Magee v. Trs. of the Hamline Univ.

Decision Date29 March 2013
Docket NumberCivil No. 11–949 (JRT/AJB).
Citation957 F.Supp.2d 1047
PartiesRobin MAGEE, Plaintiff, v. TRUSTEES OF THE HAMLINE UNIVERSITY, MINNESOTA; Donald Lewis, in his individual capacity; David Titus, in his individual capacity; and John Does, 1–5, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Albert T. Goins, Sr., Goins Law Offices, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, and Damon L. Ward, Ward Law Group, Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiff.

Maurice G. Jenkins, Jackson Lewis LLP, Southfield, MN, V. John Ella, Jackson Lewis LLP, Minneapolis, MN, Sara Gullickson McGrane and Grant T. Collins, Felhaber Larson Fenlon & Vogt, PA, Minneapolis, MN, for defendants Trustees of the Hamline University, Minnesota and Donald Lewis.

David L.D. Faith and Michelle S. Grant, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for defendant David Titus.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

JOHN R. TUNHEIM, District Judge.

This action arises out of the termination of Plaintiff Robin Magee's employment by the Hamline University School of Law. The matter came before United States Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan on Magee's motion to amend her complaint. Additionally, Defendant David Titus and Defendants Trustees of the Hamline University (Hamline) and Donald Lewis (collectively, the Hamline Defendants) filed motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. In a October 15, 2012 Order and Report and Recommendation (“R & R”), the Magistrate Judge granted Magee's motion to amend her complaint in part, allowing her to add new factual allegations, but denied Magee's motion to the extent it sought amendment to add a new defendant and new claims because such amendments would be futile. The Magistrate Judge also recommended that the Court grant Defendants' motions to dismiss Magee's federal claims and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Magee's remaining state law claims. Before the Court are Magee's and Lewis's objections to the October 15, 2012 Order and R & R. For the reasons explained below, the Court will affirm the Magistrate Judge's order, and adopt the R & R in its entirety.

BACKGROUND1
I. MAGEE'S TERMINATION

Plaintiff Robin Magee was a tenured law professor at Hamline University School of Law. (Compl. ¶ 1, Apr. 15, 2011, Docket No. 1.) Magee taught classes on policing, covering topics such as police misconduct and race issues in the criminal justice system. ( Id. ¶¶ 8–9.)

In 2007, Magee wrote a letter to the editor of the St. Paul Pioneer Press criticizing a Ramsey County court's decision not to investigate allegations of racism related to the jury in a high-profile case involving the alleged killing of a St. Paul police officer. ( Id. ¶ 10.) Magee's letter was published in the Pioneer Press. ( Id.) Defendant David Titus, a police officer with the City of St. Paul wrote a response to Magee's letter that was published on the St. Paul Police Federation (“SPPF”) 2 website. ( Id. ¶ 11.) In his response, Titus questioned Magee's “fitness to teach” and stated “I hope Professor Magee confines her race baiting and cop-hating to her newspaper submissions and keeps it out of the classroom.” ( Id.) Titus then contacted Hamline, allegedly with the intent to have Magee fired in retaliation for her critical editorial. ( Id. ¶ 12.)

After the publication of Titus' response, Defendant Donald Lewis became Dean of the Hamline University School of Law. ( Id. ¶ 13.) Lewis allegedly began working together with Titus and other St. Paul police officers to terminate Magee. ( Id.)

In 2009, Magee was charged with multiple counts of state tax law violations, and was suspended from her teaching position at Hamline. (Compl. ¶ 14; Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 47, May 14, 2012, Docket No. 36.) After she was convicted of misdemeanor tax law violations in February 2011, Hamline initiated termination proceedings against Magee. (Compl. ¶¶ 16–17.) Magee contends that this termination was a concerted effort between Lewis and St. Paul police, and ultimately effected “to please police and to prevent her from teaching about police misconduct, and otherwise to restrain her speech, and as retaliation for past speech criticizing government.” ( Id. ¶¶ 17–18.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 15, 2011, Magee filed a complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the Hamline Defendants and Titus. ( Id. ¶¶ 19–24.) Magee alleges that Defendants retaliated against her because she had “exercised her right to free speech, to criticize government,” and violated her First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of her grievances. ( Id. ¶ 21.) Magee also brings claims for intentional interference with contract against Lewis, and a claim for breach of contract against Hamline. ( Id. ¶¶ 25–31.)

On April 20, 2012, Titus and the Hamline Defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Def. Titus' Mot. to Dismiss, Apr. 20, 2012, Docket No. 20; Hamline Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Apr. 20, 2012, Docket No. 24.)

On May 11, 2012, Magee filed a motion requesting leave to amend her complaint. (Mot. to Amend, May 11, 2012, Docket No. 32.) On May 14, 2012, Magee filed a copy of her proposed amended complaint. (Ex., May 14, 2012, Docket No. 36.) Magee's proposed amended complaint adds almost one hundred new factual allegations. ( Id.) The proposed amended complaint also adds the St. Paul Police Federation (“SPPF”) as a defendant, and alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as intentional interference with an employment contract against the SPPF. ( Id. ¶¶ 124–32.) Additionally, the proposed amended complaint asserts new causes of action against the existing defendants, including intentional interference with an employment contract against Titus ( id. ¶¶ 131–32), and promissory estoppel, breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing, and defamation against Hamline, ( id. ¶¶ 133–52).

ANALYSIS

I. MOTIONS TO DISMISS

A. Standard of Review

Upon the filing of a report and recommendation by a magistrate judge, a party may “serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); accordD. Minn. LR 72.2(b). “The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3).

Here, the Magistrate Judge issued a recommendation applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In reviewing a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court considers all facts alleged in the complaint as true to determine if the complaint states a ‘claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ See, e.g., Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility[,] and therefore must be dismissed. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Court accepts the complaint's factual allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action....’ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).3

B. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 imposes liability for certain actions taken ‘under color of ‘law that deprive a person ‘of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.’ '' Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d 940, 947 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 931, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)). Therefore, in order [t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). The Hamline Defendants and Titus both bring motions to dismiss Magee's claims for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that they are not actors under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

1. Section 1983 claim against Titus

[A] public employee acts under color of law when he [e]xercise[s] power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’ Johnson v. Phillips, 664 F.3d 232, 239–40 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting West, 487 U.S. at 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250). “It is firmly established that a defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law when he abuses the position given to him by the State. Thus, generally, a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Roe v. Humke, 128 F.3d 1213, 1215 (8th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant is acting under color of state law if he “acts or purports to act in the performance of official duties, even if he oversteps his authority and misuses power.” Johnson, 664 F.3d at 240. But [a]cts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded” from the scope of § 1983 liability. Dossett, 399 F.3d at 949 (8th Cir.2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945)).

To determine whether an official is acting under color of law, the Court “look[...

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