Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Norvell
| Decision Date | 22 January 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 34671,34671 |
| Citation | 240 P.2d 80,205 Okla. 645 |
| Parties | , 1952 OK 20 MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM CO. v. NORVELL et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where a petition alleges permanent damage to an eighty acre tract of land owned by the plaintiffs caused by the unnecessary use of such lands by lessee in the drilling of six oil wells, under an oil and gas lease from plaintiffs, held: There is but one cause of action stated.
2. This court will review a verdict founded on conflicting evidence only for the purpose of determining whether it is supported by competent evidence, and not for the purpose of determining the weight of the evidence. Evidence reasonably tending to prove the essential facts in a case, either directly or indirectly, or by permissible inferences, is sufficient to sustain a verdict and judgment based thereon.
Walace Hawkins, Dallas, Tex. and Wendell J. Doggett, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
Roff & Roberts and W. M. Haulsee, all of Wewoka, for defendants in error.
The defendant, Magnolia Petroleum Company, appeals from a verdict and judgment against it in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $1,000.00, for damage to surface rights in connection with the development of an oil and gas lease. The damages claimed arise from the development of a single oil and gas lease covering an eighty acre tract. Five wells were drilled on the tract within a period of a few months and the pits of an earlier well were changed during this same period. One of the plaintiffs in the present action was one of the original lessors and the other plaintiffs are heirs of the other lessor. The plaintiffs divided their petition into six different divisions, each applying to a single well and each separate division was denominated a cause of action, resulting in six alleged causes of action.
Although timely request was made by the defendant for separate verdicts on each of these separately stated causes of action, the trial court refused to require separate verdicts and received and rendered judgment on a general verdict in the amount of $1,000.00, on all the alleged casuses of action. This action of the trial court is assigned as error and it is urged the case should be remanded for a new trial and separate verdicts required. This objection is answered by a consideration of whether the petition states more than one cause of action regardless of how divided or denominated by the plaintiff.
The alleged damage is to a single tract of land all covered by one oil and gas lease. The action is between the parties to the lease. The development of the tract was carried on as a continuous operation and practically all of the alleged damage is the result of the construction of the system of roads to these locations.
In 1 Am.Jur., Actions, Sec. 97, the author observes:
Considering the splitting of causes of action the Territorial Court in Hesser v. Johnson, 13 Okl. 747, 76 P. 181, held that where a tort was committed by the taking at one time of several chattels it gives but one cause of action. In Kansas City M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Shutt, 24 Okl. 96, 104 P. 51, this court held the wrongful burning of a barn gave rise to but one cause of action where the barn was insured and part of the loss paid by the insurance company.
The distinction, where two or more noncontiguous tracts of land are involved, was pointed out in Akin v. Bonfils, 67 Okl. 123, 169 P. 899, and it was held the injury to each was a separate cause. In the case at bar the extension of the same act of injury in the building of the road is the cause. The drilling of separate wells was not the injury giving rise to the cause of action. The defendant had the right to drill the wells. It was held in Stone v. Case, 34 Okl. 5, 124 P. 960, 965, 43 L.R.A.,N.S 1168, that, "A 'cause of action' is generally held to be a union of the right of the plaintiff and its infringement by the defendant." Also in the same case, we said: 'The wrong, per se, the act of infringement, if it be a wrong for which a remedy is afforded, constitutes the cause of action.'
In the case of Franklin Drilling Co. v. Jackson, 202 Okl. 687, 217 P.2d 816, 19 A.L.R.2d 1015, although there was apparently no issue raised as to the form of pleading, various items of damage were considered as such under one cause of action. In Atlantic Refining Co. v. Pack, 198 Okl. 447, 180 P.2d 840, we held the damage to noncontiguous tracts to be separate causes of action and the damage to one tract resulting from the separate pollution of two streams were held to be two causes of action. In Davon Oil Co. v. Steele, 186 Okl. 380, 98 P.2d 618, where damages to the tract being developed consisted of injury from the drilling operations, as well as flooding from adjacent wells operated by the lessee, we held, that the petition contained more than one cause of action and that consequently there should be separate verdicts. In Poole v. Janovy, 131 Okl....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
City of Tahlequah v. Lake Region Elec.
...(7th ed. 1999). 24. A "cause of action" is generally a union of the plaintiff's right with the defendant's infringement. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Norvell, 1952 OK 20, ¶ 6, 240 P.2d 80, 81-82. Koffler & Reppy, supra note 3 at 25. Watkins v. Board of Com'rs, 1918 OK 445, 70 Okla. 305, 174 P.......
-
Harper-Turner Oil Co. v. Bridge
...Refining Co. v. Spivey, Okl., 285 P.2d 228; H. F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 187 Okl. 382, 101 P.2d 1050; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Norvell, Okl., 240 P.2d 80. Furthermore, the burden is upon the defendant to prove that plaintiffs' action is barred by the Statute of Limitations. Pepp......
-
Stephens v. Draper
...We have heretofore decided the question. In the cases of Davon Oil Co. v. Steele, 186 Okl. 380, 98 P.2d 618; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Norvell, 205 Okl. 645, 240 P.2d 80, and Bunch v. Perkins, 198 Okl. 517, 180 P.2d 664, we held that where a cause consisting of two or more separate causes o......
-
Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Brown, 42405
...or temporary, rather than whether the cause of the damage is permanent or temporary.' In this connection also see Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Norvell, 205 Okl. 645, 240 P.2d 80. Defendants' second proposition for reversal is stated as Proposition II. 'The verdict and judgment herein are not s......
-
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING MULTIPLE SURFACE USE ISSUES
...in approach to the issue of what quantum of proof is required to raise a fact question to be decided by the jury. [97] 1952 OK 201, 240 P.2d 80, 1 O.&G.R. 114. [98] Norvell, 240 P.2d at 646. [99] 155 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1941, writ ref'd). [100] Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W......
-
CHAPTER 1 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING MULTIPLE SURFACE USE ISSUES
...in approach to the issue of what quantum of proof is required to raise a fact question to be decided by the jury. [96] .1952 OK 201, 240 P.2d 80, 1 O.&G.R. 114. [97] .Norvell, 240 P.2d at 646. [98] .155 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1941). [99] .Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Wood, 240 ......
-
CHAPTER 1 REGULATION OF SURFACE USE BY MINERAL DEVELOPERS
...of the reasonable needs of the lessee. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Wood, 403 S.W.2d 54 (Ark. 1966); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Norvell, 240 P.2d 80 (Okla. 1952); —excessive use of surface for performance of seismographic operations. United Geophysical Corp. v. Culver, 394 P.2d 393 (Alaska ......