Maffet v. Quine

• Decision Date: 08 July 1899
• Parties: MAFFET v. QUINE.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Oregon

95 F. 199

MAFFET v. QUINE.

United States Circuit Court, D. Oregon.

July 8, 1899

BELLINGER District Judge.

In this suit the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendant from tearing down and destroying a certain flume, constructed and in operation prior to the commission by the defendant of the acts complained of, across the premises of the defendant, and used in connection with certain water rights and with the carrying on of the lumber business owned and carried on by the plaintiff and her lessees. The case was heard upon all questions involved, and thereafter the court dismissed the complaint for want to jurisdiction, upon the ground that it did not appear from the evidence that the amount in controversy was of a value exceeding $2,000. Upon petition for a rehearing this order was set aside, the court being of the opinion that the order of dismissal was erroneous, and that the court was not without jurisdiction; and thereupon and upon consideration of the other questions involved, a decree was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, as prayed for perpetually enjoining the defendant from the commission of the acts complained of. The defendant files his petition asking for a rehearing. Upon this petition the defendant seeks a re-examination of the question of jurisdiction, and renews his contention that the complainant failed to introduce testimony tending to prove the present value of the flume, or the matters in controversy, and asks that an opportunity be given to the defendant to present to the court the state of the testimony and of the authorities upon this issue. The petition for a rehearing makes the further point that the defendant was denied leave by the court, upon the hearing of the motion for a preliminary injunction, to amend his answer so as to admit proof that the land in question was within the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company at the time plaintiff's grantors entered upon the same and constructed their flume, and the further point that the act of forfeiture of the railroad grant provides that the qualified homesteaders upon the land at the date of the forfeiture for six months thereafter should have the exclusive right to enter the land under the homestead laws; the contention as to this being, that by this provision the homestead right of Quine, the defendant, attached prior in law to the time of the location theretofore made, and while the land was still covered by the grant. The rehearing is further asked upon the ground that the counsel for the defendant understood that this case would not be decided upon the merits without further hearing, but would be decided simply upon the question of jurisdiction; and he therefore pleads surprise, and asks that the case be reopened for further arguments as to the other questions, at least decided by the court.

The question of jurisdiction in this case has been fully considered, and there is nothing in the authorities cited in this petition that affects the conclusion reached on that question. I am satisfied that it is enough to sustain the jurisdiction that the complaint shows the amount in controversy to exceed in value the sum of $2,000, and that the contrary of this does not appear to a legal certainty from the evidence. In Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S 558, 6 Sup.Ct. 501, it is held that the court is not at liberty to dismiss a suit upon his personal conviction that the amount involved is less than that required to give jurisdiction, unless the facts on which the persuasion is based are such as to create a legal certainty of the conclusion based on them. In this case there was no personal conviction of the court, from the evidence in the case, that the amount in controversy was less than the jurisdictional amount. The action of the court was based solely upon the fact that the evidence failed to establish the allegation of the complaint as to the value of the subject-matter of the suit. The answer admitted the value, up to the amount of $2,000; and there was testimony tending to show that the property in controversy, together with other property, had been sold previously for the sum of $8,000. There is therefore no inference in this case that the amount stated in the declaration was merely colorable. The suit is to restrain the commission of a tort, and is therefore one where exemplary damages might be allowed; so that, in any view of it, it is not a case where a rule of law fixes the limit of a possible recovery. The same doctrine is laid down in the case of Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 18 Sup.Ct. 293. For the defendant, the cases of Oleson v. Railroad Co., 44 F. 2, and Cameron v. U.S., 146 U.S. 535, 13 Sup.Ct. 184, are cited. Neither of these cases has any...