Maenak v. Agricultural Lands Condemnation Approval Bd.

• Decision Date: 21 September 1987
• Citation: 528 A.2d 295,107 Pa.Cmwlth. 334
• Parties: Carl M. MAENAK and Sarah S. Maenak, h/w, Petitioners, v. AGRICULTURAL LANDS CONDEMNATION APPROVAL BOARD and Wallace Township Municipal Authority, Respondents. WALLACE TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. Carl L. MAENAK and Sarah S. Maenak, h/w, Respondents. 1257 C.D. 1986 1406 C.D. 1986
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 295

528 A.2d 295

107 Pa.Cmwlth. 334

Carl M. MAENAK and Sarah S. Maenak, h/w, Petitioners, v. AGRICULTURAL LANDS CONDEMNATION APPROVAL BOARD and Wallace

Township Municipal Authority, Respondents.

WALLACE TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. Carl L. MAENAK and Sarah S. Maenak, h/w, Respondents.

1257 C.D. 1986

1406 C.D. 1986

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Dec. 9, 1986.

Decided July 10, 1987.

Reargument Denied Sept. 21, 1987.

Richard L. Cantor, Lentz, Cantor, Kilgore & Massey, Ltd., Paoli, and Albert P. Massey, Jr., for Maenak.

William H. Lamb, Nancy C.M. Balliet, Lamb, Windle & McErlane, P.C., West Chester, for Wallace Tp. Mun. Authority.

Gerald T. Osburn, Asst. Counsel, Dept. of Agriculture, Harrisburg, and John B. Hannum, Jr., for respondent.

Before CRAIG and DOYLE, JJ., and BLATT, Senior Judge.

OPINION

BLATT, Senior Judge.

Carl L. Maenak and his wife, Sarah S. Maenak (the Maenaks) and the Wallace Township Municipal Authority (Authority) have filed separate petitions for review ¹ from the order of the Agricultural Lands Condemnation Approval Board (Board). We have consolidated these petitions for review by a prior order and will address and dispose of the issues raised therein in this opinion.

The relevant factual background of this matter is essentially undisputed by the parties. The Maenaks own approximately fifty-two acres of land (the property) in the village of Glenmoore, Wallace Township, Chester County against which the Authority instituted condemnation proceedings. The Authority proposes to use the property for a spray irrigation waste disposal project (project). ² After the Authority had obtained a writ of possession for the property, the Maenaks filed preliminary objections nunc pro tunc in the common pleas court, contending that the Authority had failed to seek approval of the Board pursuant to Section 306 of The Administrative Code of 1929 (Code). ³ The Authority then agreed to request a Board hearing, which was subsequently requested and held.

The Board, at the hearing, with all of the parties in attendance, received testimony and argument from the parties, and thereafter issued the following order:

"AND NOW, this 1st day of April, 1986, the Board having received a request on February 10, 1986 from the Wallace Township Municipal Authority pursuant to 71 Pa. Statutes § 106 asking that the Board determine that there is no reasonable and prudent alternative to the utilization of approximately fifty-two (52) acres of land for a proposed waste water spray irrigation project, and

Further, a hearing on this matter was held before the Board on March 14, 1986, and

Further, the Board met in open session on April 1, 1986 to decide this matter and the result was that three members determined that there was a feasible and prudent alternative to the condemnation and three members determined that there was not a feasible and prudent alternative to the condemnation, and

Therefore, since this Board is unable to act in this matter, it is hereby Ordered that Wallace Township Municipal Authority may proceed to condemn land owned by Carl and Sally Maenak.

For the Agricultural Lands Approval Board.

(S) Kirk Wilson,

Chairman"

On review, the Maenaks contend that the Board, in allowing the condemnation to proceed, erroneously interpreted the legal effect of its evenly-divided vote. They argue that the correct interpretation of this vote is to prohibit further implementation of the project.

The Authority and the Board, of course, argue to the contrary. They claim that the evenly-divided vote prevented the Board from being able "to act" within the meaning of Section 306(c).

There is no definition of the term "to act" within Section 306, so we must construe this phrase according to its common and approved usage. Section 1903(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (S.C.A.), 1 Pa. C.S. § 1903(a); Conference of Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board Lodges v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 71 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 316, 454 A.2d 686 (1983).

Webster's Third New International Dictionary 20 (1966) pertinently defines the verb "act" as meaning "to move to action"; "to carry out into action" and "to give a decision or award (as by vote of a deliberative body or by judicial decree)." Using these definitions, we believe that, inasmuch as the Board, in response to the Authority's request, scheduled and held a hearing at which it received testimony and legal argument after which it conducted a vote among its members, the Board must be said to have acted in this matter. We believe that the Authority and the Board construed the term too narrowly and that such an interpretation, if allowed to stand, would produce a result which is absurd or unreasonable, a result which we must presume the legislature did not intend. Section 1922(1) of the S.C.A., 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1); Unionville-Chadds Ford School District v. Rotteveel, 87 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 334, 487 A.2d 109 (1985). Moreover, the appellate courts of the Commonwealth have clearly held that an evenly-divided administrative vote has the effect of denying the action requested of it, which here would be a determination as to whether or not there was a feasible and prudent alternative to the condemnation of the property. Giant Food Stores, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Whitehall Township, 93 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 437, 501 A.2d 353 (1985); Pennsylvania Publications, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 152 Pa. Superior Ct. 279, 32 A.2d 40 (1943), rev'd on other grounds, 349 Pa. 184, 36 A.2d 777 (1944). We must conclude, therefore, that the Board erred in interpreting its evenly-divided vote as an inability to act and as permission for the condemnation to proceed.

This does not end our inquiry, however. The Authority, under its petition for review at No. 1406 C.D. 1986, contends that the Board was without jurisdiction to consider this case because the Board made no finding that the property had been classified as agricultural land by the Agricultural Soil Conservation Service of the United States Department of Agriculture. The Authority also argues that the Board lacked jurisdiction because most of the property will continue to be used in agriculture as part of the project and because Section 306 was not intended to apply to such circumstances.

In regard to the Authority's first contention, we find ourselves in agreement with the argument of the Maenaks that the Authority, the party which requested the Board to exercise its review, is considered to have thereby agreed to the existence of jurisdictional facts and is, thereafter, precluded from disputing such facts at a later stage of the proceedings to the prejudice of the other party. See Dock v. Cauldwell, 19 Pa. Superior Ct. 51 (1902); see also Montgomery v. Kennedy, 651 S.W.2d 814 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 669 S.W.2d 309 (1984). We believe, therefore, that, having submitted this request for a ruling to the Board, the Authority necessarily admitted to the existence of the requisite jurisdictional fact, i.e., the agricultural lands classification. ⁴

The remaining jurisdictional point...