Magelssen v. Local Union No. 518

• Decision Date: 01 September 1964
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 14108-4.
• Citation: 233 F. Supp. 459
• Parties: Nils M. MAGELSSEN, Plaintiff, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 518, OPERATIVE PLASTERERS' AND CEMENT MASONS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

233 F. Supp. 459

Nils M. MAGELSSEN, Plaintiff, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 518, OPERATIVE PLASTERERS' AND CEMENT MASONS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 14108-4.

United States District Court W. D. Missouri, W. D.

September 1, 1964.

Swanson, Midgley, Jones, Blackmar & Eager, by Donald H. Loudon, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.

McCullough, Parker, Wareheim & LaBunker, by M. John Carpenter, Topeka, Kan., Ben E. Pener, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.

BECKER, District Judge.

In this civil action the plaintiff seeks relief under the Landrum-Griffin Act for wrongful expulsion from the defendant Union. This memorandum rules on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the sole issue of wrongful expulsion. The material facts involved in this issue are not in dispute.

Plaintiff relies on Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (5), which reads as follows:

"Safeguards against improper disciplinary action. — No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such a member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing."

It is conceded by the defendant Union that the only written notice given to plaintiff was a letter, the text of which reads as follows:

"This is to notify you that you are to appear before the Executive Board of Local No. 518 *** for violation of Section 97 of the International Constitution."

The question to be decided by this Court is whether the letter constitutes "written specific charges" as required by item (A) of Section 411(a) (5).

The defendant contends that the deposition of plaintiff taken in this cause shows that plaintiff had actual knowledge of the nature of the specific charges. The statute requires written specific charges as a guaranty of fairness in the expulsion process. If the Union does not comply with the statute, the expulsion order is void. An ex post facto showing of knowledge by oral testimony cannot cure the lack of written statutory notice.

In Rosen v. District Council No. 9 of New York, etc., (S.D.N.Y.) 198 F. Supp. 46, cited by the defendant in support of his contention, the sufficiency of the original charges was not even discussed because the accused member obtained a written bill of particulars a reasonable time prior to the hearing at which he was expelled. The defendant argues that the plaintiff through his own efforts could have obtained charges sufficiently specific to withstand judicial review. Under the statute it is not the duty of an accused member to secure a written notice of the specific charges; it is the duty of the union to give such notice in the accusation under Section 411(a) (5) (A).

If an accused member, on his own initiative, secures a bill of particulars, as in the Rosen case, and thereby becomes fully informed as to the nature and extent of the charges a reasonable time prior to the hearing, the statute is satisfied, even though the original notice was defective or lacking.

The question in this case is whether the letter set out above is sufficient statutory notice. It is concluded as a matter of law that the requirement of "specific charges" is not satisfied by reference in the notice to a section of a union constitution without any statement of the factual basis of the charge. No technical formalities should be imposed on those, often laymen, who must comply with Section 411(a) (5...