Magnano Co v. Hamilton

Decision Date02 April 1934
Docket NumberNo. 589,589
Citation292 U.S. 40,78 L.Ed. 1109,54 S.Ct. 599
PartiesA. MAGNANO CO. v. HAMILTON, Atty. Gen., et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Washington.

Mr. Otto B. Rupp, of Seattle, Wash., and Mr. J. Craig Peacock, of Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Messrs. E. P. Donnelly and Philip D. Macbride, both of Seattle, Wash., for appellees.

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant assails as invalid a statute of the state of Washington which levies an excise tax of 15 cents per pound on all butter substitutes sold within the state (Laws Wash. 1931, p. 77). Every distributor of such butter substitutes is required to file a duly acknowledged certificate with the Director of Agriculture, containing the name under which the distributor is transacting business within the state, and other specified information. Sale of any butter substitute is forbidden until such certificate is furnished. The distributor must render to the Director of Agriculture, on the 15th day of each month, a sworn statement of the number of pounds of butter substitutes sold during the preceding calendar month. Section 10 of the act provides that the tax shall not be imposed on butter substitutes when sold for exportation to any other state, territory, or nation; and any payment or the doing of any act which would constitute an unlawful burden upon the sale or distribution of butter substitutes in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is by section 13 excluded from the operation of the act. Violation of any provision of the act is denounced as a gross misdemeanor.

Appellant is a Washington corporation, and has for many years been engaged in importing and selling 'Nucoa,' a form of oleomargarine. Prior to the passage of the act, it had derived a large annual net profit from sales made within the state. Since then, claiming the tax to be prohibitive, it has made no intrastate sales and no effort to do so. 'Nucoa' is a nutritious and pure article of food, with a well-established place in the dietary.

Suit was brought to enjoin the enforcement of the act, on the ground that it violates the Federal Constitution in the following particulars: (1) That the imposition of the tax has the effect of depriving complainant of its property without due process of law and of denying to it the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) that the tax is not levied for a public purpose, but for the sole purpose of burdening or prohibiting the manufacture, importation, and sale of oleomargarine, in aid of the dairy industry; (3) that the act imposes an unjust and discriminatory burden upon interstate commerce; and (4) that it interferes with the power of Congress to levy and collect taxes, imposts, and excises, in violation of article 1, § 8.

The case came before a statutory court of three judges, under section 266 of the Judicial Code, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 380 (28 USCA § 380), first upon an application for an interlocutory injunction, which was denied (D.C.) 2 F.Supp. 414, and subse- quently for final hearing, at the conclusion of which that court made written findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by Equity Rule 70 1/2 (28 USCA § 723), and entered a final decree dismissing the bill. (D.C.) 2 F.Supp. 417.

First. We put aside at once all of the foregoing contentions, except the one relating to due process of law, as being plainly without merit. (1) In respect of the equal protection clause it is obvious that the differences between butter and oleomargarine are sufficient to justify their separate classification for purposes of taxation. (2) That the tax is for a public purpose is equally clear, since that requirement has regard to the use which is to be made of the revenue derived from the tax, and not to any ulterior motive or purpose which may have influenced the Legislature in passing the act. And a tax designed to be expended for a public purpose does not cease to be one levied for that purpose because it has the effect of imposing a burden upon one class of business enterprises in such a way as to benefit another class. (3) The act, considered as a whole, clearly negatives the idea that a burden is imposed upon interstate commerce, as the court below held. The tax is confined to sales within the state, and (sections 10 and 13, supra) has no application to sales of oleomargarine to be either imported or exported in interstate commerce. (4) The contention that the act interferes with the taxing power of the United States seems to be based upon the supposition that the state tax is so great that it will put an end to the sale of oleomargarine within the state of Washington, and thereby destroy a potential subject of federal taxation. Assuming such a consequence and putting other questions aside, the effect of it upon appellant would be so remote, speculative, and indirect as to afford appellant no basis for invoking the powers of a court of equity. Compare Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078; Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17, 18, 47 S.Ct. 265, 71 L.Ed. 511.

Second. Except in rare and special instances,1 the due process of law clause contained in the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493. And no reason exists for applying a different rule against a state in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment. French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 329, 21 S.Ct. 625, 45 L.Ed. 879; Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 326, 52 S.Ct. 358, 76 L.Ed. 772. That clause is applicable to a taxing statute such as the one here assailed only if the act be so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as, for example, the confiscation of property. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 423, 4 L.Ed. 579; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37 et seq., 42 S.Ct. 449, 66 L.Ed. 817, 21 A.L.R. 1432; McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 60, 24 S.Ct. 769, 49 L.Ed. 78, 1 Ann.Cas. 561; Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., supra, 240 U.S. 24, 25, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493, L.R.A. 1917D, 414, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U.S. 592, 614, 615, 19 S.Ct. 553, 43 L.Ed. 823; Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542, 47 S.Ct. 710, 71 L.Ed. 1184, 52 A.L.R. 1081. Collateral purposes or motives of a Legislature in levying a tax of a kind within the reach of its lawful power are matters beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. McCray v. United States, supra, 195 U.S. 56—59, 24 S.Ct. 769, 49 L.Ed. 78, 1 Ann.Cas. 561. Nor may a tax within the lawful power of a state be judicially stricken down under the due process clause simply because its enforcement may or will result in restricting or even destroying particular occupations or businesses (Citizens' Sav. & Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 663, 664, 22 L.Ed. 455; McCray v. United States, supra, 195 U.S. 56—58, 24 S.Ct. 769, 49 L.Ed. 78, 1 Ann.Cas. 561, and authorities cited; Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44, 48, 49, 41 S.Ct. 219, 65 L.Ed. 489; Child Labor Tax Case, supra, 259 U.S. 38, 40—43, 42 S.Ct. 449, 66 L.Ed. 817, 21 A.L.R. 1432), unless, indeed, as already indicated, its neces- sary interpretation and effect be such as plainly to demonstrate that the form of taxation was adopted as a mere disguise, under which...

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