Magraw v. Donovan
Decision Date | 26 October 1959 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 2981. |
Parties | Daniel B. MAGRAW, John O. Erickson, Ruth H. O'Dell, Arthur R. Swan, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph L. DONOVAN, Secretary of State of the State of Minnesota, Walter H. Borgen, Auditor of St. Louis County, Minnesota, Robert F. Fitzsimmons, Auditor of Hennepin County, Minnesota, Eugene A. Monick, Auditor of Ramsey County, Minnesota, Frances L. Underleak, Auditor of Olmstead County, Minnesota, individually as Auditors of their respective counties and representatives of all County Auditors of the State of Minnesota, Defendants, and County of Houston, County of Grant, County of Otter Tail, and Dolores Hauge, Auditor of County of Houston, G. J. Lynne, Auditor of County of Grant, and S. B. Johnson, Auditor of County of Otter Tail, Intervening Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Reginald Ames, Frank S. Farrell and William C. Meier, St. Paul, Minn., for plaintiffs.
Miles Lord, Atty. Gen. of Minnesota, and Harold J. Soderberg, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. of Minnesota, for the State of Minnesota.
L. L. Roerkohl, County Atty., Houston County, Caledonia, Minn., for intervenors.
This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 41 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., for an order permitting plaintiffs to dismiss the action without prejudice to any of the parties.
Plaintiffs, who are residents of the more populous areas of the state of Minnesota, in this action seek a determination that their representation, and the representation of other residents similarly situated, in the Minnesota Legislature under the 1913 Minnesota Legislative Redistricting Act, is so inadequate and unequal as to deprive them of their rights under the United States Constitution, particularly under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and plaintiffs have asked for a determination that the 1913 Redistricting Act is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs have also asked that the defendants be enjoined from carrying out the election laws of the State under the 1913 Act.
At a hearing before this Court on January 27, 1958, the Counties of Grant, Houston and Otter Tail and their County Auditors were permitted to intervene as additional defendants. The defendants at that time moved for an order dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs opposed the motion to dismiss, and requested a three-judge court to determine the issues on the merits. In a memorandum and order dated March 21, 1958, the defendants' motion to dismiss was denied. Magraw v. Donovan, D.C., 159 F.Supp. 901.
Thereafter, a three-judge court was convened under the authority of 28 U.S. C.A. § 2281. The three-judge court took evidence, received and considered the briefs submitted; and on July 10, 1958, rendered its opinion captioned "Order Deferring Final Decision", the last three paragraphs of which are as follows:
On April 24, 1959, an extra session of the 61st Session of the Minnesota Legislature convened at St. Paul, Minnesota. During said extra session, in response to the mandate of the Minnesota Constitution, the Legislature duly enacted Laws 1959, Extra Session, c. 45, which repealed the 1913 Minnesota Legislative Redistricting Act, c. 91, Minn.Laws 1913; Minn.Stats.1953, § 2.02 et seq., M.S.A. § 2.02 et seq., and provided for a reapportionment of the legislative districts in the state, said act to be effective on January 1, 1962, and to apply to all members of the Legislature elected for any regular session thereof occurring thereafter. The said act was approved on June 15, 1959. On July 1, 1959, said extra session adjourned.
Plaintiffs, in their motion for an order permitting them to dismiss, state that because of the passage of Laws 1959, Extra Session, c. 45, the purposes of plaintiffs herein have been achieved, and that plaintiffs no longer desire to maintain or prosecute this suit. In their memorandum in support of their motion, plaintiffs also urge that because of the 1959 legislation, a decision by this Court would now have no practical effect.
Rule 41(a) (1) gives the plaintiff in any action an absolute right to dismiss without prejudice at any time before defendant has filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment. Rule 41(a) (2) reads as follows:
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