 13 F. Supp. 3d 820, 825 (N.D. Ohio 2014) ("'Local bylaws are not contracts between labor organizations' and do not confer federal juri......