Magee v. US Postal Service

• Decision Date: 31 July 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3:94-1412.
• Citation: 903 F. Supp. 1022
• Parties: Lionel Wayne MAGEE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

903 F. Supp. 1022

Lionel Wayne MAGEE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 3:94-1412.

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Monroe Division.

July 31, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kenneth W. Campbell, Malcolm W. Pipes, Ruston, LA, for Lionel Wayne Magee.

Lionel Wayne Magee, Downsville, LA, pro se.

John A. Broadwell, John Robert Halliburton, Howard Brown, Sr. Attorney, Thomas Blum, Attorney, U.S. Postal Service, Memphis, TN, U.S. Attorney's Office, Shreveport, LA, for U.S. Postal Service, Marvin Runyon, Carleigh Leake.

John Robert Halliburton, U.S. Attorney's Office, Shreveport, LA, for Mike Smith, Donald G. Vercher.

MEMORANDUM RULING AND JUDGMENT

MELANÇON, District Judge.

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment to affirm a previous decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board filed by the defendants and cross-motions for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the Privacy Act. For the reasons that follow, the motion for summary judgment to affirm the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board filed by defendants is denied for want of jurisdiction, the motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiff is denied, and the motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act and Privacy Act claims filed by defendants is granted in its entirety.

The Factual Background

Plaintiff Lionel Wayne Magee is a former employee of the United States Postal Service. Following a "fitness for duty" examination that found plaintiff was unable to perform the essential functions of his job as a mailhandler the Postal Service terminated him.

Plaintiff appealed the action of the Postal Service to the Merit Systems Protection Board. The MSPB affirmed the action of the Postal Service in discharging plaintiff. Plaintiff then brought suit in federal district court under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, alleging that he was discriminated against because of a mental disability, and under the Privacy Act, claiming that certain personal records were improperly used and disclosed by the Postal Service.

The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment to affirm the ruling of the MSPB and a separate motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs Rehabilitation and Privacy Act claims. Plaintiff has also filed a motion for summary judgment on his Rehabilitation and Privacy Act claims. All motions have been opposed with the exception of defendants' motion for summary judgment to affirm the decision of the MSPB.

Summary Judgments

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56. Once the movant produces such evidence, the burden shifts to the respondent to direct the attention of the court to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The responding party may not rest upon mere allegations made in the pleadings as a means of establishing a genuine issue worthy of trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If no issue of fact is presented and if the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court is required to render the judgment prayed for. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; FRCP 56(c).

Before it can find that there are no genuine issues of material facts, the court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could have found for the non-moving party. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir.1990). Further, when a party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of proof at trial, as in this case, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence were uncontroverted at trial. International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264 (5th Cir. 1991).

The Decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board

Plaintiff sought review of the propriety of his discharge before the Merit Systems Protection Board. The MSPB eventually affirmed the action of the Postal Service in discharging plaintiff.¹ Plaintiff did not take an administrative appeal of the MSPB's ruling and, as a result, it became a final administrative decision. Defendants moved for summary judgment affirming the decision of the MSPB; plaintiff did not file an opposition to defendants' motion.

Defendants submit that this is a "mixed" case, "one in which the Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a decision rendered by the MSPB and also alleges that he has been the victim of some type of proscribed discrimination." Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Affirming Decision of MSPB, p. 4. A review of plaintiff's complaint, however, leads this Court to find otherwise, to find that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to address the MSPB decision, and to further find that if this Court does enjoy subject matter jurisdiction, that defendants lack standing to seek judgment sua sponte affirming the MSPB decision.

Judicial review of decisions of the MSPB is controlled by 5 U.S.C.A. § 7703 (West 1980 & Supp.1995). § 7703(a)(1) gives "any employee or applicant for employment adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board" the right to obtain judicial review of the order or decision. Plaintiff originally filed this action pro se. His one-page original complaint does not mention any adverse administrative action by the MSPB but it does challenge the propriety of plaintiff's discharge. It could be argued under the liberal reading a Court is required to give a pro se complaint that review of the MSPB decision would be a proper response to this complaint.

However, plaintiff subsequently retained counsel on his behalf. His attorney was allowed to file what is styled as a "First Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief." The required jurisdictional statement contained in the amended complaint states that

This is an action to recover damages under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a. Jurisdiction is vested in this Court by 29 U.S.C. 794a, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16, 28 U.S.C. 1331, 28 U.S.C. 1339, 28 U.S.C. 1343, 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)(1), and 39 U.S.C. 401.

This amended complaint entirely superseded and took the place of the original complaint. Clark v. Tarrant County, Texas, 798 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir.1986) (in which amended complaint "was a wholly self-contained instrument setting out all of plaintiffs' claims"). Nowhere in the amended complaint does plaintiff request review of the MSPB decision. Without such a request this Court does not have the necessary jurisdiction to enter judgment on the MSPB decision.

Further, § 7703(d) gives the Director of the Office of Personnel Management a right to appeal but limits his or her venue to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Nowhere does § 7703 give either an agency of the United States or the United States Postal Service the right to seek review of an MSPB decision. Absent such a grant, and in light of plaintiff's decision to not seek judicial review of the MSPB decision, the defendants simply do not have standing to seek judgment affirming the MSPB decision.

The Rehabilitation Act Claim

The parties have each filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of the defendants' liability under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 (West 1985 & Supp.1995), et seq. In addition, both sides have filed a response to the opposing motion. After careful consideration of the arguments made and, more importantly, the evidence offered in support of the motions and in response, this Court finds that plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proof, that no issues of material fact exist as to plaintiff's claim, and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities in programs that receive federal financial assistance and by agencies of the federal government, including the United States Postal Service.

To recover under the Act, plaintiff must prove that

(1) he is an "individual with a disability";

(2) he is "otherwise qualified" to perform the job at issue;

(3) he worked for the United States Postal Service; and

(4) he was adversely treated solely as a result of his disability.²

It is undisputed that plaintiff worked for the United States Postal Service. Plaintiff has further submitted, and the defendants do not contest, that he suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and hypertension which render him an "individual with a disability" as contemplated by the Rehabilitation Act.³ See Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontested Facts in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Nos. 3 & 4; Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 6; Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1. Assuming for purposes of these motions that plaintiff is in fact an individual with a disability under the Act, this Court must then determine if the evidence submitted properly establishes plaintiff's status as a "qualified individual with a disability" under the Act.

A "qualified individual with a disability" is an individual with a disability who, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position in question without endangering the health and safety of the individual or others" and who meets the experience and education requirements of the position. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1995).⁴ The reasonableness of an accommodation is...