Maglietti v. Nicholson

• Decision Date: 29 September 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3-05-cv-1819 (JCH).
• Citation: 517 F.Supp.2d 624
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Renata P. MAGLIETTI, Plaintiff, v. R. James NICHOLSON, Secretary, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Defendant.

517 F.Supp.2d 624

Renata P. MAGLIETTI, Plaintiff, v. R. James NICHOLSON, Secretary, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3-05-cv-1819 (JCH).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

September 29, 2007.

Stephen P. Fogerty, Halloran & Sage, Westport, CT, for Plaintiff.

William M. Brown, Jr., U.S. Attorney's Office, New Haven, CT, for Defendant.

RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 38), and DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT (Doc. No. 53)

JANET C. HALL, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Renata Maglietti, brings this complaint against the defendant, R. James Nicholson, Secretary of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (hereinafter "the government"), alleging employment discrimination under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, violation of her rights under the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, and violation of her rights under the Federal Personnel Practices laws. See Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 51). This action stems from the employment transfer of Maglietti from the Veterans Affairs ("VA") facility in Newington, Connecticut, to the one located in West Haven, Connecticut. Id. The government moves for summary judgment on all of Maglietti's claims.¹

I. FACTS²

Maglietti works as a Medical Technologist, Grade 9, Step 10, for the VA Healthcare System, where she has been employed since October 21, 1974. See Def.'s Loc.R.Civ.P. 56(a)(1) Statement ("Def.'s Stat.") at ¶ 1 (Doc. No. 38). On June 8, 2004, Maglietti was involved in a verbal altercation with her coworker, Eduardo Marchi-Rivera. Id. at ¶ 4. On June 16, 2004, Maglietti was reassigned from the Patient Care Services Department at the VA facility in Newington, to the Patient Care Services Department at the VA facility in West Haven. Id. at ¶ 2; Pl.'s L.Rule. Civ.P. 56(A)(2) Statement ("Pl.'s Stat.") at ¶ 4 (Doc. No. 56). The decision to transfer Maglietti was made by Dr. Gary Stack, Chief of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine. Id. at 4. Dr. Stack did not speak to Maglietti before making the decision to transfer her, and there was no investigation into the altercation, though the site manager did speak to Marchi-Rivera. Pl.'s Stat. at ¶ 2-3.

On June 18, 2004, Maglietti filed an informal grievance with her employer concerning this reassignment. Id. at ¶ 5. On July 6, 2004, Maglietti received notice that Dr. Stack had upheld his decision to reassign her. Id. at ¶ 6. On July 7, 2004, Maglietti filed a formal grievance. Id. at ¶ 8. She received the decision upholding her reassignment on July 21, 2004, from the Director of the VA Connecticut Healthcare System. Id. at 9. That decision was rescinded by the Director on July 30, 2004, but reinstated on August 16, 2004, following a fact-finding summary issued, on August 13, 2004, by the business manager of the VA facility in West Haven suggesting that the transfer be upheld. Id. at ¶ 10-3. The decision on her formal grievance was again rescinded on August 7, 2004, and then reinstated on September 10, 2004. Id. at ¶ 14-5. Maglietti's grade did not change with the transfer, and her salary increased from $55,896 to $56,570 as a result of the change in geographic location. Id. at ¶ 2.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); White v. ABCO Engineering Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir.2000). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and present such evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor in order to defeat the motion. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.2000).

In assessing the record, the trial court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Graham, 230 F.3d at 38. "This remedy that precludes a trial is properly granted only when no rational finder of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party." Carlton, 202 F.3d at 134. "When reasonable persons, applying the proper legal standards, could differ in their responses to the question" raised on the basis of the evidence presented, the question must be left to the jury. Sologub v. City of New York, 202 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir.2000).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 38)

1. Plaintiff's Title VII Claim

The analysis of whether the VA subjected Maglietti to disparate treatment based on her gender proceeds under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 356 (2d Cir. 2001). The plaintiff is first required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). A prima facie case for disparate treatment is established by showing that 1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; 2) the plaintiff performed her job adequately; 3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) that the adverse employment action occurred under conditions giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089. Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See id. Upon the employer's articulation of a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, the presumption of discrimination that arises with the establishment of the prima facie case drops out. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to fulfill her ultimate burden of proving that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her in the employment action. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105, (2000). In order to satisfy this burden, a plaintiff may attempt to prove that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by a defendant was not the employer's true reason, but was a pretext for discrimination. Id.

A prima facie case combined with a showing that an employer's asserted justification is false is sometimes, but not always, sufficient to permit a discrimination claim to survive summary judgment. Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 89-91 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097). The court must "examin[e] the entire record to determine whether the plaintiff could satisfy his `ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.'" Schnabel, 232 F.3d at 90 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105). The plaintiff need not show that gender was the only factor motivating any adverse employment action she suffered in order to make a showing of employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). "The `ultimate issue' in an employment discrimination case is whether the plaintiff has met her burden of proving that the adverse employment decision was motivated at least in part by an `impermissible reason,' i.e., a discriminatory reason," regardless of whether the case is presented as one of single or dual motive. Stratton v. Dep't for the Aging for New York, 132 F.3d 869, 878 (2d Cir.1997).

In a Title VII discrimination claim, an employment action is considered "adverse" if the employee suffers a "materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment." Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir.2006)(internal quotation omitted). An adverse employment action is "more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities." Id. Prototypical examples of adverse employment actions include termination, demotion via a reduced wage, salary, or job title, a material loss of benefits, or significantly reduced responsibilities. Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir.2006) (citation omitted).

The government argues that Maglietti cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act because she did not suffer an adverse employment action. Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. Judg. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp.), Attach. 1 at 12 (Doc. No. 38). The court disagrees. Maglietti has demonstrated that her transfer from the Newington to the West Haven facility resulted in an approximately two-hour increase in her commute each day. Aff. of Renata P. Maglietti, ¶ 21, Pl.'s Loc. Rule 56(A)2 Stat., Ex. A (Doc. No. 56). While an increased commute does not constitute an adverse employment action per se, the Second Circuit has held that a change resulting in a "much more taxing commute" may constitute a adverse employment action. Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 145 (2d Cir.2003). Furthermore, Maglietti has shown a change in her job duties since the transfer that a reasonable trier of fact could consider "significantly reduced responsibilities." Pl.'s 56(a)(2) Stat. at ¶ 36 (Doc. No. 56)(specifically she has "lost her position on the Vision Committee which evaluates new instruments," and no longer does work in the chemistry section, preventative maintenance calibrations, or laboratory testing).

The government then argues that Maglietti cannot establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination because she has supplied insufficient evidence to...