Magee v. BSN Sports LLC
| Docket Number | 3:21-cv-01726-G-BT |
| Decision Date | 26 August 2022 |
| Parties | STEVEN MAGEE, Plaintiff, v. BSN SPORTS, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Steven Magee filed this pro se lawsuit in federal court asserting a litany of claims related to the alleged misuse of trademarks he claims to own. See generally Compl. (ECF Nos. 3, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4). Defendant BSN Sports, LLC, filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for a More Definite Statement (ECF No 39), Defendants Hooplife Basketball Academy, LLC, (HLBA) Todd Denton, Taylor Rogers, Damon Francis, and Monty Patel (collectively, the HLBA Defendants) filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 41), and Defendant Nike, Inc., filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for a More Definite Statement (ECF No. 42). For the reasons stated, the Court should GRANT the HLBA Defendants' Motion and dismiss all Magee's claims against those Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and GRANT in part and DENY in part the other Motions to Dismiss. Specifically, the Court should DISMISS Magee's claims based on federal statutes with no private right of action and should ORDER Magee to provide a more definite statement of his remaining claims.
In his prolix, nearly 300-page Complaint, Magee claims to be the owner of eight registered trademarks, each involving use of the term “Hooplife.” Compl. 2 (ECF No. 3). Under these trademarks, Magee allegedly markets and sells apparel, other athletic goods, and basketball training services. Id. at 102-06. Magee alleges that four of these trademarks are implicated in this case-all of which relate to use of “Hooplife” on apparel, sports equipment, or in connection with sports and entertainment services. Id. at 2-3. According to Magee, Defendants HLBA, Todd Denton, BSN, and Nike “have partnered to market the unauthorized and infringing use of the ‘Hooplife' brand name in violation of the Plaintiff's trademark rights.” Id. at 19.
Magee contends that HLBA is a business based out of Arkansas, organized to offer “select travel basketball team[s]” that participate in tournaments using the name “Hoop Life.” Id. at 4, 49-50. Magee asserts that HLBA and its “affiliates, employees, [or] authorized personnel . . . agreed to partner with BSN to create [an online] ‘Sideline Store' to produce and sell infringing ‘Hooplife Apparel.'” Id. at 6970. These affiliates, employees, or authorized personnel include all of the individual Defendants-Todd Denton, Michael McGhee, Taylor Rogers, Damon Francis, and Monty Patel. Id. Because Nike apparel emblazoned with the name “Hoop Life” can be purchased through the online Sideline Store, Magee opines that BSN, HLBA, the individual Defendants (all of whom allegedly work for HLBA in some capacity), and Nike have conspired together to infringe on Magee's related trademarks. Id. at 69-73. Magee claims that this infringement has resulted in his “family, friends, associates, [and] players” being confused “as to the [Defendants'] unauthorized use of the ‘Hooplife' brand name.” Id. at 106. Magee posits that, collectively, Defendants “have made and will make substantial profits and gains” by infringing on his trademarks. Id. at 109-10. Magee thus seeks damages “believed to be in excess of $2,352,000” and injunctive relief prohibiting the further infringement of his trademarks. Id. at 110-11, 285-86.
In response to Magee's Complaint, BSN filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternate, Motion for More Definite Statement, the HLBA defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, and Nike filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for a More Definite Statement. Every moving Defendant argues that Magee has failed to state any claim, and the HLBA Defendants contend that this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over them. Magee has filed lengthy responses to each Motion, wherein he alleges a litany of new facts.[1] Each of the Motions is fully briefed and ripe for review.
“When a nonresident defendant presents a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that in personam jurisdiction exists.” Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985); D.J. Invs., Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff need not, however, establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence; prima facie evidence of personal jurisdiction is sufficient. Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1982). The court may resolve a jurisdictional issue by reviewing pleadings, affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, exhibits, any part of the record, and any combination thereof. Stuart, 772 F.2d at 1192. Allegations in the plaintiff's complaint are taken as true except to the extent that they are contradicted by the defendant's affidavits. Wyatt, 686 F.2d at 282 n.13 (citing Black v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 683 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977)). Any genuine, material conflicts between the facts established by the parties' affidavits and other evidence are resolved in favor of the plaintiff for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case exists. Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990).
Additionally, when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may not look beyond the pleadings. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, therefore, a plaintiff's complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “To be plausible, the complaint's ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
This pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,'” but it does demand more than an unadorned accusation devoid of factual support. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Where the facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has stopped short of showing that the plaintiff is plausibly entitled to relief. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
As a threshold matter, The HLBA Defendants argue this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over them. See Pervasive Software Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 231 (5th Cir. 2012) () citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the Court first considers the matter of personal jurisdiction, before turning to BSN's and Nike's arguments that Magee has failed to state a claim.
I. The District Court should dismiss Magee's claims against the HLBA Defendants because Magee has not shown that they are at home in Texas or that they have the requisite minimum contacts for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over them.
The HLBA Defendants argue that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over them because they are not domiciled in Texas and because they only have a few incidental contacts with Texas. HLBA Defs.' Mot. 28-29 (ECF No. 41). Magee, meanwhile, argues that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the HLBA Defendants because their travel teams participate in tournaments held in Texas, they have business relationships with Texas companies, and they train one basketball player who is domiciled in Texarkana. Magee's HLBA Resp. 56-60 (ECF No. 54).
In a federal question case, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause fixes the limits of the Court's personal jurisdiction. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). Due process is satisfied when a court finds that a defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” See Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant gains the requisite minimum contacts by conduct that gives rise to either general or specific jurisdiction. Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 867-68 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
General jurisdiction exists over a person in the state where she is domiciled and over a corporation in a place where it “is fairly regarded as at home,” usually the state of incorporation and the state in which the...
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