Magic Fingers, Inc. v. Robins

• Citation: 206 A.2d 601,86 N.J.Super. 236
• Decision Date: 18 January 1965
• Docket Number: No. C--1285,C--1285
• Parties: MAGIC FINGERS, INC., Plaintiff, v. William C. ROBINS, Jerry F. Girardi and Services International, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, Defendants.
• Court: Superior Court of New Jersey

Page 236

86 N.J.Super. 236

206 A.2d 601

MAGIC FINGERS, INC., Plaintiff, v. William C. ROBINS, Jerry F. Girardi and Services

International, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, Defendants.

No. C--1285.

Superior Court of New Jersey

Chancery Division.

Jan. 18, 1965.

Pitney, Hardin & Kipp, Newark, for plaintiff (Clyde A. Szuch and Harold J. Wallum, Newark, appearing).

Toolan, Haney & Romond, Perth Amboy, for defendants (John E. Toolan, Perth Amboy, appearing).

HERBERT, J.S.C.

Plaintiff seeks an interlocutory injunction. The individual defendants, Robins and Girardi, are plaintiff's former employees. The corporate defendant is their present employer. The only bases for relief asserted in the complaint are contracts signed by Robins and Girardi while employed by plaintiff. The following language is found in each of these papers:

'* * * for a period of three year after the termination of your employment with the Company for any cause, you will not directly or indirectly engage in any business which shall be in competition with the business of the Company, and you consent that the Company may, regardless of remedies available at law or for damages obtain an injunction in any court having jurisdiction in the matter restraining you from such conduct.'

Plaintiff manufactures and sells a motordriven device which can be attached to a bed and operated to make the spring and mattress vibrate. The corporate defendant is in the same business. Plaintiff conducts its business from a location on Route 17 in Bergen County. The corporate defendant has its headquarters in Newark. Defendant Robins was, prior to some time in October 1964, plaintiff's national sales director for hotel sales. Defendant Girardi, prior to November 9, 1964, occupied a similar position with plaintiff for sales to motels. Both Robins and Girardi left plaintiff and went with the corporate defendant and are still working for it.

The language quoted above is the pertinent portion of the alleged contracts of Robins and Girardi upon which plaintiff relies. Although a time limit of three years is stated, no definition of a geographical area can be found in either document. Plaintiff can argue, however, that prohibiting other employment in 'competition' with plaintiff has the same effect as a geographical limit; that enforcement of a post-employment covenant which specifies an area depends upon the existence of competition in the area, and that here plaintiff seeks to enjoin only what is clearly direct competition.

Defendants contend that the form of covenant relied upon is unenforceable under Hudson Foam Latex Products, Inc. v. Aiken, 82 N.J.Super. 508, 198 A.2d 136 (App.Div.1964). In that case a motion for summary judgment was granted on the ground that the covenant relied upon by Hudson Foam was unreasonably broad and, therefore, unenforceable. Aiken had signed a covenant that for a period of a year after leaving Hudson Foam he would not work as an employee of any business 'similar to that of' Hudson Foam. Thus, Aiken's covenant differed from those of Robins and Girardi because it made no mention of competition.

Many cases have dealt with post-employment covenants not to compete. From them it is clear that the courts have attributed much strength to the social policy that every man should be free to earn his own living and have also recognized that an employee who is asked to sign a covenant may not have the full freedom to bargain about its terms that exists in other business situations. In other words, contracts of this type--if they are to be enforced--must pass a stricter test than many other types of contracts; it is not enough to say that the parties signed a document in good faith and are, therefore, bound to respect all of its terms. In the Hudson Foam case the court said:

'* * * The balance is struck thusly: if the contractual prohibition is...