Maggio v. Sipple, No. 99-12884

• Decision Date: 17 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-12884
• Citation: 211 F.3d 1346
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2000) Janet MAGGIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cathy SIPPLE, individually; Yolanda Dennis, individually; et al., Defendants- Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1346

211 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000)

Janet MAGGIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cathy SIPPLE, individually; Yolanda Dennis, individually; et al., Defendants- Appellants.

No. 99-12884.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

May 17, 2000.

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.(No. 98-02473-CIV-T-17B), Elizabeth A. Kovachevich, Chief Judge.

Before EDMONDSON and HULL, Circuit Judges, and WOOD^*, Senior Circuit Judge.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellee Janet Maggio ("Maggio") brought this action against her employer, the State Department of Labor and Employment Security ("DLES"), and against Defendants-Appellants Cathy Sipple, Yolanda Dennis, Joyce McKenzie, Isabell Davis, Jerry Singletary, and Renee Benton, in their individual capacities. Maggio asserted a § 1983 claim against only the individual Defendants-Appellants and disability discrimination claims against only DLES under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act.

This interlocutory appeal concerns solely Maggio's § 1983 claim, which alleges that the individual Defendants retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The individual Defendants appeal the district court's denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds. See Maggio v. Florida Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 56 F.Supp.2d 1370 (M.D.Fla.1999). After review, we conclude that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Maggio's § 1983 claim and reverse.

I. THE COMPLAINT

Maggio was a Customer Service Specialist employed by DLES from April 15, 1985, until her resignation on May 15, 1998. The six individual Defendants were also DLES employees. Defendant Cathy Sipple was Maggio's immediate supervisor during the relevant time period. The other Defendants held these positions: Yolanda Dennis was a Personnel Technician; Joyce McKenzie was a Human Service Program Specialist; Isabell Davis was a Program Administrator; Jerry Singletary was the Tampa Jobs and Benefits Manager; and Renee Benton was the Regional Administrator.

Maggio's complaint states that she is legally blind. Her vision is not better than 20/300 in her right eye and is worse in her left eye. The complaint alleges that DLES, through its employees, discriminated against Maggio because of her disabilities and failed to provide her reasonable accommodations in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Maggio alleges that DLES, through its employees, failed, inter alia, to provide special computer equipment to allow her to have full-line text in 36-point font, to train Maggio regarding computers, to provide "pink lights," and to make various other accommodations.

In addition to her several disability discrimination claims, Maggio also brought a § 1983 claim alleging that the six individual Defendants retaliated against her after she testified on behalf of Johnnye Davis ("Davis") at Davis's grievance hearings. Davis was Maggio's supervisor at DLES prior to Cathy Sipple. Davis was charged with insubordination and filed a grievance. Davis's grievance was upheld, and her insubordination charge was overturned. DLES later terminated Davis's employment. Davis appealed that decision. Maggio again testified on Davis's behalf in the administrative appeal process. The termination was overturned, and Davis was reinstated in a management position, although in a different section.

According to the complaint, Maggio's testimony at Davis's hearings "did not involve matters of Janet Maggio's personal interest, but were [sic] matters of public concern in that they related to the fair and honest implementation of the DLES's personnel policies and the rights to redress complaints through appeal procedures established by the DLES." Complaint, ¶ 21. Maggio alleges that the individual Defendants retaliated against her by "causing, allowing, or ratifying the denial of, delay in providing, and failure to provide reasonable accommodations" for Maggio's disability. Complaint, ¶ 32. Additionally, Maggio asserts that the individual Defendants retaliated against her for her protected speech by "causing, allowing, or ratifying ... the creation of [a] discriminatory, humiliating, intimidating, abusive, hostile, working environment that substantially altered the working conditions under which [she] worked when compared with the terms and conditions experienced by other employees similarly situated." Complaint, ¶ 32.

The district court denied the individual Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Maggio's § 1983 claim based on qualified immunity. Defendants timely appealed.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The denial of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss is an appealable interlocutory order. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817-18, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). We review de novo the denial of qualified immunity. See Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir.1994); Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d 1531, 1536 (11th Cir.1990). The determination of whether a complaint sufficiently alleges a constitutional violation is also a matter of law reviewed de novo. See GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir.1998). In reviewing the complaint, we accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id.; Williams v. Alabama State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir.1997).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Qualified Immunity

"Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil trials (and the other burdens of litigation, including discovery) and from liability if their conduct violates no 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)).¹ The individual Defendants are undisputedly government officials. Thus, to determine whether these Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, we conduct a two-step inquiry. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738; Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir.1998). First, we consider whether " 'the defendant government official [has proved] that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the alleged wrongful act occurred.' " Gonzalez v. Lee County Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting Evans v. Hightower, 117 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir.1997)). If so, then we examine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that "the defendant violated clearly established law." Gonzalez, 161 F.3d at 1295; Harbert Int'l, 157 F.3d at 1281; see also Rowe v. Schreiber, 139 F.3d 1381, 1383 (11th Cir.1998).

Maggio does not dispute that the individual Defendants were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred.² Thus, we consider only whether Maggio has demonstrated that the individual Defendants violated clearly-established law. See Gonzalez, 161 F.3d at 1295.

B. Constitutional Violation Required

The Supreme Court has held that a "necessary concomitant" to the question of whether a plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly-established federal right is "the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all." Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991); GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (11th Cir.1998); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir.1996). "If a plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a violation of any constitutional right, it is axiomatic that the plaintiff likewise has failed to allege the violation of a 'clearly established' right." GJR Invs., Inc., 132 F.3d at 1367; see also Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787, 793 (7th Cir.1993) ("Courts are not required to examine the clearly established law at the time of the offense if the plaintiff's allegations do not assert a violation of constitutional rights." (citing Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232, 111 S.Ct. at 1793)). Maggio alleges that the individual Defendants retaliated against her in violation of her First Amendment right to freedom of speech for testimony she gave while employed by DLES. Thus, we examine whether Maggio's complaint sufficiently alleges a violation of her First Amendment right to freedom of speech.

Maggio does not dispute that, as a government employee, she does not enjoy an absolute right to freedom of speech. See Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir.1989) ("Although the law is well-established that the state may not demote or discharge a public employee in retaliation for speech protected under the first amendment, a public employee's right to freedom of speech is not absolute." (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987))). Instead, Maggio's speech is constitutionally protected only if it satisfies both elements of the test set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), and refined in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (the "Pickering-Connick test"): (1) as a threshold matter, the speech must be "fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern," Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. at 1690; and (2) her First Amendment interests in commenting on matters of public concern must outweigh the government's interests, " 'as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.' " Connick, 461 U.S. at 142, 103 S.Ct. at 1687 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at 1734). See also...