Magann v. Long's Baggage Transfer Co.

• Decision Date: 05 July 1941
• Docket Number: No. 43.,43.
• Citation: 39 F. Supp. 742
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
• Parties: MAGANN v. LONG'S BAGGAGE TRANSFER CO., Inc.

39 F. Supp. 742

MAGANN v. LONG'S BAGGAGE TRANSFER CO., Inc.

No. 43.

District Court, W. D. Virginia, at Lynchburg.

July 5, 1941.

Edmunds, Whitehead, Baldwin & Graves, of Lynchburg, Va., for plaintiff.

D. H. Kizer & Sons, of Lynchburg, Va., for defendant.

BARKSDALE, District Judge.

This is a civil action brought by an employee against his employer for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, and liquidated damages, the cause of action being grounded upon the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.

Section 16 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 216, provides for the recovery by an employee of an employer of unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, and liquidated damages, in any court of competent jurisdiction, together with a reasonable attorney's fee and costs.

The plaintiff here seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages pursuant to Section 6 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 206, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:

"§ 206. Minimum wages; effective date

"(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the following rates —

"(1) during the first year from the effective date of this section, not less than 25 cents an hour,

"(2) during the next six years from such date, not less than 30 cents an hour, * * *."

Plaintiff also seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation under the provisions of Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. A. § 207, the pertinent portion of which is as follows:

"§ 207. Maximum hours

"(a) No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce —

"(1) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the first year from the effective date of this section,

"(2) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the second year from such date, or * * *."

This case having been tried by the court, upon the facts, without a jury, the court, pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, doth hereby find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment, as follows:

Findings of Fact.

Defendant, Long's Baggage Transfer Company, Inc., a Virginia corporation, entered into a contract with the Post Office Department of the United States of America, by which, for an agreed compensation, it undertook to transport by motor vehicle the outgoing United States mails from the Post Office to the railway stations, and to transport incoming mails from the railway stations to the Post Office. These mails, including parcel post, included letters and parcels going to the various states of the Union and foreign countries, and also included such mail matter coming to Lynchburg, Virginia, from various states and foreign countries.

By the terms of the contract, the Post Office Department reserved for itself a considerable degree of supervision of the manner in which defendant should comply with the contract. Defendant, by the terms of the contract, was required to take the mail from, and deliver it into, the Post Office, railway depots and cars, at the points and at the hours directed by the Postmaster of said City, and to furnish the number of trucks that in the opinion of the Postmaster would be sufficient for prompt and proper performance of the service. Defendant agreed not to commit the care and transportation of the mails to any person under eighteen years of age, or any person who had not satisfied the Postmaster that he had good moral character and ability to perform the service, and only to such persons as had taken the oath prescribed by law, who could read and write the English language, and who had passed the required examination and furnished satisfactory references as to his qualifications and fitness. Defendant, by the terms of the contract, was obliged to discharge any driver whenever required by the Postmaster General so to do. And finally, it was provided that, subject to the approval of the Department, the drivers, motor vehicles, and service, should be at all times under the control of the Postmaster and were to be operated under such schedules as the Postmaster might prescribe. Defendant did on one occasion suspend a driver for a good reason called to its attention by the Postmaster.

The plaintiff, Clarence H. Magann, was employed by defendant on or before July 1, 1937, as the driver of one of its mail trucks. He was so employed during the period involved in this action, which is from October 24, 1938 (the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Act), to January 7, 1940, when plaintiff voluntarily terminated his employment.

At or before the date upon which the plaintiff entered upon his employment, he took the oath prescribed for those employed in the care, custody and conveyance of mail. He was provided with, and wore while employed, a uniform cap and badge. During his employment as driver of the mail truck, plaintiff took the mails from the Post Office under the directions of the Post Office personnel. Frequently, and at all times when so requested, he transported postal employees with him on the truck, and at all times obeyed the directions of such postal employees in regard to transportation of the mail, and in cases where he was in doubt, he asked for and obtained the directions and instructions of such postal employees.

With the approval of the Postmaster, defendant employed the plaintiff. The amount of plaintiff's compensation was fixed by the defendant, and his compensation was paid to him by defendant. Plaintiff's hours of labor were fixed by defendant.

During the term of his employment, the plaintiff went to work regularly at 5 o'clock P. M. and quit at 5 o'clock A. M. During this twelve-hour period, the plaintiff ordinarily went home to supper at approximately 8 P. M., and stayed off duty for approximately one hour. However, whether or not he was able to leave his work at 8 P. M., depended on whether or not a train due at 7:40 P. M. was on time. If it was late, plaintiff was delayed in going to his supper. Between 10:20 P. M. and 11:50 P. M., plaintiff had no duty to perform and was free to go where he chose if a certain train due at 10:20 P. M. was on time. If, however, this train was late, the plaintiff was required to remain at the station and await its arrival. The mail truck driver whose duty ordinarily it was to meet this train was required to meet another train which arrived shortly after 10:40 P. M. at another station, and could not wait for the 10:20 train if it was as much as twenty minutes late. The 10:20 train was as much as twenty minutes late more frequently than it was on time.

As the mails on Sunday were of substantially lesser volume than on week days, only one driver was employed on Sundays in the place of two on week days. As a result of this system, the drivers working on Sunday had less time off on that day than they customarily had on week days.

Taking the average of plaintiff's daily free time, as best I may from the evidence, I find as a fact that plaintiff was off duty one hour during each daily working period, so that he worked an average of eleven hours during each day he was on duty.

Plaintiff customarily alternately worked seven days in one week and six days the next week, he being allowed to be off duty on alternate Sundays. Besides his regular Sunday off, plaintiff took other days off with the permission of the defendant. A statement of the days which I find that plaintiff worked in each week during the period in controversy is attached hereto,¹ I find as a fact that during the period in controversy, defendant worked an aggregate of 379 days. Of this aggregate, during the first year of the Fair Labor Standards Act, i. e., October 24, 1938-October 23, 1939, inclusive, plaintiff worked 314 days of eleven hours each, which is an aggregate of 3,454 hours. The minimum hourly rate of 25 cents per hour, fixed by the act, applied to this aggregate of hours, would make a total of $863.50. During that part of the second year of the Fair Labor Standards Act which plaintiff worked for defendant, i. e., October 24, 1939-January 6, 1940, inclusive, plaintiff worked 65 days of eleven hours each, an aggregate of 715 hours. The minimum hourly rate of 30 cents an hour, fixed by the act, applied to this aggregate of hours, makes a total of $214.50. For the period here in controversy, at the minimum hourly rates fixed by the act, the plaintiff's total wages would have been $863.50 plus $214.50, an aggregate of $1,078.

As compensation for his services, the plaintiff was paid by the defendant at the rate of $15 per week. For such days as defendant did not work (excepting the alternate Sundays when he was not required to work), the sum of $2.15 was deducted from the plaintiff's salary for each day he failed to work. I find that for the period here in controversy, plaintiff was paid by the defendant the aggregate sum of $878.40, which is 62 weeks at the rate of $15 per week, less deductions of $2.15 per day for twenty-four days which during the period, defendant was off duty in addition to alternate Sundays which he was allowed.

Conclusions of Law.

Upon my findings of fact as above stated, my conclusions of law are:

(1) That the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., is constitutional. The question of the constitutionality of the act was raised by defendant's brief, but not seriously urged, and it would seem that the constitutionality of the act has now been put beyond question by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. ___, 132 A.L.R. 1430, and Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., &c. v. Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, 312 U. S. 126, 61 S.Ct. 524, 85 L.Ed. ___.

(2) That...