Magnuson v. Idaho State Tax Commission

Decision Date01 December 1976
Docket NumberNo. 12055,12055
Citation97 Idaho 917,556 P.2d 1197
PartiesHarry F. MAGNUSON and Colleen B. Magnuson, his wife, Plaintiff-Respondents, v. IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Dean W. Kaplan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Wayne L. Kidwell, Atty, Gen., Boise, for defendant-appellant.

E. L. Miller, of Miller & Knudson, Coeur d'Alene, Woolvin Patten, of LeSourd, Patten, Fleming & Hartung, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff-respondents.

PER CURIAM:

The State Tax Commission appeals from an order granting summary judgment to taxpayers Harry F. and Colleen B. Magnuson and reversing the Commission's determination of the taxpayers' income tax deficiency for the years 1966 and 1967. The district court ruled that the Commission's action, which was initiated more than three years after the taxpayers' returns were filed, was barred by the statute of limitations on income tax assessments in I.C. § 63-3068(a). 1 The Tax Commission argues that this limitations period was extended under I.C. § 63-3068(c) 2 and its regulations adopted for the enforcement of those provisions.

We hold that the statute of limitations was extended under I.C. § 63-3068(c) and that the deficiency assessments by the Tax Commission were not barred. The summary judgment entered by the district court is reversed.

I.C. § 63-3068(a) imposes a three year limitations period on the assessment of income taxes by the State Tax Commission, from the date of filing of the tax return. However, if the taxpayer's '. . . taxable income . . . has been adjusted by federal internal revenue action or by voluntary action on the part of the taxpayer, and no corresponding adjustment has been reported by the taxpayer to the state of Idaho, . . .' the Tax Commission may be entitled to a one year extension of the limitations period under the terms of I.C. § 63-3068(c). While this subsection is not a model of draftsmanship, it is clear that the legislature intended 3 to create a one year extension of the limitations period to enable the Tax Commission to correlate its actions with that of the Internal Revenue Service.

Generally, I.C. § 63-3068(c) applies '(w)hen taxable income for any year has been adjusted by federal internal revenue action or by voluntary action on the part of the taxpayer, . . .' If subsection (c) is applicable, the one year extension period 'shall be one (1) year from the delivery by the taxpayer to the state tax commission of notice' of a final redetermination of federal tax liability. This notice refers to the obligation imposed on the taxpayer in I.C. § 63-3069 4 to immediately report to the State Tax Commission all final federal tax determinations. It is undisputed that the taxpayers here did comply with this provision and reported Internal Revenue Service adjustments in their federal returns to the State Tax Commission. The difficulty arises in attempting to determine what is meant by that portion of I.C. § 63-3068(c) which reads '. . . and no corresponding adjustment has been reported by the taxpayer to the state of Idaho. . . .' The district court ruled that this phrase referred to the obligatory notice of federal final determinations in I.C. § 63-3069 and therefore, the one year extension provision would not be available unless the taxpayer had failed to give such notice. However, this interpretation would render subsection (c) both a nullity and an absurdity, because if it were interpreted in this way the one year extension would never be available because under such an interpretation the one year limitations would run from the date of the taxpayer's report of a final determination to the state, but only if the taxpayer failed to report the final determination to the state-two obviously inconsistent conditions.

We reject that interpretation of the statute. We must attempt to construe this provision consistent with the primary rules of statutory instruction-that all sections of the applicable statutes should be considered and construed together to determine the intent of the legislature, Janss Corp. v. Borad of Equalization of Blaine County, 93 Idaho 928, 478 P.2d 878 (1970); and that it is incumbent upon a court to give the statute an interpretation that will not in effect nullify it. Filer Mutual Telephone Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 76 Idaho 256, 281 P.2d 478 (1955).

As we have noted, the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the extension of the limitations period in I.C. § 63-3068(c) was to enable the state to correlate its actions with that of the Internal Revenue Service when the taxpayer's taxable income for federal income tax purposes has been redetermined by the Internal Revenue Service. This federal readjustment, as recited in subsection (c), is done either by Internal Revenue Service action or by voluntary action by the taxpayer. We read 'voluntary action on the part of the taxpayer' as referring to situations when the taxpayer has voluntarily filed an amended federal return, and we agree with the Tax Commission that 'and no corresponding adjustment has been reported by the taxpayer to the state of Idaho' refers to the filing of a corresponding amended return by the taxpayer with the State Tax Commission. Thus, read as a whole, I.C. § 63-3068(c) will operate to extend the statute of limitations on assessments by the state when the taxpayer's taxable income has been readjusted for federal income...

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17 cases
  • American Smelting and Refining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • March 12, 1979
    ...The effect of this reasoning would nullify the statutory provision, a result we must avoid if possible. Magnuson v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 97 Idaho 917, 556 P.2d 1197 (1976). However, these provisions are not necessarily inconsistent. They have different objectives and they can be read......
  • Cowles Pub. Co. v. Magistrate Court of the First Judicial Dist. of State, County of Kootenai
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • October 23, 1990
    ...its potency unless such course is absolutely necessary. Maguire v. Yanke, 99 Idaho 829, 590 P.2d 85 (1978); Magnuson v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 97 Idaho 917, 556 P.2d 1197 (1976). We are of the opinion that the right of public access to preliminary hearing can co-exist with the mandate of I......
  • Umphrey v. Sprinkel
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • October 12, 1983
    ...all sections of applicable statutes must be construed together so as to determine the legislature's intent. Magnuson v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 97 Idaho 917, 556 P.2d 1197 (1976). We hold, therefore, that an action for fraud or deceit is covered by the statute of limitations for fraud, I.C.......
  • Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • February 2, 1994
    ...and consider all sections of applicable statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature. Magnuson v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 97 Idaho 917, 920, 556 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1976). It is incumbent upon the court to give the statute an interpretation that will not deprive it of its poten......
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